United States v. Roland Morrison

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

ROLAND LEE MORRISON, a/k/a Rashad El-Mumin Muhammad,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Arenda Wright Allen, District
Judge. (2:10-cr-00195-AWA-TEM-1)

Submitted: July 20, 2012 Decided: August 6, 2012

Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Walter B.
Dalton, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt,
Appellate Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H.
MacBride, United States Attorney, Joseph L. Kosky, Assistant
United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Roland Lee Morrison appeals his convictions for

fraudulent assertion of diplomatic immunity, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 915 (2006). On appeal, Morrison challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him. We affirm.

We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment

of acquittal pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. United States v.

Chong Lam, 677 F.3d 190, 198 (4th Cir. 2012). We are required

to “sustain a guilty verdict that, viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, is supported by

substantial evidence.” United States v. Osborne, 514 F.3d 377,

385 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“‘[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of

fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a

conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” Chong Lam, 677 F.3d at 198 (quoting United States v.

Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). “[W]e do

not review the credibility of the witnesses and assume that the

[factfinder] resolved all contradictions in the testimony in

favor of the government.” United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d

233, 245 (4th Cir. 2007). A defendant challenging the

sufficiency of the evidence “bears a heavy burden,” as reversal

of a conviction is limited to “the rare case where the

prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. Ashley, 606

2
F.3d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

The United States Code prohibits a person, “with

intent to defraud within the United States, [from] falsely

assum[ing] or pretend[ing] to be a diplomatic, consular or other

official of a foreign government duly accredited as such to the

United States and act[ing] as such, or in such pretended

character, demand[ing] or obtain[ing] or attempt[ing] to obtain

any money, paper, document, or other thing of value.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 915. “Attempting to secure immunity from possible prosecution

is a ‘thing of value’ within the meaning of this

statute.” United States v. Shaabu-El, 275 F. App’x 205, 207

(4th Cir. 2008) (argued but unpublished) (citing United

States v. Callaway, 446 F.2d 753, 754-55 (3d Cir. 1971)).

Morrison first argues that, because no Moorish state

exists, the Government failed to establish that he “pretended to

be a diplomatic, consular, or other official of a foreign

government duly accredited as such to the United States.”

(Appellant’s Br. at 11). Because Morrison did not raise this

specific issue in his Rule 29 motion, the argument is waived on

appeal. Chong Lam, 677 F.3d at 200 (“When a defendant raises

3
specific grounds in a Rule 29 motion, grounds that are not

specifically raised are waived on appeal.”). *

Next, Morrison argues that he lacked the intent to

defraud because no reasonable officer would have considered his

Moorish National Road Traveler card a legitimate diplomatic

card. However, it is Morrison’s state of mind, not that of the

arresting officers, that is relevant to his guilt or innocence.

When viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, including

Morrison’s dialogue with the officers and the testimony of

Morrison’s family members regarding his “diplomatic” card, we

conclude that the Government presented sufficient evidence to

establish that Morrison intended to defraud the officers by

presenting the card as diplomatic identification.

Finally, Morrison argues that the Government failed to

establish that he attempted to obtain a “thing of value” by

presenting the Moorish National card in response to the

officers’ request for identification. Viewing the evidence as a

whole in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude

that substantial evidence supported the court’s conclusion that

Morrison provided the card in an attempt to use it “as a shield

*
In any event, were we to review this issue on its merits
for plain error, we would conclude without difficulty that
Morrison could not meet the requisite showing. See United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (standard of review);
Shaabu-El, 275 F. App’x at 207-08.

4
against the law,” Callaway, 446 F.2d at 754, and therefore

attempted to obtain a “thing of value” through its use.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED