UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1791
WAYNE BRYAN,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Chief District
Judge. (8:10-cv-02452-DKC)
Submitted: June 21, 2012 Decided: June 28, 2012
Before WILKINSON, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kamal Nawash, THE NAWASH LAW OFFICE, Washington, D.C., for
Appellant. M. Andree Green, Acting County Attorney, William A.
Snoddy, Deputy County Attorney, Tonia Y. Belton-Gofreed,
Associate County Attorney, Upper Marlboro, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Wayne Bryan appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to Defendant in his civil action under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (“Title
VII”), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 2003 & Supp.
2012), Maryland’s Fair Employment Practices Act, Md. Code Ann.,
Art. 49B, §§ 14-18 (repealed 2009), and the Prince George’s
County Code. On appeal, Bryan challenges the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to Defendant on his Title VII claims
of discrimination on the basis of national origin and his claim
of retaliation premised on his termination from employment.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
We review a district court’s adverse grant of summary
judgment de novo, drawing reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead
Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 2011). Summary
judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To
withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party
must produce competent evidence to reveal the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Thompson v.
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002)
(“Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice, nor does
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a mere scintilla of evidence in support of [the non-moving
party’s] case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Title VII prohibits an employer from “discharg[ing]
any individual, or otherwise . . . discriminat[ing] against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s . . . national origin.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
2(a)(1). Absent direct evidence of intentional discrimination,
claims under Title VII are analyzed under the burden-shifting
framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-07 (1973). In the employee discipline context, a
prima facie case of discrimination is established if the
plaintiff shows that he engaged in prohibited conduct similar to
that of a person of another national origin and that the
disciplinary measures enforced against him were more severe than
those enforced against the comparator. Moore v. City of
Charlotte, 754 F.2d 1100, 1105-06 (4th Cir. 1985).
Title VII also prohibits an employer from
“discriminat[ing] against any of [its] employees . . . because
[the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by [Title VII], or because [the employee]
has made a charge . . . or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a). To establish a prima facie case of
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retaliation, a plaintiff must show “(1) engagement in a
protected activity; (2) adverse employment action; and (3) a
causal link between the protected activity and the employment
action.” Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190
(4th Cir. 2010).
If a plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for its actions. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
411 U.S. at 802-03. Once the employer comes forward with such a
reason, “the burden reverts to the plaintiff to establish that
the employer’s non-discriminatory rationale is a pretext for
intentional discrimination.” Heiko v. Colombo Sav. Bank,
F.S.B., 434 F.3d 249, 258 (4th Cir. 2006). This “final pretext
inquiry merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court
that the plaintiff has been the victim of intentional
discrimination, which at all times remains with the plaintiff.”
Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 601 F.3d 289, 294
(4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted).
After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we
conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment to Defendant. Bryan’s claims fail at the prima facie
stage because he does not offer any evidence from which a
factfinder could conclude that employees of a different national
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origin were subject to less severe discipline for similar
prohibited conduct or that his termination from employment and
protected activity of filing a charge of discrimination were
causally linked. Further, even assuming, as the district court
did, that Bryan made his prima facie showings, he points to no
evidence tending to show that Defendant’s non-discriminatory
reasons for disciplining him were a pretext for intentional
discrimination. Finally, we reject as wholly without merit
Bryan’s argument that the district court’s consideration of his
actions during the disciplinary proceedings instituted by
Defendant vis-à-vis those of his ostensible comparators violated
his privilege under the Fifth Amendment against compelled
self-incrimination.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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