delivered the opinion of the Court.
Relator JoAnn Palmer applied to this Court on September 4, 1980, for a writ of supervisory control, seeking review of the District Court’s denial of her motion for intervention. We find that this issue is properly before this Court by writ, but we deny all relief to relator.
Relator and her sister Margaret Simonson are the primary heirs of their deceased mother, Emma Sauter. Prior to Emma’s death, Emma’s conservator, Dwaine Iverson, initiated proceedings against Margaret Simonson and her husband, on behalf of Emma Sauter. He alleged oppression, fraud, and malice in their leasing of farmland from Emma. The Simonsons retained the law firm of Werner & Nelson to defend the action, but Emma died testate prior to further proceedings in the lawsuit.
Emma’s will named Wilbur Werner of the Werner & Nelson law firm as personal representative of her estate. Shortly thereafter, Barney Reagan was substituted as counsel for defendants Simon-sons in the previously-filed lawsuit. JoAnn Palmer then petitioned the court for the appointment of Dwaine Iverson as personal representative of the estate, or in the alternative for his appointment as a special administrator for the purpose of handling the lawsuit against the Simonsons. Palmer alleged that Werner should be disqualified from acting as personal representative because of his conflict of interest in previously representing the defendants. In *187November 1979, the trial court denied the petition, finding that petitioner did not adequately show that Werner was biased and further that Palmer had an adequate remedy against Werner if he failed to prosecute the claim.
Palmer appealed that ruling to this Court. In an opinion dated August 13, 1980, In the Matter of the Estate of Sauter (1980), 189 Mont. 244, 615 P.2d 875, 37 St.Rep. 1425, we determined that Werner should remain as personal representative, but that a special administrator should be appointed by the District Court solely for handling the claim against the Simonsons. The district judge appointed Dwaine Iverson, Palmer’s personal choice.
In February, 1980, while the appeal was pending, Palmer filed a motion to intervene in the lawsuit, alleging that Werner was not effectively pursuing the claim against the Simonsons, and that in order to protect her interest as beneficiary, she should become a party. The district judge denied her motion on June 20, 1980. Palmer filed a notice of appeal from that ruling on July 17, 1980. Prior to the hearing of the appeal, but subsequent to this Court’s ruling of August 13 on the matter of the personal representative, Palmer petitioned this Court for a writ of supervisory control to review the denial of the motion to intervene.
Rule 1, M.R.App.Civ.P., sets out those judgments or orders from which an appeal can be taken. A denial of a motion to intervene is not one of those orders. Thus, the June 20, 1980, ruling by the trial court is not appealable, but we find that it is properly before us on a writ. If we were not to review this decision immediately, and the pending lawsuit went to completion without the joinder of a proper intervenor, the intervenor would be left at the end of the suit without a proper remedy at law. However, we find that Jo Ann Palmer is not a proper intervenor in the suit because her interest is adequately represented by the special administrator, Dwaine Iverson.
Relator petitioned to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2), M.R.Civ.P.:
*188“Intervention of right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: ... (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.”
She argued that the personal representative (then Werner) could not adequately represent her interests in the lawsuit because of his conflict in having had an attorney-client relationship with defendants. She alleged that she was the only person interested in the outcome of this lawsuit, making her the sole person interested in prosecuting it to completion. We find this position to be untenable.
At the outset, we note that throughout this litigation, JoAnn Palmer has argued that Werner as personal representative was an improper person to handle the lawsuit, and that it should be handled instead by Iverson, who filed the suit initially as conservator. Yet at this point in the litigation, she argues that she should intervene because the now-appointed special administrator Iverson cannot adequately represent her interests. It would appear that relator is hardly in a position to argue now against Iverson’s ability to represent her.
Additionally, the prosecution of claims for the benefit of the estate is a task delegated to the personal representative of an estate, section 72-3-613(22), MCA, 33 C.J.S., Executors & Administrators § 100, and an heir does not have the right to pursue the action himself unless the personal representative fails to act on the claim. Holland v. McCarthy (1917), 177 Cal. 507, 171 P. 421. There is certainly no evidence before this Court that Iverson has failed in his duty to prosecute.
At this point, the lawsuit is being brought to protect the interest of the heirs, and Rule 17(a), M.R.Civ.P., demands that all actions be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. But it further provides that “[an] administrator ... may sue in his own name without joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is *189brought.” This Court has previously discussed the purpose of this rule, noting that any other rule would promote a multitude of suits by heirs, resulting in hopeless confusion with respect to the prosecution of an action. State ex rel. Carroll v. District Court (1961), 139 Mont. 367, 371-72, 364 P.2d 739, 741.
This same problem was addressed in the recent Colorado case of In the Matter of the Estate of Scott (1978), 40 Colo.App. 343, 577 P.2d 311. There, heirs of the decedent attempted to intervene, in order to appeal from an adverse ruling on a claim defended by the administrator. In denying intervention, the Colorado Court said:
“We noted . . . that there are substantial problems with basing the right to intervene upon various questions as to how or in what manner a law suit should be prosecuted. When the law created a mechanism whereby one person as a representative of a group could conduct litigation, the purpose was the efficient, speedy, and orderly determination of rights which were held in common. For the courts to grant intervention to any member of a represented class who disagrees with the decisions of the representative, solely on that basis, would in our view defeat the entire purpose of representative litigation. A personal representative, under such a rule, would always be in danger of losing the ability to represent and act for the estate and might well find himself relegated to a position of looking on as the affairs of the estate became hopelessly entangled. It seems hardly likely that the General Assembly when it clothed the personal representative with far reaching affirmative powers, could have intended for his position to be so fragile.” Estate of Scott, supra, 577 P.2d at 313.
That court went on to say that in determining adequacy of representation under Rule 24(a), the court will look to see if “there is a party charged by law with representing [the absent party’s] interest. [If so,] then a compelling showing would be required to show why this representation is not adequate.” Estate of Scott, supra.
There is no question about the duty of Iverson (special administrator) to represent the interests of JoAnn Palmer. By statute, he is deemed a fiduciary, and is charged with acting in the best in*190terests of the successors to the estate. Sections 72-3-610, 72-3-701-704, MCA. If he does not so act, he is liable to interested persons for damages. Section 72-3-616, MCA. See also Estate of Graf (1968), 150 Mont. 577, 580, 437 P.2d 371, 373.
Based on the foregoing, we find that JoAnn Palmer’s interests are being adequately represented by parties to the lawsuit. Therefore, we determine that the trial judge correctly denied her petition to intervene.
MR. JUSTICES HARRISON, DALY and SHEA concur.