11-3914-ag
Gao v. Holder
BIA
A077 957 470
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 20th day of July, two thousand twelve.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN,
8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
9 BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 Hong Ping Gao,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 11-3914-ag
17 NAC
18 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23
24 FOR PETITIONER: Peter D. Lobel, New York, NY.
25
26 FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant
27 Attorney General; John S. Hogan, Senior
28 Litigation Counsel; Laura M.L. Maroldy,
29 Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
30 Litigation, Civil Division, United States
31 Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
4 is DENIED.
5 Hong Ping Gao, a native and citizen of the People’s
6 Republic of China, seeks review of an August 31, 2011, order
7 of the BIA denying her motion to reopen her removal
8 proceedings. In re Hong Ping Gao, No. A077 957 470 (B.I.A.
9 Aug. 31, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
10 underlying facts and procedural history of the case.
11 We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for
12 abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517
13 (2d Cir. 2006). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion
14 by denying Gao’s motion to reopen as untimely as she filed
15 it nearly seven years after her final order of removal. See
16 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).
17 Although the time limits on motions to reopen may be
18 excused when the movant demonstrates changed country
19 conditions, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), the BIA
20 reasonably concluded that Gao did not demonstrate changed
21 conditions in this case.
22 We defer to the BIA’s general conclusion that the
23 ongoing persecution of Christians across China did not
24 change significantly between 2002 and 2010. See Shao v.
2
1 Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 171 (2d Cir. 2008) (“We do not
2 ourselves attempt to resolve conflicts in record evidence, a
3 task largely within the discretion of the agency.”); see
4 also Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 257 (BIA 2007)
5 (explaining that an “incremental or incidental” change in a
6 country’s policies does not constitute changed country
7 conditions for purposes of motions to reopen).
8 The BIA’s decision noted that the repression of
9 Christians in China varies by locality. Gao contends that
10 the BIA abused its discretion in failing to consider the
11 letter she submitted from a friend who was arrested for
12 being a Christian in Gao’s hometown. This argument is
13 unavailing.
14 While the BIA did not expressly consider the letter, it
15 was not required to “expressly parse or refute on the record
16 each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the
17 petitioner.” Shao, 546 F.3d at 169 (quotation marks
18 omitted). Accordingly, we presume that the BIA considered
19 the letter and gave it the appropriate weight. See Chen v.
20 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 336 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006)
21 (noting that this Court will “presume” that the agency “has
22 taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless
23 the record compellingly suggests otherwise”). The letter
24 did not establish changed conditions in Gao’s hometown
25 because there was no evidence about conditions in that
3
1 hometown at the time of her 2002 merits hearing. See Matter
2 of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 253 (“In determining whether
3 evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a
4 material change in country conditions that would justify
5 reopening, we compare the evidence of country conditions
6 submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time
7 of the merits hearing below.”); Moosa v. Holder, 644 F.3d
8 380, 386–87 (7th Cir. 2011).
9 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
10 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
11 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
12 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
13 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
14 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
15 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
16 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
17 FOR THE COURT:
18 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
4