Hong Ping Gao v. Holder

11-3914-ag Gao v. Holder BIA A077 957 470 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan 3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of 4 New York, on the 20th day of July, two thousand twelve. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, 8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 9 BARRINGTON D. PARKER, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 Hong Ping Gao, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 11-3914-ag 17 NAC 18 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES 19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent. 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 24 FOR PETITIONER: Peter D. Lobel, New York, NY. 25 26 FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant 27 Attorney General; John S. Hogan, Senior 28 Litigation Counsel; Laura M.L. Maroldy, 29 Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration 30 Litigation, Civil Division, United States 31 Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 4 is DENIED. 5 Hong Ping Gao, a native and citizen of the People’s 6 Republic of China, seeks review of an August 31, 2011, order 7 of the BIA denying her motion to reopen her removal 8 proceedings. In re Hong Ping Gao, No. A077 957 470 (B.I.A. 9 Aug. 31, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 10 underlying facts and procedural history of the case. 11 We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for 12 abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 13 (2d Cir. 2006). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion 14 by denying Gao’s motion to reopen as untimely as she filed 15 it nearly seven years after her final order of removal. See 16 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). 17 Although the time limits on motions to reopen may be 18 excused when the movant demonstrates changed country 19 conditions, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), the BIA 20 reasonably concluded that Gao did not demonstrate changed 21 conditions in this case. 22 We defer to the BIA’s general conclusion that the 23 ongoing persecution of Christians across China did not 24 change significantly between 2002 and 2010. See Shao v. 2 1 Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 171 (2d Cir. 2008) (“We do not 2 ourselves attempt to resolve conflicts in record evidence, a 3 task largely within the discretion of the agency.”); see 4 also Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 257 (BIA 2007) 5 (explaining that an “incremental or incidental” change in a 6 country’s policies does not constitute changed country 7 conditions for purposes of motions to reopen). 8 The BIA’s decision noted that the repression of 9 Christians in China varies by locality. Gao contends that 10 the BIA abused its discretion in failing to consider the 11 letter she submitted from a friend who was arrested for 12 being a Christian in Gao’s hometown. This argument is 13 unavailing. 14 While the BIA did not expressly consider the letter, it 15 was not required to “expressly parse or refute on the record 16 each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the 17 petitioner.” Shao, 546 F.3d at 169 (quotation marks 18 omitted). Accordingly, we presume that the BIA considered 19 the letter and gave it the appropriate weight. See Chen v. 20 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 336 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006) 21 (noting that this Court will “presume” that the agency “has 22 taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless 23 the record compellingly suggests otherwise”). The letter 24 did not establish changed conditions in Gao’s hometown 25 because there was no evidence about conditions in that 3 1 hometown at the time of her 2002 merits hearing. See Matter 2 of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 253 (“In determining whether 3 evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a 4 material change in country conditions that would justify 5 reopening, we compare the evidence of country conditions 6 submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time 7 of the merits hearing below.”); Moosa v. Holder, 644 F.3d 8 380, 386–87 (7th Cir. 2011). 9 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 10 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of 11 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition 12 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in 13 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for 14 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with 15 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second 16 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b). 17 FOR THE COURT: 18 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 4