FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 02 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 11-30088
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:09-cr-00402-RAJ-1
v.
MEMORANDUM *
MARK STEVEN ASHMORE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 11, 2012 **
Seattle, Washington
Before: HAWKINS, BYBEE, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Mark Ashmore appeals his convictions for one count of
conspiracy to commit wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1349 and three counts of wire
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to
support the convictions.
With regard to the conspiracy count, Ashmore argues that the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to show a single conspiracy and instead
demonstrated only several disconnected conspiracies, and thus the evidence was
unconstitutionally at variance with the indictment. This is a “recurring” issue,
United States v. Bibbero, 749 F.2d 581, 586 (9th Cir. 1984), and it is well
established that the “government must [have] prove[d] that an overall agreement
existed among the conspirators,” though “[a] formal agreement is not necessary,”
and an “agreement may be inferred from the defendants’ acts pursuant to the
scheme or other circumstantial evidence,” id. at 587. Here, there is evidence that
each of the co-conspirators named in the complaint was involved during the same
time frame; the nature of the conspiracy and the method of operation remained
constant; they discussed the plan with Ashmore, and some even participated as
straw buyers themselves, meaning that they knew the details of the plan and the
goals of the conspiracy; they were each involved in some significant role,
including recruiting straw buyers, procuring financing, and maintaining properties
purchased in the conspiracy; and each of them benefitted or was promised benefits
from the success of the scheme. This evidence is more than sufficient for a
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reasonable jury to infer that there was one overall agreement among the co-
conspirators. Id.
Beyond the named co-conspirators, the government also introduced
testimony concerning what Ashmore told another alleged conspirator. The
indictment includes “others known and unknown” as part of the charged
conspiracy. There was evidence that this co-conspirator realized the nature of the
scheme; was aware of Ashmore’s position in the conspiracy and the participation
of other members in the scheme; and communicated with a straw buyer on behalf
of Ashmore, as well as with Ashmore and another co-conspirator. The government
adequately proved this member’s connection to the overall conspiracy. See United
States v. Delgado, 357 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004).
Ashmore also suggests that there was insufficient evidence supporting his
convictions for wire fraud. Because this argument was not coherently developed in
his briefs, any such argument has been abandoned. See Fed. R. App. P.
28(a)(9)(A); United States v. Kimble, 107 F.3d 712, 715 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997). Yet
even if he has pressed such an argument on appeal, it is without merit.
AFFIRMED.
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