Michael Martinez v. Max Williams

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 23 2012 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MICHAEL M. MARTINEZ, No. 11-35115 Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:09-cv-00580-ST v. MEMORANDUM * MAX WILLIAMS; et al., Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding Submitted July 17, 2012 ** Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges. Former Oregon state prisoner Michael M. Martinez appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations in connection with a prison guard’s shooting of Martinez during a prison yard riot. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). review de novo, Day v. Apoliona, 616 F.3d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 2010), and we may affirm on any ground supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment as to Williams and Nooth because Martinez failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether either was “personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). To the extent that Martinez alleges that Williams and Nooth are liable based on their promulgation or implementation of an unconstitutional use-of-force policy, summary judgment was proper because Martinez has failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Oregon Department of Corrections’ policy is “so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding a similar policy to be constitutional). The district court also properly granted Fletcher qualified immunity because a “reasonable official standing where [Fletcher] was standing” could believe that shooting an inmate to “stop an assault that could have seriously injured or killed 2 11-35115 another inmate was a good faith effort to restore order, and thus lawful.” Marquez v. Gutierrez, 322 F.3d 689, 693 (9th Cir. 2003). Martinez’s remaining contentions, including those concerning the alleged deficiencies of his court-appointed counsel, are unpersuasive. AFFIRMED. 3 11-35115