specially concurs.
I am satisfied that Justice Gray’s dissent is more legally correct than is our opinion. I, nevertheless, concur in the Court’s opinion only because I cannot conclude, on balance, that the right of the mother to parent should take precedence over the rights of the children to be free from abuse and neglect, when the deciding factor is a technical violation of the 48 hour filing deadline and where the mother has, otherwise, had ample opportunity for notice and hearing. In joining our opinion, however, I do not in anyway condone DFS’ failure to comply with the statute; there is simply no justification for a public agency which is charged with the responsibility of protecting fundamental rights, to not comply with both the letter and spirit of the laws that govern its operations. As Justice Gray correctly points out, it is, perhaps, the unfortunate, but understandable, reluctance of the judiciary to stringently enforce the letter of the law when to do so might adversely affect the welfare of a child, that encourages and contributes to the sort of administrative laxity that brings this case before the Court. If the 48 hour deadline is unworkable, then the legislature should change it. Unless and until it does, however, the requirements of the law are clear, and DFS has the obligation to comply. Hopefully some future abused or neglected child will not suffer from DFS’failure to recognize the seriousness of this situation, when his or her case becomes the straw that breaks the camel’s back.