UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1867
TONY EDWARD SAVAGE,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
LARRY WAYNE STURDIVANT, JR., Deputy Sheriff, County of
Stafford Sheriff’s Office, sued in his official and
individual capacity,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
COUNTY OF STAFFORD, VIRGINIA, sued in its official
capacity, A Municipal Corporation; COUNTY OF STAFFORD
SHERIFF’S OFFICE, sued in its official capacity; CHARLES E.
JETT, County of Stafford Sheriff, sued in his official and
individual capacity; C.P. CAMERON, Detective, County of
Stafford Sheriff’s Office, sued in his official and
individual capacity; RAY HUSTON DAVIS, II, Supervisory
Deputy Sheriff, County of Stafford Sheriff’s Office, sued
in his official and individual capacity; MICHAEL JENKINS,
Supervisory Deputy Sheriff, in his official and individual
capacity; DANIEL M. CHICHESTER, Office of the
Commonwealth’s Attorney, in their official capacity; E.
OLSEN, Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney, in his official
and individual capacity,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District
Judge. (1:09-cv-01328-LO-JFA)
Submitted: May 17, 2012 Decided: July 17, 2012
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Carl L. Crews, C. LOWELL CREWS, ATTORNEY AT LAW, PLLC,
Arlington, Virginia, for Appellant. Jeff W. Rosen, Lisa Ehrich,
PENDER & COWARD, PC, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Tony Edward Savage filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)
suit against Larry Wayne Sturdivant, Jr., and other defendants,
alleging, among other claims, violations of his Fourth Amendment
rights in connection with a warrantless arrest in his home.
Savage’s suit was tried before a jury, and the jury rendered a
verdict in favor of Sturdivant. We affirm.
On appeal, Savage first argues that the district court
erred in denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 motion for judgment as a
matter of law on his claim that Sturdivant’s warrantless arrest
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We review de novo a
district court’s denial of a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a
matter of law. Sloas v. CSX Transp. Inc., 616 F.3d 380, 392
(4th Cir. 2010). We must “view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party” and are obliged to affirm
unless “the jury lacked a legally sufficient evidentiary basis
to find in that party’s favor.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits a warrantless
arrest within a suspect’s home absent valid consent to entry or
exigent circumstances. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177,
181 (1990); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980). The
voluntariness of consent is measured under the totality of the
circumstances, considering the accused’s characteristics and the
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conditions of the encounter, including the officer’s conduct.
See United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir.
1996). “A voluntary response to an officer’s knock at the front
door of a dwelling does not generally implicate the Fourth
Amendment . . . .” United States v. Cephas, 254 F.3d 488, 493
(4th Cir. 2001). However, the Fourth Amendment is implicated
“when officers gain visual or physical access to a room after an
occupant opens the door not voluntarily, but in response to a
demand under color of authority.” United States v. Mowatt, 513
F.3d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Kentucky v.
King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011); see Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 12-13 (1948).
As the district court noted, this case is readily
distinguishable from Mowatt. Viewing the totality of the
circumstances in the light most favorable to Sturdivant, we
conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s
finding that Savage voluntarily consented to Sturdivant’s entry
into his bedroom. See Lattimore, 87 F.3d at 650. Thus, we
conclude that the district court did not err in denying Savage’s
Rule 50 motion on this ground.
Savage next argues that the district court improperly
instructed the jury by denying his proposed instructions and in
providing misleading instructions on the issue of warrantless
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arrest. We review a district court’s decision to give or not to
give a jury instruction for abuse of discretion. A Helping
Hand, LLC v. Baltimore County, Md., 515 F.3d 356, 370 (4th Cir.
2006). “The test of the adequacy of jury instructions is
whether the jury charge, construed as a whole, adequately states
the controlling principle without misleading or confusing the
jury.” Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 408 (4th Cir.
1999).
We conclude that Savage’s proposed instructions would
tend to confuse or mislead the jury and that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give these proposed
instructions. Further, we conclude that the court’s
instructions adequately described the law of consent and,
because it properly informed the jury that the officer’s conduct
was a relevant consideration in assessing consent, no further
instruction under Mowatt was needed. Lattimore, 87 F.3d at 650.
We also conclude that the jury instructions given on the issue
of warrantless arrest would not tend to confuse or mislead the
jury. The jury was permitted to find that Sturdivant could
lawfully arrest Savage in his bedroom following Savage’s
voluntary consent to entry if Sturdivant had probable cause to
believe Savage had recently committed a felony. See Rodriguez,
497 U.S. at 181 (noting that consent is valid exception to
general rule that warrantless entry into home for arrest or
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search is unreasonable); United States v. Stokes, 631 F.3d 802,
807 (6th Cir.) (noting consent is valid exception to general
prohibition against warrantless in-home arrest), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 2946 (2011). We conclude that the jury instructions
adequately conveyed this controlling principle and that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the
jury accordingly. See Chaudhry, 174 F.3d at 409.
Finally, Savage argues that the district court issued
contradictory rulings by denying his motion for partial summary
judgment as to the warrantless arrest claim because the parties
had not addressed exigent circumstances, while later concluding
that the parties failed to provide testimony regarding this
issue at trial. We conclude Savage’s claim lacks merit. Thus,
we need not resolve Savage’s contention that no exigent
circumstances existed to justify the entry.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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