UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1349
JIA AI WENG,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: June 11, 2012 Decided: July 17, 2012
Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jia Ai Weng, Petitioner Pro Se. Carol Federighi, Senior
Litigation Counsel, Ada E. Bosque, Rebecca Hoffberg Phillips,
Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jia Ai Weng, a native and citizen of the People’s
Republic of China, petitions for review of an order of the Board
of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing his appeal from the
immigration judge’s order denying his applications for asylum,
withholding from removal and withholding under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the petition for review.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes
the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a) (2006). The INA defines a refugee as a person
unwilling or unable to return to his native country “because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
“Persecution involves the infliction or threat of death,
torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom, on account of one
of the enumerated grounds[.]” Qiao Hua Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d
171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
An alien “bear[s] the burden of proving eligibility
for asylum,” Naizgi v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir.
2006); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2012), and can establish
refugee status based on past persecution in his native country
on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).
“An applicant who demonstrates that he was the subject of past
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persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of
persecution.” Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir.
2004).
Without regard to past persecution, an alien can
establish a well-founded fear of persecution based on a
protected ground. Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 187. The well-founded
fear standard contains both a subjective and an objective
component. The objective element requires a showing of
specific, concrete facts that would lead a reasonable person in
like circumstances to fear persecution. Gandziami-Mickhou v.
Gonzales, 445 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 2006). “The subjective
component can be met through the presentation of candid,
credible, and sincere testimony demonstrating a genuine fear of
persecution . . . [It] must have some basis in the reality of
the circumstances and be validated with specific, concrete facts
. . . and it cannot be mere irrational apprehension.” Qiao Hua
Li, 405 F.3d at 176 (internal quotation marks, brackets and
citations omitted).
A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or
withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Administrative
findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to decide to the contrary. 8
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U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006). This court will reverse the
Board only if “the evidence . . . presented was so compelling
that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite
fear of persecution.” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84; see
Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325 n.14 (4th Cir. 2002).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that
substantial evidence supports the finding that Weng did not show
that he was the victim of past persecution. Thus, he was not
eligible for the presumption that he had a well-founded fear of
persecution. We also conclude that substantial evidence
supports the finding that Weng did not independently establish
that he had a well-founded fear of persecution. In addition, we
conclude that Weng did not show that he was entitled to relief
under the CAT.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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