11-3093
Guiqiu Jiang v. Holder
BIA
Videla, IJ
A093 389 870
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
New York, on the 21st day of June, two thousand twelve.
PRESENT:
JOSEPH M. McLAUGHLIN,
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
Circuit Judges.
GUIQIU JIANG,
Petitioner,
v. 11-3093
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
FOR PETITIONER: Peter L. Quan, Law Offices of Peter
L. Quan, PLLC, New York, N.Y.
FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
General; Alison Marie Igoe and Lyle
D. Jentzer, Senior Counsel, National
Security Unit, Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
DENIED.
Guiqiu Jiang, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of
a July 7, 2011 order of the BIA affirming the June 23, 2009
decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Gabriel C. Videla, which
denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re
Guiqiu Jiang, No. A093 389 870 (BIA July 7, 2011), aff’g No. A093
389 870 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 23, 2009). We assume the
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural
history of the case.
In the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s
decision as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). “We review the
agency’s factual findings, including adverse credibility
determinations, under the substantial evidence standard, treating
them as ‘conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,
534 F.3d 162, 165 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B)). Because Jiang filed his application for relief
after May 11, 2005, we apply the credibility standard imposed by
the REAL ID Act of 2005, Div. B of Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
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302, 303 (2005). Under that standard, the agency may,
considering the totality of the circumstances, base a credibility
determination on, inter alia, the “responsiveness of the
applicant,” “the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s
written and oral statements,” and “any inaccuracies or falsehoods
in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency,
inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s
claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse
credibility determination. First, Jiang provided inconsistent
testimony concerning whether he had lost his job in China as a
result of his ex-wife’s failure to report for a sterilization
appointment. Second, the IJ properly relied on inconsistencies
between Jiang’s testimony and asylum application concerning
whether his ex-wife hid at a friend’s house during her second
pregnancy. Third, the IJ properly found that Jiang’s testimony
lacked credibility, given his inability to recall basic details
about: his current wife’s whereabouts when they sought to have a
child, despite her allegation that she was hiding; and their
applications to Chinese authorities for permission to have a
child, despite the allegation in his asylum application that such
permission had been denied twice.
Moreover, while not directly relevant to his claims, Jiang
testified inconsistently about where he has lived in the United
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States, and admitted that his Texas driver’s license was
fraudulently obtained, thus casting doubt on his veracity.
Although minor and isolated discrepancies may be insufficient to
support an adverse credibility finding, see Diallo v. INS, 232
F.3d 279, 288 (2d Cir. 2000), the IJ reasonably relied on the
cumulative effect of the noted inconsistencies and the fraudulent
document to call into question Jiang’s credibility, see Xiu Xia
Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d
Cir. 2007).
Jiang contends that any inconsistencies in his testimony can
be explained by the fact that he suffers from memory loss and
psychological problems. However, the psychological evaluation in
the record -- while indicating that he suffers from depression,
that his cognitive abilities are average, and that his “retention
was mildly compromised,” J.A. 333 -- does not support a
conclusion that “a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled” to
find that he suffers from memory loss or another cognitive
disability to such a degree that the various inconsistences in
his testimony could be reconciled. Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d
77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf.
Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir.
2006) (explaining that the weight afforded to evidence lies
largely within the IJ’s discretion).
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In sum, the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was fatal
to Jiang’s application for asylum and withholding of removal, as
each claim was based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v.
Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006). Therefore, we need
not address the agency’s alternate ruling on his eligibility for
such relief.1
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, petitioner’s motion for
a stay of removal is DENIED as moot.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
1
To the extent that Jiang alleges that the IJ excluded
medical evidence, or alludes to due process and CAT claims in
his brief, without any developed argument, we deem such claims
waived. See Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir.
1998); see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A); Sioson v. Knights
of Columbus, 303 F.3d 458, 459 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
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