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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-10120
Non-Argument Calendar
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Agency No. A079 478 211
CRISTIAN HOYOS SALAZAR,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Respondent.
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Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
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(July 30, 2012)
Before CARNES, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Cristian Hoyos Salazar (“Hoyos”), a citizen of Colombia, petitions for
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review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen based on changed country
conditions. On appeal, Hoyos states that the underlying basis for his motion to
reopen is the subsequent grant of his parents’ asylum applications. Hoyos argues
that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen because the
BIA failed to consider all of the evidence submitted with the motion; the evidence
submitted with Hoyos’s motion purports to show that since his application for
asylum and withholding of removal was denied in 2004, the persecution in
Colombia has continued to escalate.
We review the denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.
Jiang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 568 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2009). Our review is
limited to determining whether the BIA exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or
capricious manner. Id.
A party may only file one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that
motion “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the
motion is granted, and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary
material.” INA § 240(c)(7)(A), (B); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (B). Under 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), a “motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of
the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal,” subject to certain
exceptions. INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). The 90-day
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period for filing a motion to reopen is jurisdictional and mandatory. Abdi v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 430 F.3d 1148, 1150 (11th Cir. 2005). An exception to the time and
number limit applies if the motion to reopen is for the purpose of reapplying for
relief “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in
the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and
was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous
hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (c)(3)(ii); see INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
We have held that, at a minimum, the BIA may deny a motion to reopen on
the following three grounds: (1) failure to establish a prima facie case; (2) failure
to introduce evidence that was material and previously unavailable; or (3) a
determination that an alien is not entitled to a favorable exercise of discretion
despite statutory eligibility for relief. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1302
(11th Cir. 2001).
Even in the context of a ruling on the merits, the BIA or the IJ is not
required to discuss in its opinion every piece of evidence presented. Tan v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1369, 1374 (11th Cir. 2006). Where the BIA has given
reasoned consideration to the petition, and made adequate findings, we will not
require that it address specifically each claim the petitioner made or each piece of
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evidence the petitioner presented. See id. Rather, the BIA must “consider the
issues raised and announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing
court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted.” See id.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hoyos’s motion to reopen,
because that motion was untimely and Hoyos failed to establish changed country
conditions in Colombia. The fact that Hoyos’s family was granted asylum in 2009
based on the same set of facts does not establish that conditions in Colombia have
materially changed since the BIA affirmed Hoyos’s order of removal in 2004. In
support of his motion to reopen, Hoyos submitted four affidavits from three people
in Colombia who rented Hoyos’s family’s home and his father’s affidavit stating
that he was unable to rent their home in Colombia because people associated with
FARC continued to search for and threaten Hoyos and his family. These affidavits
do not establish changed country conditions in Colombia, but instead show that he
faced the same fear of persecution that he did at the time of his removal hearing.
Likewise, the expert witness affidavit and the 2010 State Department Country
Report are not material because they do not establish changed country conditions
in Colombia. The affidavit and the Country Report show that FARC continues to
commit human rights abuse and violence in Colombia. Having not demonstrated
materially changed country conditions, Hoyos’s motion to reopen was both time-
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and number-barred. See INA § 240(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C);
8 C.F.R. §1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
Although Hoyos argues that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his
motion to reopen because the BIA failed to consider all of the evidence submitted,
the record shows that the BIA noted that Hoyos submitted “limited evidence” with
his motion but concluded that the evidence did not demonstrate changed country
conditions. Because the BIA adequately explained the decision, it was not
required to provide a detailed explanation about how the affidavits and Country
Report did not support Hoyos’s claim of changed country conditions. See Tan,
446 F.3d at 1374.
PETITION DENIED.
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