FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 19 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALAA GHASSOUB OBEID, No. 08-72944
Petitioner, Agency No. A095-282-938
v.
MEMORANDUM *
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted March 12, 2012
San Francisco, California
Before: NOONAN, McKEOWN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Alaa Ghassoub Obeid petitions for review of a decision of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (the Board). We hold that the Board erred in its disposition
and remand for proceedings consistent with our decision.
The immigration judge (IJ) denied Obeid’s application for adjustment of
status, finding Obeid inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(I) both as a money
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
launderer and as an “aider and assister” to a money laundering scheme. The Board
affirmed Obeid’s inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(I)(ii) as an aider and
assister to a money laundering scheme. The Board did not address Obeid’s
inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(2)(I)(i) as a money launderer.
We review whether there is substantial evidence in support of the IJ’s factual
determinations, reversing only if no reasonable factfinder could reach the IJ’s
determination. See Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2000). Questions of
law are reviewed by us de novo. Id.
The parties agree that it is Obeid’s burden to prove that he is “clearly and
beyond doubt” admissible and not inadmissible. See Blanco v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d
714, 720 (9th Cir. 2008). The parties dispute whether Obeid is inadmissible as an
aider of money laundering.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(I) states:
Any alien--
(i) who a consular officer or the Attorney General knows, or has
reason to believe, has engaged, is engaging, or seeks to enter the
United States to engage, in an offense which is described in section
1956 or 1957 of Title 18 (relating to laundering of monetary
instruments); or
(ii) who a consular officer or the Attorney General knows is, or has
been, a knowing aider, abettor, assister, conspirator, or colluder with
others in an offense which is described in such section; is
inadmissible.
2
The phrase “knows, or has reason to believe” in § 1182(a)(2)(I)(i) is common in §
1182(a). See § 1182(a)(2)(C); § 1182(a)(2)(H); § 1182(a)(3). As interpreted by the
IJ, the reason to believe standard is analogous to the probable cause standard. See
United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2002); Lopez-Molina v.
Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding conviction not required to
establish reason to believe); Alarcon-Serrano v. INS, 220 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir.
2000).
Section 1182(a)(2)(I)(ii) is unusual in that it is the only instance in § 1182(a)
in which “the Attorney General knows” is not followed by “or has reason to
believe.” The Attorney General’s knowledge is a narrower standard than “reason
to believe.” The parties do not cite dispositive case law establishing what
knowledge is required. Clearly, the Attorney General’s knowledge does not
require a conviction given that earlier parts of § 1182(a) explicitly require
convictions for purposes of inadmissibility. See § 1182(a)(2)(A).
A short answer to the question before us is arguably provided by section
1956(h) of the Laundering of Monetary Instruments Act, which provides:
Any person who conspires to commit any offense defined in
this section or section 1967 shall be subject to the same penalties as
those prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the
object of the conspiracy.
3
As Obeid was originally indicted as a co-conspirator of Sammy in money
laundering, a grand jury had found probable cause to come to this conclusion. The
IJ apparently thought that § 1182(a)(2)(I)(i) was a sufficient basis for his
conclusion.
The Board, however, explicitly rested its decision on subsection (ii) of the
statute that requires knowledge by the Attorney General not merely “reason to
believe.” The Attorney General's knowledge that Obeid had been "a knowing
aider, abetter, assister, conspirator, or colluder" was not documented by the Board.
The Board also failed to clarify the basis for the standard under subsection (ii) and
did not distinguish between this standard under subsection (ii) and the "reason to
believe" standard under subsection (i).
Accordingly, we must remand. It remains open to the Board to affirm the
IJ's reasoning under subsection (i), or to articulate a standard for establishing
knowledge by the Attorney General. We do not substitute our judgment for that of
the Board. INS v. Ventura, 527 U.S. 12 (2002).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
4