UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4838
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOHN IVEY HALL, a/k/a John John,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (5:10-cr-00237-FL-1)
Submitted: June 13, 2012 Decided: June 26, 2012
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Mark Herring, WHITE & ALLEN, P.A., Kinston, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
Attorney, Jennifer E. Wells, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
John Ivey Hall appeals the 240-month sentence imposed
following his guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute and
possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine
base and a quantity of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846 (2006). Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether the
district court imposed an unreasonable sentence. Hall was
notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but
has not done so. We affirm.
We review a sentence imposed by a district court for
reasonableness. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51
(2007). We must first ensure that the district court committed
no “significant procedural error,” including improper
calculation of the Guidelines range, insufficient consideration
of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, and inadequate
explanation of the sentence imposed. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If
we find the sentence procedurally reasonable, we must examine
the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under the
totality of the circumstances. Id.
Upon review of the record, we conclude that Hall’s
sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable.
Assuming, without deciding, that the 1997 drug sales should have
2
been excluded from the relevant conduct determination in Hall’s
presentence report, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(“USSG”) § 1B1.3 & cmt. n.9; United States v. Mullins, 971 F.2d
1138, 1144 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting, in context of wire fraud,
that regularity and temporal proximity were weak or absent when
charged and relevant conduct were separated by six months),
Hall’s base offense level and criminal history category would
remain the same. See USSG §§ 2D1.1, 4A1.1(c), (d), (e) & cmt.
n.8. The district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and
provided an adequate explanation for the chosen sentence. See
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. In addition, Hall’s within-Guidelines
sentence is deemed on appeal to be substantively reasonable,
United States Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2012), and
we conclude that Hall did not rebut this presumption. United
States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006)
(stating that presumption may be rebutted by showing “that the
sentence is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a)
factors”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Hall, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Hall requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
3
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Hall.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
4