Case: 11-14004 Date Filed: 07/23/2012 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 11-14004
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 8:10-cr-00414-EAK-AEP-4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
STEPHANINE RENEE FIELDS,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(July 23, 2012)
Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 11-14004 Date Filed: 07/23/2012 Page: 2 of 8
Stephanine Fields appeals her 95 month total sentence for conspiracy to
commit bank fraud and aggravated identity theft. On appeal, Fields argues that the
district court erred in: (1) applying a sentencing enhancement for the amount of loss,
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(E), because she should not be held accountable
for those losses caused by the conspiracy in which she was not directly involved; (2)
calculating the number of victims, and thus erroneously applied the §
2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i) enhancement, as Fields cannot legally be held responsible for the
victims that she had no knowledge of; (3) applying a sophisticated means
enhancement because Fields herself did not do anything sophisticated, as any
elements of the offense that may have been sophisticated were executed by her
co-conspirators; and (4) failing to give her a downward adjustment for having a minor
role in the offense, pursuant to § 3B1.2(b). After thorough review, we affirm.
We review for clear error the district court’s factual findings at sentencing,
including the loss amount, the number of victims, and the use of sophisticated means.
See United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1199 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S.Ct. 1066 (2012); United States v. McCrimmon, 362 F.3d 725, 728 (11th Cir.
2004). We also review for clear error a district court’s determination not to apply a
minor role adjustment. See United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 937 (11th Cir.
1999) (en banc).
2
Case: 11-14004 Date Filed: 07/23/2012 Page: 3 of 8
First, we disagree with Fields’s claim that the district court erred in enhancing
her sentence based on the amount of loss. Under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, a defendant is
responsible for loss that “the defendant knew or, under the circumstances, reasonably
should have known, was a potential result of the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1,
comment. (n.3(A)(iv)). A participant in a conspiracy may be held responsible for the
losses resulting from the reasonably foreseeable acts of co-conspirators in furtherance
of the conspiracy. United States v. Mateos, 623 F.3d 1350, 1370 (11th Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1540 (2011); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (providing
that, in the case of jointly undertaken criminal activity, all reasonably foreseeable acts
and omissions of others in furtherance of the criminal activity can count towards
offense characteristics). A court must first make individualized findings concerning
the scope of the defendant’s criminal activity, and then may consider all reasonably
foreseeable acts of others in the jointly undertaken criminal activity. Mateos, 623
F.3d at 1370. A failure to make such individualized findings does not require us to
vacate a sentence, however, if the record supports the district court’s determination.
United States v. Petrie, 302 F.3d 1280, 1290 (11th Cir. 2002). “In calculating the
amount of loss, the district court ‘need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss.’”
United States v. Grant, 431 F.3d 760, 762 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1,
comment. (n.3(C))).
3
Case: 11-14004 Date Filed: 07/23/2012 Page: 4 of 8
Here, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Fields’s offense
involved a loss of between $70,000 and $120,000. For starters, we are unpersuaded
by Fields’s claim that the court held her accountable for that loss amount merely
because she was in a personal relationship with co-conspirator Gerald Lange, since
the court found that Fields was an active participant in the conspiracy during their
relationship. Indeed, the testimony of the postal service inspector at sentencing
reflected that Fields had directly participated in stealing mail from mailboxes and
negotiating checks, that she had been present and acted as a lookout when Lange used
fraudulent checks, and that she and Lange had shared the proceeds after paying a
tribute to another co-conspirator. Thus, the court reasonably concluded that she had
“assist[ed] full force in this conspiracy,” and that those losses that Fields was not
“directly responsible for” were reasonably foreseeable, because Fields was aware of
the full scope of the fraudulent activity and knowingly participated in the scheme.
Moreover, the sum attributed to Fields was limited to those losses that occurred
during Fields’s participation in the conspiracy, and did not include losses that
occurred before or after she became a member.
We are also unpersuaded by Fields’s argument that the district court erred in
calculating the number of victims. For sentencing purposes, a “victim” is defined as
any person who sustained any part of the actual loss, with a “person” defined to
4
Case: 11-14004 Date Filed: 07/23/2012 Page: 5 of 8
include individuals, corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships,
societies, and joint stock companies. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 comment. (n.1). Actual loss
is further defined as “reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the
offense.” Id. at comment. (n.3(A)(i)). In the case of mail theft, a victim includes “any
person who was the intended recipient, or addressee, of the undelivered United States
mail.” Id. at comment. (n.4(C)(i)).
Fields’s argument that the government failed to prove that she victimized more
than 10 people, which, as Fields recognizes is “inextricably intertwined” with her
amount of loss argument, fails for the same reasons set forth above. The court did not
clearly err in attributing to Fields all of the victims injured as a result of the
conspiracy during the period that she was involved, since the evidence shows that
Fields was aware of the scope of the conspiracy and therefore the conduct of her
co-conspirators was reasonably foreseeable. As a result, because Fields participated
in mail theft, the court did not clearly err in finding that each addressee of the mail
stolen while she was a member of the conspiracy was a victim of her offense.
Nor do we find clear error in the district court’s application of the sophisticated
means enhancement. The sophisticated means enhancement is appropriate for
especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct, during either execution or
concealment of the conduct. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 comment. (n.8(B)). Only the totality
5
Case: 11-14004 Date Filed: 07/23/2012 Page: 6 of 8
of the scheme needs to be sophisticated, not each individual action. Barrington, 648
F.3d at 1199. Repetitive and coordinated activities by numerous individuals using
sophisticated technology can justify a sophisticated means enhancement. Id.
Here, the conspirators manufactured, and Fields used, Ohio driver’s licenses
containing all of the security features present on authentic licenses, and fraudulent
checks that met industry standards. The conspirators also varied the numbering on
the fraudulent checks they manufactured in order to avoid detection. This complex
conduct, using sophisticated technology, is sufficient to support a sophisticated means
enhancement. See Barrington, 648 F.3d at 1199. In addition, Fields’s counsel
recognized at sentencing that the other co-conspirators had acted in a sophisticated
fashion. Thus, the totality of the scheme was sophisticated, and the district court did
not clearly err in applying the sophisticated means enhancement to Fields.
Finally, we find no merit to Fields’s argument that the district court erred in
failing to give her a downward adjustment for having a minor role in the offense.
Under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, a defendant is entitled to a two-level decrease if she “was
a minor participant in any criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). The Application
Notes explain that such an adjustment is appropriate if a defendant “play[ed] a part
in committing the offense that makes him substantially less culpable than the average
participant.” Id. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.3(A)). To determine whether a defendant is
6
Case: 11-14004 Date Filed: 07/23/2012 Page: 7 of 8
entitled to a minor role reduction, the district court should consider her conduct in
comparison to the relevant conduct attributed to her in determining her base offense
level and in comparison to the conduct of the other participants. United States v.
Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d 1303, 1320 (11th Cir. 2010). The defendant bears the
burden of proving her minor role by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. However,
she “‘is not automatically entitled to a minor role adjustment merely because she was
somewhat less culpable than the other discernable participants.’” Id. at 1320-21
(quoting De Varon, 175 F.3d at 944).
Here, Fields argues that she should have been given the downward adjustment
because she was the least culpable person in the conspiracy, and was “merely a pawn
used by the other members.” However, even if Fields was less culpable than the
others, that fact alone would not entitle her to a minor role adjustment. See id. at
1320. Moreover, evidence before the sentencing court indicated that Fields was not
only aware of the scope of the fraudulent activity, but she also participated with the
co-conspirators in stealing checks from mailboxes and negotiating checks, and shared
in the proceeds of the fraud. Based on this evidence, the district court determined that
Fields had participated “full force” in the conspiracy, and had performed “essential
tasks.” Therefore, the district court did not clearly err in concluding that Fields’s role
was not minor.
7
Case: 11-14004 Date Filed: 07/23/2012 Page: 8 of 8
AFFIRMED.
8