UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-6069
DION ORLANDO TAYLOR,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SGT. MICHAEL LANG, all in individual and official
capacities; MAJOR EICHELBERGER, all in individual and
official capacities; WARDEN LEVERN COHEN, all in individual
and official capacities; LT. S. LOWERY, all in individual
and official capacities; M. E. MONTOUTH, Grievance
Coordinator, all in individual and official capacities,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (0:10-cv-02327-HMH)
Submitted: May 31, 2012 Decided: June 21, 2012
Before WILKINSON, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Dion Orlando Taylor, Appellant Pro Se. William T. Young, III,
HOWELL, GIBSON & HUGHES, PA, Beaufort, South Carolina, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Dion Orlando Taylor, a South Carolina state inmate,
appeals the district court’s order adopting the recommendation
of the magistrate judge and granting summary judgment to
defendants Sergeant Michael Lang, Warden Levern Cohen, and
Sergeant Mary Montouth on his claims of various violations of
his constitutional rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further
consideration.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting
summary judgment. See Robinson v. Clipse, 602 F.3d 605, 607
(4th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment shall be granted when “there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). “At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . if there
is a genuine dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). A
district court should grant summary judgment unless a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party on the
evidence presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 249 (1986). An otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment will not be defeated by the existence of any
factual dispute; only disputes over facts that might affect the
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outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude
summary judgment. Id. at 248-49.
First, Taylor contends that the district court erred
in granting summary judgment to Sergeant Lang on his claim of
excessive use of force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In
the prison context, the Eighth Amendment “protects inmates from
inhumane treatment and conditions while imprisoned.” Williams
v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). Eighth Amendment
analysis necessitates inquiry as to whether the prison official
at issue “acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind
(subjective component) and whether the deprivation suffered or
injury inflicted on the inmate was sufficiently serious
(objective component).” Id.
In a claim for excessive application of force, a
claimant must meet a heavy burden to satisfy the subjective
component - that correctional officers applied force
“maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm” rather than “in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)
(internal quotation marks omitted). To satisfy the subjective
component, a claimant must show that a prison official acted
with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” Wilson v. Seiter,
501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991), i.e., “wantonness in the infliction of
pain.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322. In determining whether a
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prison official has acted with “wantonness,” courts should
consider the necessity for the application of force; the
relationship between the need for force and the amount of force
used; the extent of the injury inflicted; the extent of the
threat to the safety of the staff and other prisoners, as
reasonably perceived by the responsible officials based on the
facts known to them at the time; and the efforts, if any, taken
by the officials, to temper the severity of the force applied.
See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992).
After careful evaluation of the record, which consists
in relevant part of Lang’s and Taylor’s conflicting statements,
we conclude that material issues of fact exist regarding the
justification for the force Sergeant Lang used against Taylor.
Construed in a light most favorable to Taylor, the evidence
would permit a finding that Lang, while engaged in a verbal
disagreement with Taylor, commanded Taylor to face him, and
that, when Taylor complied, Lang applied a burst of pepper spray
to Taylor’s face, despite the fact that Taylor was complying
with Lang’s various directives and was not acting in an
aggressive or threatening manner. Because the version of the
incident proffered by Taylor could be credited by a reasonable
factfinder, we conclude that the district court erred on the
record before it by resolving the differing descriptions of the
events that transpired between Lang and Taylor in Lang’s favor.
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We further conclude this error undermines the propriety of the
district court’s analysis regarding the subjective component of
Taylor’s excessive force claim. See Treats v. Morgan, 308 F.3d
868, 872-75 (8th Cir. 2002); Williams, 77 F.3d at 762-63; Slakan
v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984). We accordingly
vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this
claim, and remand for further proceedings. *
Taylor, however, cannot establish Warden Cohen’s
liability based on his supervision of Lang. Taylor’s
identification of one admittedly unrelated occasion on which he
was subjected to an application of pepper spray several months
after the incident at issue here is insufficient to establish
that Cohen knew or had reason to know that Lang or other prison
officials were engaging in potentially unjustified uses of
force. See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994).
Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to Warden
Cohen.
Finally, the district court determined correctly that
Taylor’s due process claim against Sergeant Montouth alleging
*
This disposition should not be considered as indicating
any view by this Court as to the merits of Taylor’s claim.
Rather, it simply reflects our judgment that the versions of
events recounted by Taylor and Lang are sufficiently disparate
on material points that summary judgment on the present record
was premature. We leave the course of proceedings on remand to
the sound judgment of the district court.
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unsatisfactory investigation and consideration of his various
administrative grievances is without merit. Taylor’s access to
and participation in the prison’s grievance process are not
constitutionally protected, and Sergeant Montouth’s alleged
malfeasance cannot be said to have impeded Taylor’s access to
the courts. See Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994).
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s
order granting summary judgment on each of Taylor’s claims
except for his claim against Sergeant Lang of excessive use of
force. As to that claim, we vacate the grant of summary
judgment and remand for further proceedings. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the Court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
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