UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-5177
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
COREY RYDELL JENKINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 11-5180
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
COREY RYDELL JENKINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina, at Columbia and Florence. Terry L. Wooten,
District Judge. (3:01-cr-00536-TLW-1; 4:11-cr-00273-TLW-1)
Submitted: June 7, 2012 Decided: July 12, 2012
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William F. Nettles, IV, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Florence, South Carolina; Kimberly H. Albro, Research & Writing
Specialist, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. William N.
Nettles, United States Attorney, A. Bradley Parham, Assistant
United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina; John D.
Buretta, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Lanny A.
Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas E. Booth, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Corey Rydell Jenkins
appeals both his conviction by jury of one count of possessing a
firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
(2006), and the subsequent revocation of his supervised release.
We have thoroughly reviewed the record, and we affirm.
Jenkins first asserts that his motion to suppress
evidence retrieved pursuant to a search of his car was
improperly denied. The district court’s legal conclusions
underlying a suppression determination are reviewed de novo
while its factual findings are reviewed for clear error. United
States v. Guijon-Ortiz, 660 F.3d 757, 762 (4th Cir. 2011).
Because the district court denied the motion to suppress, the
evidence is construed on appeal in the light most favorable to
the government. United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 320
(4th Cir. 2004). Despite Jenkins’ assertions to the contrary,
our review of the record convinces us that the facts known to
the detaining officers sufficed to give them reasonable,
articulable suspicion warranting his detention. United
States v. Ortiz, 669 F.3d 439, 444 (4th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 336, 337 (4th Cir. 2008).
Moreover, we are unconvinced by Jenkins’ argument that the
officers impermissibly extended the scope of the stop such that
his consent to search was rendered invalid. See United
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States v. Mason, 628 F.3d 123, 132 (4th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 329 (2011). As a result, Jenkins’ motion to
suppress was properly denied.
Jenkins attacks his trial largely on the grounds that
the district court improperly admitted several pieces of
evidence, including the detaining officers’ suspicions that
Jenkins was involved in narcotics distribution, the officers’
purportedly-expert opinions that Jenkins’ activity was
consistent with narcotics distribution, and the fact that
Jenkins had previously been convicted of offenses involving
firearms. A district court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed
for abuse of discretion, which occurs only when the district
court’s decision is guided by erroneous legal principles or
rests upon a clearly erroneous factual finding. United
States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 292 (4th Cir. 2010). Further,
evidentiary rulings are subject to harmless error review, such
that any error is harmless where this court may say “with fair
assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping
the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not
substantially swayed by the error.” Id. (quotation marks
omitted); United States v. McBride, 676 F.3d 385, 400 (4th Cir.
2012). We have examined the record and find that any error with
respect to the district court’s evidentiary decisions was
harmless.
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Finally, Jenkins’ argument that his term of supervised
release was improperly revoked rests solely on his assertion
that his felon-in-possession conviction must be reversed.
Because he is incorrect on that score, we decline to disturb the
revocation of his supervised release.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument will not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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