UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4036
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
TRAVIS MELVIN ROBINSON
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:11-cr-00110-WO-1)
Submitted: July 27, 2012 Decided: August 2, 2012
Before SHEDD, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ames C. Chamberlin, THE LAW OFFICES OF AMES CHAMBERLIN,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Graham Tod Green,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Travis Melvin Robinson appeals from his conviction and
180-month sentence entered pursuant to his guilty plea to
possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. On appeal, counsel
filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), stating that there were no meritorious issues for
appeal, but questioning whether the district court erred by
determining that Robinson was an Armed Career Criminal (“ACC”).
Robinson filed a pro se supplemental brief, further challenging
his ACC designation and also asserting that police improperly
arrested him and failed to read him his Miranda rights. We
affirm.
Pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act, a person
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006), who has sustained
three or more prior convictions for violent felonies or serious
drug offenses “shall be . . . imprisoned not less than fifteen
years.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006). A violent felony is any
crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment that “has
as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2006). On appeal, Robinson claims that two
of his predicate convictions did not satisfy the requirements of
the statute. Because Robinson did not challenge his ACC status
in district court, we review it for plain error
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only. E.g., United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576-77 (4th
Cir. 2010). Given the information in the presentence report and
the lack of any objection, we find no plain error in the
district court’s determination that Robinson was an ACC.
Regarding Robinson’s challenges to his arrest
procedure, a valid guilty plea waives all antecedent,
nonjurisdictional defects “not logically inconsistent with the
valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in
the way of conviction if factual guilt is
established.” Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2
(1975); see Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)
(holding that, when defendant pleads guilty voluntarily, he
waives challenges to deprivations of constitutional rights
occurring prior to guilty plea); United States v. Moussaoui, 591
F.3d 263, 279 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he defendant who has pled
guilty has no non-jurisdictional ground upon which to attack
that judgment except the inadequacy of the plea or the
government’s power to bring any indictment at all.”). As such,
we conclude that Robinson’s challenges were waived by his guilty
plea.
Pursuant to Anders, we have reviewed the entire record
in this case for meritorious issues and have found none.
Accordingly, we affirm Robinson’s conviction and sentence. This
court requires that counsel inform Robinson in writing of his
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right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Robinson requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may motion this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Robinson. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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