FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 25 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL E. SPENCER, No. 09-16014
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:05-cv-04338-PJH
v.
MEMORANDUM*
RICHARD J. KIRKLAND,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 20, 2012**
San Francisco, California
Before: PAEZ and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and VANCE, Chief District Judge.***
Michael Spencer was sentenced to state prison for 121 years to life after a
jury found him guilty of committing three robberies and being a felon in
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Sarah S. Vance, Chief District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
possession of a firearm. During his trial, Spencer was visibly restrained. Spencer
argues that the manner in which he was restrained was an unreasonable application
of Supreme Court precedent and based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts. The district court denied Spencer’s request for habeas relief. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
Spencer does not challenge the trial court’s finding of a manifest need for
physical restraints, and the record supports such a finding. Instead, he argues that
the trial court failed to use less restrictive alternatives that would have allowed him
increased movement and would have been less obvious to the jury.
The Supreme Court recognizes that “the Constitution forbids the use of
visible shackles during [trial], unless that use is ‘justified by an essential state
interest’—such as the interest in courtroom security—specific to the defendant on
trial.” Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624 (2005). The Court has not, however,
“mandat[ed] specific procedures or evidence that must be considered before
imposing restraints.” Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 972 (9th Cir. 2010).
Because Spencer fails to cite to Supreme Court precedent requiring that the
trial court pursue less restrictive alternatives to his restraints, and because the state
court’s determination of the facts was not unreasonable, the district court properly
denied habeas relief.
2
AFFIRMED.
3