FILED
FOR PUBLICATION JUL 27 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DANIEL WAYNE COOK, No. 12-16562
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:97-cv-00146-RCB
v.
ORDER AND OPINION
CHARLES L. RYAN,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Robert C. Broomfield, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 26, 2012
San Francisco, California
Filed July 27, 2012
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, GRABER, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:
This is the second time Daniel Wayne Cook seeks habeas review in this
court. See Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 2008). Three things
have happened since we issued our decision in 2008. First, the Supreme Court
issued its decision in Martinez v. Ryan, -- U.S. -- , 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
Martinez “changed the landscape with respect to whether ineffectiveness of
postconviction counsel may establish cause for procedural default.” Lopez v. Ryan,
678 F.3d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 2012). Second, the State of Arizona issued a death
warrant and set August 8, 2012, as Cook’s execution date. Third, the district court
denied Cook’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) motion for relief from
judgment under Martinez. Cook v. Ryan, No. 97-cv-00146-RCB, 2012 WL
2798789 (D. Ariz. July 9, 2012) (unpublished).1
Cook asserts that his pretrial counsel was ineffective and that his
postconviction relief (“PCR”) counsel was ineffective in Cook’s presentation of
that claim. In Cook’s view, Martinez requires us to excuse his procedural default
because of ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) in his state PCR proceedings.
Cook also asks us to stay his execution so that he may further pursue his
underlying pretrial IAC claim.
We affirm the district court’s decision to deny Cook’s Rule 60(b) motion
and deny Cook’s motion for a stay of execution. Martinez does not apply to this
case given Cook’s decision to represent himself during his trial and at sentencing.
1
Cook filed a second habeas petition raising the same IAC claims that form
the basis of his Rule 60(b) motion. The district court dismissed the petition as a
second or successive petition barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Cook has not
appealed from that ruling, and we do not discuss it further.
2
Even if Martinez does apply, that decision affords Cook no relief because his
pretrial IAC claim lacks merit.
A unique feature of this case, and one that informs much of our analysis, is
that Cook’s pretrial counsel ceased to represent Cook after seven months, at which
point Cook decided to represent himself. The propriety of Cook’s waiver of
counsel has been fully litigated and is not at issue in this appeal. During his
limited period of representation, Cook’s pretrial counsel acted competently by,
among other things, procuring two mental evaluations and a hearing on Cook’s
competence to stand trial. Indeed, in Cook’s waiver of counsel hearing, Cook
stated that his lawyer “has worked hard for my defense; [he] cares about the
outcome of my trial.”
Cook’s pretrial counsel cannot be faulted for failing to develop a mitigation
case based on information that Cook knew but decided not to disclose, either
before or during sentencing. Even if such fault could be assigned to Cook’s
pretrial counsel, Cook cannot show prejudice because Cook affirmatively chose
not to present any mitigation information. Moreover, the same judge who
sentenced Cook in 1988 recently reviewed most of the “new” mitigation
information Cook has since developed and concluded that it would not have
3
changed his decision. Thus, even assuming Martinez applies to this case, Cook has
not raised a “substantial” claim that his pretrial counsel was ineffective.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual background
The facts are set forth in our opinion affirming the denial of Cook’s first
federal habeas petition, as well as in the Arizona Supreme Court’s opinion denying
Cook’s direct appeal. See Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1008-09 (9th Cir.
2008); State v. Cook, 821 P.2d 731, 736-37 (Ariz. 1991). To summarize, at about
6 p.m. on July 19, 1987, Cook suggested to his roommate, John Eugene Matzke,
that the two men steal money from Carlos Cruz-Ramos, a co-worker at a local
restaurant who recently had moved in with Cook and Matzke. After Cruz-Ramos
realized his money was gone, Cook and Matzke tied Cruz-Ramos to a chair and
tortured him for six hours. Among other things, Cook and Matzke beat
Cruz-Ramos with a metal pipe; burned his chest, stomach, and genitals with
cigarettes; and cut his chest with a knife. Cook also raped Cruz-Ramos and stapled
Cruz-Ramos’s foreskin to a chair. Matzke finally strangled Cruz-Ramos to death
with a metal pipe, and the two men put his body in a closet.
At around 2:30 or 3 a.m., Kevin Swaney arrived at Cook and Matzke’s
apartment. Swaney was a 16-year-old dishwasher at the restaurant where Cook
4
and Matzke worked. Cook originally told Swaney to go away, but then invited him
in. Cook barricaded the door after telling Swaney that he and Matzke had drugs
they wanted to get rid of. Cook took Swaney upstairs and showed him
Cruz-Ramos’s body. When they returned downstairs, Swaney was crying. Cook
and Matzke forced Swaney to undress and then gagged him and tied him to a chair.
Matzke told Cook he wanted no part of any torture, and went to the living room
and fell asleep. At around 4:30 or 5 a.m., Cook woke Matzke. Swaney remained
tied and gagged and was crying. Cook told Matzke they had to kill Swaney
because he (Cook) had raped him. Cook then strangled Swaney, and the two men
put his body in the closet. Cook and Matzke went to sleep.
Matzke went to work that afternoon but returned home a few hours later. He
and Cook went to a bar and then hung out with Byron Watkins and other friends by
the pool of their apartment complex, as well as in their apartment. The following
morning, Matzke showed Watkins the bodies. Watkins convinced Matzke to go to
the police. The two men went to the police department, whereupon Matzke gave a
videotaped statement.
The police went to Cook and Matzke’s apartment and arrested Cook. After
receiving Miranda warnings, Cook said, “we got to partying; things got out of
hand; now two people are dead.” Cook then said, “my roommate killed one and I
5
killed the other.” He specifically admitted choking Swaney to death. After
making these statements, Cook refused to say anything further.
B. Procedural background
1. Proceedings before and during trial
The long procedural history of this matter is set forth in Cook, 538 F.3d at
1009-14. As relevant here, Cook and Matzke were charged with two counts of
first-degree murder, including a death penalty allegation under Arizona Revised
Statute § 13-703. The trial court appointed attorney Claude Keller (hereinafter
“pretrial counsel”) to represent Cook. A grand jury returned an indictment on two
counts of first-degree murder against both defendants.
Cook was given two pretrial psychological evaluations. After a hearing, the
trial court concluded that Cook was competent to stand trial. Cook was then given
an additional neurological examination, the results of which were filed with the
trial court. A couple of months later, Cook filed a pro se motion to waive counsel
and have his counsel appointed as advisory counsel. During the ensuing hearing,
Cook asked that the trial court “not appoint Mr. Keller as my legal advisor.” Cook
explained, “Mr. Keller has worked hard for my defense; cares about the outcome
of my trial. My personal belief[] is that he cannot advise me according to my
defense.” Cook asked for a specific attorney, but the trial court said only someone
6
else was available, whom Cook rejected. The trial court explained at length the
perils of self-representation, but Cook still wanted to proceed pro se. The court
then conducted extensive questioning pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 835 (1975), and found that Cook knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
relinquished his right to counsel. The court granted Cook’s motion and appointed
Keller as Cook’s advisory counsel. This was two weeks before trial.
Matzke entered into a stipulated guilty plea and was sentenced to 20 years in
prison. Matzke testified against Cook at Cook’s trial. At the end of the trial, the
jury deliberated for 77 minutes before returning a guilty verdict against Cook on
both first-degree murder counts.
Following his conviction, Cook continued to represent himself and presented
no mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing, stating that the “[o]nly sentence I
will accept from this Court at this time is the penalty of death, your Honor. I have
nothing further.” The court reviewed the presentence report, the mental health
evaluations, the State’s sentencing memorandum, a letter from Cook, the trial
evidence, and matters from hearings in the case. The court found three aggravating
factors (the murders were multiple, were committed for pecuniary gain, and were
committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner). The court found
7
no mitigating factors to offset these aggravating factors and sentenced Cook to
death.
2. State PCR and federal habeas proceedings
Cook, with the help of a lawyer (hereinafter “appellate counsel”), filed a
direct appeal in which he raised 16 issues. Cook argued, among other things, that
the trial court had erred in allowing him to waive his appointed trial counsel. The
Arizona Supreme Court rejected this claim, explaining that “[w]hile Cook certainly
lacked a lawyer’s skills, the record demonstrates that he was intellectually
competent, understood the trial process, and was capable of making—and did
make—rational decisions in managing his case.” Cook, 821 P.2d at 739.
While his appeal was pending, Cook filed a motion to relieve his appellate
counsel for allegedly failing to communicate with him and explain the issues to
him. Cook also filed, pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, a PCR
petition asserting IAC by his pretrial counsel. Cook’s appellate counsel moved to
withdraw or, in the alternative, to have the Arizona Supreme Court clarify his
status. The Arizona Supreme Court denied the motion to withdraw and issued an
order finding Cook’s PCR petition premature, appointing new counsel for PCR
proceedings, and granting additional time to file an amended PCR petition, if
necessary. About nine months later, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Cook’s
8
conviction and sentence. Cook, 821 P.2d at 756. The United States Supreme
Court denied Cook’s petition for certiorari. Cook v. Arizona, 506 U.S. 846 (1992).
In September 1993, Cook filed, through counsel John Williams (hereinafter
“first PCR counsel”), a “Supplement to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief” in
Arizona Superior Court. The supplemental petition raised nine claims, two of
which were that Cook’s pretrial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate
and prepare for trial and sentencing, and that this ineffectiveness forced Cook to
choose between ineffective counsel and self-representation. In May 1994, Cook’s
first PCR counsel moved to withdraw due to a conflict and the court appointed a
new attorney, Michael Terribile (hereinafter “second PCR counsel”). In various
rulings issued in late 1994 and early 1995, the trial court—which was the same
court that presided over Cook’s trial and sentencing—rejected some of Cook’s
supplemental PCR issues as precluded or not colorable and denied the others on
their merits after holding evidentiary hearings to receive any newly discovered
evidence.2
In denying Cook’s pretrial IAC and “forced” self-representation claims, the
court explained that Cook failed to show prejudice or deficient performance.
2
During one of the evidentiary hearings, Cook’s second PCR counsel
elicited testimony about pretrial counsel’s actions in preparing Cook’s case,
alleged inexperience with capital cases and applicable law, and personal problems.
9
Specifically: (1) there was “no evidence of witnesses who could have been called
that would have testified in a way that was beneficial” to Cook; (2) the court could
only speculate as to what might have happened at trial had Cook not represented
himself or had Cook’s pretrial counsel “done a better job”; (3) Cook did not show
any specific deficiency, and no case required the judge to inquire into the
effectiveness of appointed counsel in determining whether a waiver of counsel is
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Cook, through his second PCR counsel, filed a motion for rehearing
regarding several of the claims asserted in his supplemental PCR petition, as well
as one new claim. Cook sought rehearing of his self-representation/waiver claim,
but not of his pretrial IAC claim. The court denied the motion for rehearing. Cook
then filed a petition for review that simply stated, “Daniel Wayne Cook, through
counsel and pursuant to Rule 32.9 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure,
petitions the Arizona Supreme Court for review.” The Arizona Supreme Court
denied the petition and the United States Supreme Court denied Cook’s petition for
certiorari. Cook v. Arizona, 519 U.S. 1013 (1996).
In January 1997, Cook filed a federal habeas petition in Arizona district
court. The court appointed habeas counsel and granted Cook’s motion to proceed
10
in forma pauperis.3 Cook asserted 21 claims for relief, among them the claim that
his decision to waive counsel was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, as well
as the claim that his pretrial counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate
mitigating evidence. The district court denied Cook’s waiver claim on its merits,
holding that no clearly established federal law required the state trial court to
inquire into Cook’s dissatisfaction with pretrial counsel’s performance before
allowing him to waive representation. Cook v. Schriro, No. 97-cv-00146-RCB,
2006 WL 842276, at *6-10 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2006) (unpublished). As for Cook’s
independent pretrial IAC claim, the court held that this claim was procedurally
barred because Cook had failed to preserve it in his motion for rehearing. Under
the version of Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.9 that applied to Cook,
[a]ny party aggrieved by a final decision of the trial court in these
proceedings may, within ten days after the ruling of the court, move
the court for a rehearing setting forth in detail the grounds for
believing the court erred.
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(a). Moreover, “[o]n denial of a motion for rehearing any
party aggrieved may petition the appropriate appellate court for review of the
actions of the trial court.” Id. R. 32.9(c). Thus, a petitioner could (but was not
3
The court originally appointed an attorney from the federal public
defender’s office, but he was replaced by a Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”) attorney.
That CJA attorney continues to represent Cook, including in this appeal.
11
required to) seek rehearing, but doing so was a prerequisite to further review.
Moreover, failure to file a detailed motion for rehearing waived further review.4
See State v. Gause, 541 P. 2d 396, 397 (Ariz. 1975); State v. Bortz, 821 P. 2d 236,
239 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
On appeal in 2008, we affirmed the district court’s rulings. As relevant here,
we concluded that “the state trial court’s determination that Cook’s waiver of his
right to counsel was voluntary . . . was not objectively unreasonable.” Cook, 538
F.3d at 1015. We also affirmed the district court’s ruling that Cook’s claim that his
pretrial counsel was ineffective was procedurally barred. Specifically, we held that
“preclusion for failure to preserve the issue on motion for rehearing was proper”
under Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) and 32.9(c), and thus that
“Cook must demonstrate cause and prejudice in order to excuse his procedural
default.” Id. at 1027 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)).
Cook argued that he had cause because his second PCR counsel was ineffective in
failing to preserve his pretrial IAC claim in the motion for rehearing and the
4
The Arizona Supreme Court changed Rule 32.9 in June 1992 to eliminate
the requirement for a detailed motion for rehearing. However, the court made that
change applicable only to defendants sentenced after December 1, 1992, well after
Cook’s sentencing. Cook’s first PCR counsel “realized that the former Rule 32.9
governed the case and filed an unopposed motion for rehearing to conform to the
old rule.” Cook, 538 F.3d at 1026-27.
12
petition for review. We rejected this argument, citing a long line of Supreme Court
and Ninth Circuit cases for the proposition that IAC in post-conviction proceedings
does not establish cause. Id. at 1027-28; see, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53;
see also Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing these
cases); Towery v. Ryan, 673 F.3d 933, 941 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (same). We also cited the fact that Cook had no right to counsel
at the motion for rehearing stage. Cook, 538 F.3d at 1027 (citing State v. Smith,
910 P.2d 1, 4 (Ariz. 1996) (“After counsel or the pro per defendant submits the
post-conviction petition to the court and the trial court makes its required review
and disposition, counsel’s obligations are at an end.”)). Because Cook was unable
to show cause, we did not consider whether he suffered prejudice. Id. at 1028 n.13.
We affirmed the district court’s denial of Cook’s habeas petition, and the Supreme
Court denied Cook’s petition for certiorari. Id. at 1031; Cook v. Schriro, 555 U.S.
1141 (2009).
13
3. Additional post-trial proceedings
In January 2009, after the Supreme Court denied certiorari, the State of
Arizona sought a warrant of execution.5 The Arizona Supreme Court declined to
issue a warrant because litigation regarding the constitutionality of Arizona’s
lethal-injection protocol was then underway. Cook filed a second PCR petition
challenging the lethal-injection protocol, but also asserting that his pretrial counsel
was ineffective in failing to investigate mitigating evidence. In December 2009,
the trial court denied Cook’s second PCR petition after concluding, among other
things, that Cook’s pretrial IAC claim had been previously litigated and therefore
was barred. In September 2010, the Arizona Supreme Court denied Cook’s
petition for review, and the State once again sought a warrant of execution.
5
In February 2009, Cook sought, and we granted, re-appointment of an
attorney from the federal defender’s office to represent Cook, along with his CJA
attorney, in potential further proceedings. See infra. Specifically, Cook sought re-
appointment of the federal defender’s office on the grounds that his CJA attorney
had “never litigated a death penalty case through execution,” and that the federal
defender’s office would help his CJA attorney: (1) mount a challenge to Arizona’s
lethal injection protocol; (2) assert unexhausted claims “based on changes in recent
state and federal law”; (3) provide funding for a mental health expert to explore
“issues related to competency”; (4) file a second or successive habeas petition
based on new constitutional rules of law or a showing of actual innocence; and (5)
pursue any due process violations that might occur during clemency proceedings.
Cook did not argue that he needed the federal defender’s expertise or resources to
conduct an investigation into mitigating circumstances.
14
In November 2010, while the State’s warrant request was pending, Cook
filed a third PCR petition seeking relief on the ground that newly discovered
information likely would have led the original state trial court to impose a sentence
other than death. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e), (h) (allowing PCR relief on
grounds of newly discovered evidence). Specifically, based on an investigation
conducted by his federal defender, Cook presented the declarations of Cook’s
mother, sister, and a former group home parent, all of whom knew Cook as a child
or adolescent. These declarations documented a long history of physical and
sexual abuse by family members, sexual abuse by the group home parent, a gang
rape by Cook’s peers in the group home when Cook was fifteen years old, and
Cook’s own drug and alcohol abuse. Several of the declarants indicated that no
one had contacted them previously.6
In addition, Cook presented the declaration of a psychiatrist who reviewed
information from Cook’s trial and the declarations and records described above.
The psychiatrist opined that, at the time Cook committed the murders, Cook
suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), “organic mental syndrome,
not otherwise specified,” and alcohol and amphetamine intoxication. A letter and a
6
As part of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion, Cook submitted additional
declarations containing similar statements.
15
declaration from a clinical psychologist highlighted what the psychologist believed
were deficiencies in Cook’s pretrial competency evaluations.
Finally, Cook presented the declaration of Eric Larsen, the lead prosecutor at
Cook’s trial in 1988. Larsen declared that Cook’s pretrial counsel was at the “low
end of the competency scale” and “did not speak with me about mitigating
circumstances.” Larsen also declared that: he reviewed the declarations of Cook’s
relatives; “[e]vidence of [Cook’s] brain damage and post-traumatic stress disorder
was present at the time that Mr. Cook was arrested and tried for murder”; and
“[h]ad I been informed of this mitigating information regarding Mr. Cook’s
severely abusive and traumatic childhood and his mental illnesses, I would not
have sought the death penalty in this case.”7
7
Cook asserted in his Rule 60(b)(6) motion that all of this newly discovered
mitigation information
could not have been presented in Cook’s 1997 petition for habeas
corpus, because it was not until the Federal Public Defender for the
District of Arizona was appointed co-counsel for Cook in 2009, with
its financial and personnel resources to carry out the necessary
investigative and professional investigations and evaluations, that a
proper mitigation investigation could be accomplished. It was in the
process of preparing for clemency . . . that facts were uncovered to
support an application such as is made here.
16
In January 2011, the trial court denied Cook’s third PCR petition. State v.
Cook, No. CR-9358 (Maricopa Co. Sup. Ct. Jan. 27, 2011).8 The judge—who
again was the same judge who presided over Cook’s trial and
sentencing—considered Cook’s additional information and explained that it either
reflected information the court already knew in 1988 or was irrelevant post-hoc
speculation. Thus, the judge still would have imposed the death penalty. The
judge also concluded that Cook had not been diligent in securing his PTSD
diagnosis.
The Arizona Supreme Court then issued a warrant of execution for April 5,
2011. Cook filed a petition for review to that court of the trial court’s denial of his
third PCR petition. Among other things, he argued that his lack of diligence in
developing the PTSD diagnosis was the result of his first PCR counsel’s
ineffectiveness. The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review. Cook
filed a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court and sought a stay
of execution pending the Court’s resolution of the petition in Martinez. The Court
granted a stay pending the resolution of Cook’s certiorari petition. Cook v.
Arizona, 131 S. Ct. 1847 (2011).
8
We take judicial notice of this decision. See Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d
854, 866 (9th Cir. 2002) (taking judicial notice of state judicial opinion).
17
4. Martinez
In March 2012, the Supreme Court decided Martinez. The Court
established an equitable, rather than constitutional, “narrow exception” to the rule
previously announced in Coleman:
Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a
procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a
substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the
initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel
in that proceeding was ineffective.
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320. Thus, under Martinez, a petitioner may establish
cause for procedural default of a trial IAC claim, where the state (like Arizona)
required the petitioner to raise that claim in collateral proceedings, by
demonstrating two things: (1) “counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding,
where the claim should have been raised, was ineffective under the standards of
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),” and (2) “the underlying
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say
that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.” Martinez, 132
S. Ct. at 1318.
Immediately after deciding Martinez, the Supreme Court denied Cook’s
certiorari petition, Cook v. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 1790 (2012), and the State sought a
new warrant of execution. Cook filed a motion before the Supreme Court for leave
18
to file an untimely petition for rehearing from the Court’s 2009 denial of his
petition for certiorari in the federal habeas proceedings, urging a remand to allow
the Ninth Circuit to apply Martinez to Cook’s pretrial and PCR IAC claims. On
May 29, 2012, the Court denied Cook’s motion. Cook v. Schriro, 132 S. Ct. 2709
(2012).
5. Current proceedings
On June 5, 2012, Cook filed in Arizona district court the Rule 60(b) motion
that underlies this appeal. On June 12, 2012, the Arizona Supreme Court issued a
warrant of execution for August 8, 2012. Cook filed a motion for stay of execution
pending the district court’s disposition of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion.
On July 9, 2012, the district court denied Cook’s motions. Applying the
six-factor test from Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2009); see also
Lopez, 678 F.3d at 1135-37, the court concluded that Martinez does not constitute
an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying relief under Rule 60(b). Although
certain factors favored granting relief, others—namely finality, comity, and the
degree of connection between Cook’s claims and Martinez—did not. Furthermore,
the court held, Cook failed to show that his underlying pretrial IAC claim was
substantial, and therefore he could not establish cause under Martinez for his
procedural default.
19
Cook timely appeals the district court’s order denying his Rule 60(b)(6)
motion. Cook also seeks a stay of his execution from this court.
DISCUSSION
A. Cook’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion is not a second or successive petition under
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
A Rule 60(b)(6) motion constitutes a second or successive habeas petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) when it “seeks to add a new ground” for relief or “it
attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim on the merits . . . .”
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532 (2005) (emphasis in original). “On the
merits” means “a determination that there exist or do not exist grounds entitling a
petitioner to habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a) and (d).” Id. at 532
n.4. A habeas petitioner does not seek merits review “when he merely asserts that
a previous ruling which precluded a merits determination was in error—for
example, a denial for such reasons as failure to exhaust, procedural default, or
statute-of-limitations bar.” Id.
We agree with the district court that Cook’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion is not a
barred second or successive habeas petition. In his motion, Cook seeks relief not
from the district court’s ruling on the merits of his claim that his waiver of counsel
was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because his pretrial counsel was
ineffective, but from the district court’s ruling that his separate claim that his
20
counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and prepare a mitigation plan was
procedurally barred.9 The district court correctly interpreted the statement in
Cook—that “the trial court’s rulings on Cook’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claims were not contrary to or unreasonable applications of Strickland,” Cook, 538
F.3d at 1016—as being limited to the waiver issue. Section 2244(b) therefore did
not bar the district court from considering Cook’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion.
B. Cook is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
We review the district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of
discretion. Delay v. Gordon, 475 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2007). “‘However, as
the Supreme Court held in Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 536-38, appellate courts may, in
their discretion, decide the merits of a Rule 60(b) motion in the first instance on
appeal.’” Lopez, 678 F.3d at 1135 (quoting Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1134-35).
Whether we conduct our review independently or through the lens of the district
court’s discretion, Cook’s claim to Rule 60(b)(6) relief fails. Even if Cook
otherwise could “show ‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying the reopening of a
final judgment,” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535 (citations omitted), the ground for his
motion—Martinez—affords him no relief.
9
Although the two claims are interrelated, as we discuss infra, they are
sufficiently separate to evade § 2244(b)’s bar.
21
1. Martinez does not apply to Cook’s claims.
In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975), the Supreme Court
explained that, “[w]hen an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a
purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to
counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must
‘knowingly and intelligently’ forgo those relinquished benefits.” The Court also
explained that, “whatever else may or may not be open to him on appeal, a
defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the
quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of ‘effective assistance of
counsel.’” Id. at 834 n.46.
In this case, Cook was represented by pretrial counsel from August 1987
through April 1988. Cook then made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver
of his right to counsel,10 and represented himself at his trial and sentencing hearing.
Even if Cook’s pretrial counsel performed deficiently during the seven months he
represented Cook (a contention we reject below), Cook could have corrected those
10
As discussed supra, we previously rejected Cook’s claim that his waiver
was not voluntary. See Cook, 538 F.3d at 1015.
22
errors once he decided to represent himself.11 Faretta therefore precludes Cook
from complaining about the “quality of his own defense.” It follows that the
reason given by the Supreme Court for creating an exception to the Coleman rule
in Martinez—“[t]o protect prisoners with a potentially legitimate claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel”—does not apply to Cook. Martinez, 132 S.
Ct. at 1315 (emphasis added).12
11
This is particularly true because Cook already knew much, if not all, of the
information he now faults his counsel for failing to develop. Indeed, Cook admits
that much of his “new” mitigation information was “available” before and during
his trial in 1988. Cook has to admit this: even if he was not completely aware of
the mental impairments he now alleges he had at the time he committed the
murders, he plainly was aware of his own troubled childhood and adolescence.
Yet Cook apparently never told his pretrial or PCR counsel about that mitigation
information, never presented the information during the penalty phase of his trial
(instead saying that he would accept only the death penalty, and that he had
“nothing further”), and never presented the information in his federal habeas
proceedings, even though he has been represented by the same counsel since his
habeas proceedings commenced in 1997.
Cook points to the district court’s decision to deny his request for funding in
2000. However, while Cook said he needed funds for a “documents
investigator/mitigation specialist” and a mental health examination, his pretrial
IAC claim was not among the claims for which he said he needed those things.
Cook also suggests that it was not until he had the additional resources of the
federal defender’s office in 2009 “that a proper mitigation investigation could be
accomplished.” But Cook did not seek that assistance to develop a mitigation case.
See supra. Finally, even if these explanations had merit, they fail to explain
Cook’s inaction before 2000.
12
We do not hold that a Martinez claim can never be available to a
defendant who represents himself. Here, however, the conduct of the trial and
sentencing phases, and Cook’s strategy, were his own.
23
In short, Cook’s trial counsel was, at his own request, Cook. Accordingly,
he cannot claim he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Nor can Cook be
prejudiced by PCR counsel’s alleged failures to assert IAC by trial counsel where,
again, Cook chose to forego trial counsel. Nonetheless, even if Martinez applied to
Cook notwithstanding Faretta, he is not entitled to relief because his pretrial IAC
claim is not substantial.
2. Cook’s underlying pretrial IAC claim is not substantial.
To succeed under Martinez, a petitioner must “demonstrate that the
underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which
is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.”
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. “Thus, Martinez requires that a petitioner’s claim of
cause for a procedural default be rooted in ‘a potentially legitimate claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.’” Lopez, 678 F.3d at 1137-38 (quoting
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315); see also Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1319 (“When faced
with the question whether there is cause for an apparent default, a State may
answer that the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is insubstantial, i.e., it
does not have any merit or that it is wholly without factual support . . . .”).
As an initial matter, Cook argues that the district court applied too exacting a
standard to his pretrial IAC claim. In Cook’s view, the court evaluated whether
24
Cook would succeed on his IAC claim, rather than whether his claim was
“substantial,” i.e., “has some merit.”13 Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. We disagree.
Here, while the district court explained that Cook “cannot establish” deficient
performance or prejudice, the court was clear that it was applying the “Martinez
test of substantiality.” Lopez, 678 F.3d at 1138.
Cook’s pretrial IAC claim—that his pretrial counsel was ineffective in
failing to investigate and to prepare a mitigation case for sentencing—does not
meet Martinez’s test. An IAC claim has merit where counsel’s “performance was
unreasonable under prevailing professional standards,” and (2) “there is a
reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would
have been different.” Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001)
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-91, 694).
First, Cook cannot show that his pretrial counsel performed deficiently.
Cook’s lawyer represented Cook for just seven months. During that time, the
13
In explaining that an underlying trial IAC claim must have “some merit,”
Martinez referenced, not as direct but as generally analogous support, Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003), which sets forth the standards for issuing
certificates of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Under Miller-El, a certificate
of appealability should issue where the “resolution [of a habeas petitioner’s claim]
[is] debatable amongst jurists of reason.” Id. at 336. A court should conduct a
“general assessment of the[] merits,” but should not decline to issue a certificate
“merely because it believes the applicant will not demonstrate an entitlement to
relief.” Id. at 336-37.
25
lawyer obtained two mental health evaluations, hired an investigator who
interviewed several witnesses, filed a host of motions, and caused the trial court to
hold a competency hearing. In particular, Cook’s two mental health evaluations
provided detailed information about Cook’s background, mental state at the time of
the murders, and competency to stand trial. The first evaluation, conducted by Dr.
Daniel Wynkoop, a psychologist, described Cook’s unstable home life, juvenile
delinquency, continuing drug and alcohol use, sexual abuse, emotional instability,
and repeated hospitalizations for depression. The second evaluation, conducted by
Dr. Eugene Almer, a psychiatrist, recapped much of the first evaluation but also
detailed the unstable life of Cook’s parents and siblings, Cook’s medical history,
and other topics. Dr. Almer reviewed Dr. Wynkoop’s evaluation, “extensive”
medical records, and a taped interview of Cook’s mother and stepfather that was
conducted after the murders. Although both doctors explained that Cook likely
had been using drugs and alcohol when he committed the murders, they also
explained that he did not have significant cognitive deficits or organic brain
problems. Finally, both doctors concluded that Cook was competent to assist his
pretrial counsel in his defense, with Dr. Wynkoop adding that Cook “could provide
considerable data if he so chose.”
26
As the district court explained, it is apparent from these evaluations that
Cook’s pretrial counsel obtained extensive records and background information
about his client during the limited period during which he represented Cook. It is
also apparent that the state trial court, which reviewed these evaluations, the
presentence report, the State’s sentencing memorandum, a letter from Cook, the
trial evidence, and the testimony from evidentiary hearings, was aware of that
information when it imposed the death penalty. Given these facts, we cannot say
that Cook’s pretrial counsel performed deficiently.14
14
Thus, this is not a case where a lawyer knew his client had or might have
mitigating circumstances but did nothing to investigate them. Cf. James v. Ryan,
679 F.3d 780, 807-10 (9th Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, -- U.S.L.W. -- (U.S.
June 28, 2012) (No. 12-11) (finding deficient performance where counsel “failed to
conduct even the most basic investigation of James’s social history” despite
“obvious indications” of a troubled childhood and mental health problems).
Nor is this a case in which counsel discovered initial mitigating information
and then did nothing further despite continuing to represent his client through
sentencing. Cf. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523-28 (2003) (holding that
counsel performed deficiently where they considered only basic social history
documents, conducted no further investigation after learning of possible leads, and
presented no mitigating information at the sentencing hearing); Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 370, 396 (2000) (counsel performed deficiently where he failed to,
among other things, present known mitigating information during sentencing);
James, 679 F.3d at 807-10 (finding deficient performance where counsel learned of
substantial mitigating information following guilty verdict but failed to present it
during the sentencing hearing).
As discussed above, Cook’s pretrial counsel took actions that were
reasonable “under prevailing professional norms,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,
especially in light of the short period during which Cook allowed his counsel to
represent him.
27
Our conclusion is bolstered by the unique procedural history of this case,
and in particular Cook’s own role in it. First, Cook’s pretrial counsel represented
him for at most seven months, before Cook successfully moved to represent
himself. In doing so, Cook accepted responsibility for preparing for his trial and
sentencing hearing. Second, the information Cook’s pretrial counsel allegedly
failed to discover or to develop during this short period was peculiarly within
Cook’s knowledge, but he withheld that information from his counsel and the
court. Indeed, Dr. Wynkoop noted that Cook could provide considerable data if he
chose to. Instead, Cook declined to provide any information, going so far as to say
at sentencing that the “[o]nly sentence I will accept from this Court at this time is
the penalty of death, your Honor. I have nothing further.”15
Even if Cook’s pretrial counsel could be faulted for not developing
information that Cook withheld, Cook cannot show that he suffered any prejudice
15
Even though Cook never told his counsel about his own background, Cook
argues that the need for a more “thorough” investigation nonetheless was made
apparent by his pretrial motion for a competency hearing, in which he revealed that
he had been a patient at two mental hospitals and received treatment at a mental
health clinic, and that a car had run over his head. However, that information was
more fully developed during, and as a result of, the dual competency evaluations.
As for the alleged car accident, Dr. Almer discussed it in his report, even though
the neurology expert who examined Cook’s hospital records found no record of a
head injury. When confronted with this fact, Cook claimed his records had been
“transferred.” The expert also conducted a neurological exam of Cook and
concluded that it was “[c]ompletely normal.”
28
as a result of that alleged error. First, whether Cook’s pretrial counsel had
developed further mitigation information would have made no difference given
that Cook already knew the information but affirmatively chose not to present it.
See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 477 (2007) (“The District Court was
entitled to conclude that regardless of what information counsel might have
uncovered in his investigation, Landrigan would have interrupted and refused to
allow his counsel to present any such evidence.”).
Second, the same trial judge who sentenced Cook to death in 1988 has stated
that Cook’s additional information would not have made any difference. See id. at
476 (“And it is worth noting, again, that the judge presiding on postconviction
review was ideally situated to make this assessment because she is the same judge
who sentenced Landrigan and discussed these issues with him.”). In ruling on
Cook’s third PCR petition, the judge considered much of Cook’s “new” mitigation
information, particularly his PTSD diagnosis. The judge explained that Cook’s
“subsequent diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder simply gave a name to
significant mental health issues that were already known to the Court at the time of
sentencing.” Thus, the judge, writing as the court, determined “unequivocally that
if it had known in 1988 that the Defendant had been diagnosed with post-traumatic
29
stress disorder at the time of the murders it still would have imposed the death
penalty.”
The trial judge also explained that the declaration of Eric Larsen, the
prosecutor-turned-criminal-defense-attorney who said he would not have sought
the death penalty had he known about Cook’s mitigating circumstances,
represented “the ultimate in speculation.” Given the prosecutor’s background and
practices in 1987 and 1988, as well as the “fairly regular basis” on which the
prosecutor’s office sought the death penalty during that period, it was
“unfathomable” that the death penalty would not have been sought in a case
“involving the torture, mutilation, and eventual killing of 2 completely innocent
victims.” That was true “even for a defendant who was known to have been
diagnosed” with PTSD. We think these observations, made by the same judge who
sentenced Cook nearly 25 years ago, are persuasive.
In sum, Cook fails to set forth a substantial claim that his pretrial counsel
performed deficiently or that, even if he did, Cook suffered prejudice. This
conclusion supports the district court’s denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief.
C. Cook has not established that he is entitled to a stay of execution.
“[L]ike other stay applicants, inmates seeking time to challenge the manner
in which the State plans to execute them must satisfy all of the requirements for a
30
stay, including a showing of a significant possibility of success on the merits.”
Hill v. McDonald, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006). As discussed supra, we reject
Cook’s Martinez claim on the grounds that Martinez does not apply, and that, even
if it does, Cook’s pretrial IAC claim is not substantial. Because Cook therefore
fails to show “a significant possibility of success on the merits,” we must deny his
request for a stay.
We also conclude that Cook fails to meet two of the three remaining
requirements for a stay: “that the balance of equities tips in his favor[] and that an
injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555
U.S. 7, 20 (2008). As discussed supra, Cook has delayed for 25 years disclosing
much of the information on which he now premises his pretrial IAC claim. Cf.
Hill, 547 U.S. at 584 (explaining that where a prisoner has delayed bringing his
claim, the equities cut sharply against him); Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court, 503 U.S.
653, 654 (1992) (per curiam) (noting that the “last-minute nature of an application”
or an applicant’s “attempt at manipulation” of the judicial process may be grounds
for denial of a stay). In addition, the citizens of the State of Arizona—especially
the families of Carlos Cruz-Ramos and Kevin Swaney—have a compelling interest
in seeing that Arizona’s lawful judgments against Cook are enforced.
31
CONCLUSION
The district court properly denied Cook’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief
from judgment. Martinez does not apply to Cook given Cook’s decision to
represent himself. Even if Martinez does apply, Cook has not established that his
pretrial counsel IAC claim is substantial. Cook also fails to meet the requirements
for a stay of execution. The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED, and Cook’s
motion for a stay of execution is DENIED.
32
COUNSEL
Michael J. Meehan (argued), Law Office of Michael Meehan, Tucson, Arizona,
and Dale A. Baich and Robin C. Konrad, Federal Public Defender, Capital Habeas
Unit, Phoenix, Arizona (on the briefs), for Petitioner-Appellant Daniel Wayne
Cook.
Kent E. Cattani (argued) and Thomas C. Horne (on the briefs), Office of the
Attorney General, Phoenix, Arizona, for Respondent-Appellee Charles L. Ryan.
33