FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
June 28, 2012
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 11-2211
VERNON LEE BAKER, (D.C. No. 1:08-CR-01680-PJK-1)
(D.N.M.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior
Circuit Judge. **
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), a felon may not possess either a firearm or
ammunition. And, of course, for a defendant to be found guilty of this offense, the
Government must prove that a defendant “possessed” the firearm or ammunition. In
this case, a jury convicted Defendant Vernon Lee Baker of being a felon in
possession of a firearm and ammunition. But Defendant argues the Government did
not present sufficient evidence to the jury to support a finding he possessed a firearm
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however,
for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
and ammunition. Defendant appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review
sufficiency of the evidence claims de novo, asking only whether, taking the
evidence—both direct and circumstantial, together with reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom—in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury
could find [Defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Davis,
437 F.3d 989, 993 (10th Cir. 2006). Applying this standard, we hold a reasonable
jury could find Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and affirm.
I.
Our story begins on a June evening outside the Sandia Vista apartments in
Albuquerque, New Mexico. Patricia Guereca, a resident of the apartment complex,
hosted her neighbor as well as five children ranging from ages two to eleven for
dinner. The children were playing on Guereca’s apartment’s balcony when,
according to Guereca, she observed Defendant, who resided in the apartment across
from hers, “messing around with a gun” in the apartment complex’s well-lighted
parking lot. ROA vol. 4, 173, 180. Defendant, leaning on a white, older model car
resembling a Buick, spoke to Guereca’s neighbor. Guereca testified the neighbor
instructed Defendant to put the gun away because of the children. Guereca described
the gun as “big and black.” Id. at 176. Although Guereca admitted she knew little
about guns, she stated the gun was “big enough” for her to “see it and be like, whoa.”
Id. At that point, Guereca and her neighbor gathered the children inside and Guereca
testified Defendant placed the gun in the trunk of the white automobile and left. Id.
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at 177. Guereca then testified Defendant returned to the parking lot, removed the
gun from the trunk, and wiped it. Id. at 179, 181. Guereca further testified
Defendant handled “bullets.” Id. at 181. Guereca again made the children go inside
the apartment and she called law enforcement. Id. at 179. When calling law
enforcement, Guereca provided a false name because she “didn’t want any of this to
come back to [her].” Id. at 183.
Two officers arrived on the scene in response to the telephone call, but the
officers found no one in the parking lot. Id. at 217. One of the officers approached
Defendant, who was on an apartment balcony, to ask about the ownership of the
Buick. Id. at 219. As the officer spoke with Defendant, the officer observed
Defendant matched the clothing description as well as the physical features of the
man provided in the dispatch notification. Id. at 220. Like Guereca, Defendant
provided a false name to the officers. Id. at 222. Defendant claimed ownership of
the automobile, but denied having a weapon in the vehicle. Id. at 226. The officers
soon discovered, however, that the automobile belonged to Defendant’s nephew.
Officers asked to search the trunk. Id. at 227. Defendant denied them access to the
trunk. Id. at 226. A field technician then sealed the automobile and law enforcement
transported the vehicle to a secure facility until it could obtain a warrant to search
the automobile. Id. at 262. Law enforcement obtained a warrant and found a loaded
Mossberg shotgun in the trunk of the automobile. Id. at 265.
Law enforcement conducted a DNA analysis of the gun’s pump handle, grip
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area, and trigger and guard area. In addition, law enforcement swabbed four separate
shotgun casings. On three of the four casings, law enforcement detected no DNA
profiles. Id. at 358. On the fourth casing, law enforcement excluded Defendant as
a possible contributor of the DNA. Id. at 357. As to the trigger and guard area of
the gun, law enforcement also excluded Defendant as a possible contributor of the
DNA. Id. at 357. The pump handle area of the gun contained too much DNA for law
enforcement to make a determination whether Defendant contributed to the DNA.
Id. at 363. Law enforcement, however, could not exclude Defendant as a possible
contributor to the DNA on the grip area of the gun. Id. at 357. Law enforcement’s
forensic scientist determined that the DNA found on the grip area most likely
consisted of a mixture of at least three individuals. Id. at 364. The forensic scientist
next determined the DNA on the grip area most likely came from Defendant and two
unknown individuals rather than three unknown individuals. Id. at 365.
At trial, a defense expert testified law enforcement should have tested
Defendant’s nephew and that law enforcement should have compared the nephew’s
sample to the DNA on the grip area to confirm Defendant could not be excluded as
a contributor. Defendant argued the absence of his nephew’s DNA sample rendered
law enforcement’s statistical analysis unreliable.
II.
The sole issue before us on appeal is whether the jury had sufficient evidence,
taken in the light most favorable to the Government, to convict Defendant of being
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a felon in possession of a firearm. “We do not question the jury’s credibility
determinations or its conclusions about the weight of the evidence.” Davis, 437 F.3d
at 993. Importantly, “[t]he evidence necessary to support a verdict need not
conclusively exclude every other reasonable hypothesis and need not negate all
possibilities except guilt. Instead, the evidence only has to reasonably support the
jury’s finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
The government must establish three elements beyond a reasonable doubt to
obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1): “(1) the defendant was previously
convicted of a felony; (2) the defendant thereafter knowingly possessed a firearm;
and (3) the possession was in or affecting interstate commerce.” United States v.
Kitchell, 653 F.3d 1206, 1228 (10th Cir. 2011). At trial, defendant stipulated the
first and third prongs were met. Accordingly, possession is the only prong at issue.
A.
On appeal, Defendant’s challenge to his conviction first focuses on the
accuracy of law enforcement’s DNA analysis. Defendant argues his nephew had
access to the gun, as well as the trunk of the automobile. Because of this access,
Defendant contends law enforcement should have tested his nephew’s DNA against
the sample found on the gun. Defendant asserts he and his nephew likely have DNA
genetic markers in common. In addition, Defendant states one of his DNA markers
was absent from the sample found on the gun. Defendant further argues law
enforcement should have used substrate controls to test the background DNA and
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should have eliminated DNA transfer as a means of depositing the DNA on the gun. 1
Defendant also challenges Guereca’s eyewitness testimony. Defendant asserts
Guereca testified vaguely, particularly with respect to a description of the gun.
Defendant claims Guereca “was never asked to identify the Mossberg Maverick
Arms, Model 88, 12-gauge shotgun, Serial No. 21 MV38998L, that was listed in the
indictment.” Defendant argues the Government failed to link him to the gun named
in the indictment and the element of possession cannot be met because the jury
cannot infer the “big and black” object was the same object as the gun in the
indictment.
B.
We turn now to the evidence presented at trial, starting with Guereca’s
eyewitness testimony. Guereca testified she saw Defendant, a man she recognized
as her neighbor, holding a gun in a “pretty bright” parking lot. ROA vol. 4, 173,
180. Although she could not identify the gun as a Mossberg, she clearly identified
the object as a big and black gun. Id. at 176. She testified Defendant wiped the gun
and she saw him with “bullets.” Id. at 181. Guereca testified Defendant placed the
gun in the trunk before leaving the parking lot the first time and removed the gun
from the trunk when he returned the second time. Id. at 177, 179. Mark Andrew
1
According to Defendant’s expert, “substrate” is a location where one can
collect evidence. ROA vol. 4, 414. Therefore, substrate controls would test
surrounding locations such as the trunk and surfaces in the automobile to provide
information about the background DNA present at the crime scene.
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Krueger, the detective with the Albuquerque Police Department who executed the
search warrant of the automobile trunk, testified he found a loaded Mossberg shotgun
in the trunk of the automobile. Id. at 265. Moreover, Guereca not only identified
Defendant’s physical characteristics at the scene, but also identified Defendant later
at a photo array and at trial. Id. at 175, 188, 190. Guereca additionally identified
the gun at trial. The district court admitted the Mossberg listed in the indictment as
Government’s Exhibit 1. Guereca stated, “[Exhibit 1] looks like the gun that he had
. . . and it was big like that.” Id. at 189.
We need not consider Defendant’s arguments as to the DNA analysis because
the eyewitness testimony from Guereca provides ample evidence to support the
jury’s verdict. Based on Guereca’s testimony, a jury could find Defendant held a
big, black gun in the parking lot and placed that gun in the trunk of his nephew’s
automobile. Because Guereca saw Defendant place the gun in the trunk and remove
it from the trunk, the jury could conclude Defendant had access to the trunk of the
automobile where law enforcement found the gun. The jury did not have to pile
inference upon inference to conclude Defendant knowingly possessed that gun. We
“do not question the jury’s credibility determinations or its conclusions about the
weight of the evidence.” Davis, 437 F.3d at 993. Accordingly, Defendant’s
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conviction is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court,
Bobby R. Baldock
United States Circuit Judge
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