UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1200
SABRINA RENEE BROWN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
HUNTINGTON INGALLS INCORPORATED,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Raymond A. Jackson,
District Judge. (4:11-cv-00044-RAJ-FBS)
Submitted: June 22, 2012 Decided: July 19, 2012
Before MOTZ, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Sabrina Renee Brown, Appellant Pro Se. Scott William Kezman,
Anna Richardson Smith, KAUFMAN & CANOLES, PC, Norfolk, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Sabrina Renee Brown appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to the defendant, Huntington Ingalls,
Inc., on her claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012) (“ADA”) and
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 701-796 (West 2008 & Supp. 2012). Brown also
challenges the magistrate judge’s denial of several discovery
motions, seeks to supplement the record on appeal, and moves
this court to compel the production of discovery materials. For
the following reasons, we decline to supplement the record or
compel discovery, and we affirm the judgment below.
I. Discovery motions *
We review the denial of discovery prior to the grant
of summary judgment for an abuse of discretion. See Harrods
Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir.
*
Huntington contends that Brown has waived review of the
magistrate judge’s denial of her various discovery motions
because she did not challenge their disposition in the district
court. Because Brown, proceeding pro se, did not receive notice
of the consequences of failing to file timely objections to the
magistrate judge’s orders, however, her failure to object to
them below does not waive appellate review. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(a); Wells v. Shriners Hosp., 109 F.3d 198, 200-01 (4th Cir.
1997); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir.
1984).
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2002). A trial court necessarily has broad discretion in
managing pretrial discovery and an appellate court should not
disturb its orders absent a clear abuse of discretion. Ardrey
v. United Parcel Serv., 798 F.2d 679, 682 (4th Cir. 1986).
Having carefully reviewed the record, we find no abuse
of discretion in the magistrate judge’s denial of Brown’s
various discovery motions. Further, to the extent that Brown
seeks to supplement the record with additional materials and
information that were not considered by the district court, she
has failed to show that such supplementation would be
appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(e)(2)(C). Nor is her
present appeal the proper venue for her to seek the production
of additional discovery materials.
II. Summary judgment
We review de novo a district court’s order granting
summary judgment. See Robinson v. Clipse, 602 F.3d 605, 607
(4th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment shall be granted when “there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A district court should grant summary judgment unless a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party
on the evidence presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Only disputes over facts that might
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affect the outcome of the suit under governing law, i.e.,
material facts, will properly preclude summary judgment. Id. at
248-49. “Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice
[to generate a genuine dispute of material fact], nor does a
mere scintilla of evidence” in support of the nonmoving party’s
case. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649
(4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under the ADA, an employer may not discriminate
against a “qualified individual” based on her disability. 42
U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West Supp. 2012). A “qualified individual”
is one “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that
such individual holds or desires.” Id. It was Brown’s burden
at the summary judgment stage to project evidence that she could
perform the essential functions of the position in question
here, with or without reasonable accommodations. Tyndall v.
Nat’l Educ. Ctrs., Inc. of California, 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th
Cir. 1994). As the district court noted, Brown has failed to
produce competent or admissible evidence tending to contradict
Huntington’s well-documented determination that she was not a
“qualified individual.” Accordingly, summary judgment in favor
of Huntington on Brown's ADA claim was appropriate. For the
same reasons, any claim Brown sought to raise under the
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Rehabilitation Act also fails. See Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med.
Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1264-65 (4th Cir. 1995).
Therefore, we affirm the judgment below and deny
Brown’s pending motion to compel discovery. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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