UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5129
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL QUINN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:09-cr-00442-JFM-1)
Submitted: June 29, 2012 Decided: July 10, 2012
Before AGEE, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gary A. Ticknor, Columbia, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Michael C. Hanlon, Assistant
United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Quinn appeals his convictions following a jury
trial for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006), and possessing materials to
manufacture controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 843 (2006). On appeal, Quinn challenges several evidentiary
rulings made by the district court. This court reviews
evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Hodge, 354 F.3d 305, 312 (4th Cir. 2004). Applying this
standard, we affirm.
Quinn first contends that the Government did not
provide notice of certain evidence it offered at trial. A
review of the record leads us to conclude that Quinn had
adequate notice of the evidence presented by the Government.
Quinn next argues that Fed. R. Crim. P. 404(b)
prohibited the introduction of portions of the trial evidence.
Rule 404(b) prohibits evidence of a “crime, wrong, or other act”
as proof of a person’s character when it is used “to show that
on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character.” Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion that allows for
the introduction of all evidence “except that which proves only
criminal disposition.” United States v. Sanchez, 188 F.3d 192,
195 (4th Cir. 1997).
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We find no merit in Quinn’s argument that Rule 404(b)
was violated. A search of Quinn that occurred prior to his
arrest on the charges of which he was ultimately convicted and
testimony of his subsequent admission that he had possessed a
handgun during that earlier search were relevant to Quinn’s
state of mind and intent to unlawfully possess weaponry. See,
e.g., United States v. Cassell, 292 F.3d 788, 793 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (noting that in cases where unlawful possession is at
issue, evidence of previous possession can be relevant to
knowledge and intent of crime charged). We thus conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting
such evidence. We also conclude that admission of a letter
found in Quinn’s possession during the execution of a search
warrant was relevant to show Quinn’s possession and knowledge of
the contraband at issue and was not overly prejudicial. See
United States v. Smith, 441 F.3d 254, 262 (4th Cir. 2006)
(testimony of son that he delivered drugs for his father was not
overly prejudicial). Finally, we conclude that reference to
Quinn’s fugitive status was not an abuse of discretion because
“evidence of flight is admissible to prove guilty conscience.”
United States v. Peoples, 748 F.2d 934, 936 (4th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 2006) (“the jury
unquestionably was entitled to draw the reasonable inference
that Moye fled because he knew he was prohibited under federal
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law from possessing firearms.”); United States v. Obi, 239 F.3d
662, 665 (4th Cir. 2001).
Quinn next argues that the district court erred in
allowing the Government to introduce evidence of his gang
membership and inquire into other "bad acts" during cross-
examination. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
evidence to which Quinn objects because Quinn’s gang affiliation
was relevant to his motive for possessing a weapon and his
involvement in drug transactions.
Quinn lastly challenges the district court’s denial of
his motion to disclose the identity of a confidential informant.
A decision not to require disclosure of an informant is within
the discretion of the district court. United States v. Gray, 47
F.3d 1359, 1363-64 (4th Cir. 1995). “Under the abuse of
discretion standard, this Court may not substitute its judgment
for that of the district court; rather, [it] must determine
whether the [district] court’s exercise of discretion,
considering the law and facts, was arbitrary or capricious.”
United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 (4th Cir. 1995).
Here, the informant was not a participant in the crimes Quinn
was charged with. Thus, his identity or testimony was not
necessary for Quinn’s defense, and we will not disturb the
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district court’s conclusion that the identity should be kept
confidential.
Accordingly, we affirm Quinn’s convictions and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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