Fang Huang v. Eric Holder, Jr.

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-2299

FANG PING HUANG,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.

Submitted: June 1, 2012 Decided: July 2, 2012

Before GREGORY, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Joshua Bardavid, New York, New York, for Petitioner. Stuart
Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Blair T. O’Connor,
Assistant Director, Edward C. Durant, Office of Immigration
Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,
D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Fang Ping Huang, a native and citizen of the People’s

Republic of China, petitions for review of an order of the Board

of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing his appeal from the

immigration judge’s order denying his applications for asylum,

withholding from removal and withholding under the Convention

Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the petition for review.

An alien has the burden of showing he is eligible for

relief. In order to show eligibility for asylum, he must show

that he was subjected to past persecution or has a well-founded

fear of persecution on account of a protected ground such as

political opinion. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2012). If the

applicant establishes past persecution, he has the benefit of a

rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution.

This court will uphold the Board’s decision unless it

is manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion.

The standard of review of the agency’s findings is narrow and

deferential. Factual findings are affirmed if supported by

substantial evidence. Substantial evidence exists to support a

finding unless the evidence was such that any reasonable

adjudicator would have been compelled to conclude to the

contrary. Therefore, we review an adverse credibility

determination for substantial evidence and give broad deference

to the Board’s credibility determination. The Board and the

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immigration judge must provide specific, cogent reasons for

making an adverse credibility determination. We recognize that

omissions, inconsistent statements, contradictory evidence, and

inherently improbable testimony are appropriate bases for making

an adverse credibility determination. The existence of only a

few such inconsistencies, omissions, or contradictions can be

sufficient for the Board to make an adverse credibility

determination as to the alien’s entire testimony regarding past

persecution. An inconsistency can serve as a basis for an

adverse credibility determination even if it does not go to the

heart of the alien’s claim. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)

(2006); see also Djadjou v. Holder, 662 F.3d 265, 272-74 (4th

Cir. 2011) (case citations omitted). An adverse credibility

finding can support a conclusion that the alien did not

establish past persecution. See Dankam v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d

113, 121-23 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Chen v. Attorney General,

463 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2006) (denial of asylum relief

can be based solely upon an adverse credibility finding).

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the

adverse credibility finding. The immigration judge listed

specific and cogent reasons in support of the finding. We note

that the immigration judge was not obligated to accept Huang’s

reasons for the inconsistencies, even if the reasons were

plausible. See Dankam, 495 F.3d at 122. We further conclude,

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that after reviewing the independent evidence, including the

State Department’s report, the record does not compel a

different result. *

We deny the petition for review. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED

*
Huang has abandoned any challenge to the denial of relief
under the CAT by failing to raise an issue in his brief.
Accordingly, this court will not review this ruling. See
Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 189 n.7 (4th Cir. 2004)
(finding that the failure to raise a challenge in an opening
brief results in abandonment of that challenge); Edwards v. City
of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999) (same).

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