[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-12012 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar JULY 10, 2012
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 5:08-cv-00106-WTH-KRS
FULGENCIO DELEON,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Respondents - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(July 10, 2012)
Before MARTIN, JORDAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Fulgencio DeLeon, a Florida state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas petition. We granted
a certificate of appealability on whether the district court violated Clisby v. Jones,
960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc), when it failed to address DeLeon’s claim
that his plea of guilty was invalid because he entered into it involuntarily and
unknowingly. After careful review, we vacate and remand.
In Clisby, we “express[ed] our deep concern over the piecemeal litigation of
federal habeas petitions filed by state prisoners.” Id. at 935. Exercising our
supervisory power, we instructed district courts to “resolve all claims for relief
raised in a [Section 2254] petition . . . regardless [of] whether habeas relief is
granted or denied.” Id. at 936. A claim for relief, we explained, is “any allegation
of a constitutional violation.” Id. We made it clear that we “will vacate the
district court’s judgment without prejudice and remand the case for consideration
of all remaining claims whenever the district court has not resolved all such
claims.” Id. at 938.
Here, DeLeon raised five grounds for relief in his Section 2254 petition, one
of which asserted that DeLeon did not knowingly or voluntarily enter into the
guilty plea. The district court held that DeLeon had satisfied the exhaustion
requirement as to this claim, and in a footnote, it acknowledged that it can reject a
claim on the merits, even if a petitioner has not exhausted a claim. However, the
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district court did not go on to address the merits of that claim. The district court
thus left unresolved a claim of a constitutional violation. See Bradshaw v. Stumpf,
545 U.S. 175, 183, 125 S. Ct. 2398, 2405 (2005) (noting that a plea “is valid only
if done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently”).
The state points out that DeLeon did not ask the district court to reconsider
its order denying his petition. That fact, however, is irrelevant. In Clisby, the
petitioner filed a motion to alter or amend judgment, but he did not ask the district
court to address all of the claims that it had left unresolved. See 960 F.2d at 935.
Nonetheless, we remanded the case to the district court for consideration of all of
those claims. Id. at 927. The state also suggests that the district court’s failure to
resolve the claim is “harmless” because, in any event, the claim fails on the merits
or is procedurally defaulted. The rule that we laid out in Clisby, however, is not
subject to harmless error analysis. See id. at 938 (noting that we will vacate and
remand “whenever the district court has not resolved all such claims” (emphasis
added)).
For these reasons, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand
the case for consideration of DeLeon’s remaining claim for relief.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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