Case: 11-15332 Date Filed: 08/07/2012 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 11-15332
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-00050-LGW-JEG
SUNTRUST BANK,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RAYMOND HARRIS, SR.,
MARY C. HARRIS,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendants-Appellants.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
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(August 7, 2012)
Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 11-15332 Date Filed: 08/07/2012 Page: 2 of 3
This case began in the Magistrate Court of Glynn County, Georgia, when
Suntrust Bank sought two dispossessory warrants as the result of the foreclosure
sales of two properties owned by Raymond and Mary Harris. The Harrises
responded by removing the case to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia and seeking a stay of eviction. Suntrust moved the
District Court to remand the case, since the Magistrate Judge had already granted
Suntrust the warrants it had requested. The District Court granted the motion and
remanded the case to the Magistrate Court on the ground that the Harrises failed to
allege facts supporting federal jurisdiction and the court therefore lacked the
authority to review the final state court decision. Order dated August 4, 2011.
The District Court then awarded Suntrust the “costs and attorney’s fees” it
incurred as a result of the Harrises’ groundless removal of the case. Id.
On August 6, 2011, the Harrises filed with the District Court a notice that
they were appealing the August 4 order to the “Court of Appeals of Georgia.”1
Then, on August 15, 2011, the Harrises moved the District Court to vacate its
August 4 order.
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The notice of appeal is styled “Motion for Reconsideration and the Right to Appeal to
the 11th Circuit.” It states that “Notice is given that Defendants . . . appeal[ ] to the Court of
Appeals of Georgia from the judgment of the Trial Court entered on the August 4, 2011, as
anticipated.”
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Case: 11-15332 Date Filed: 08/07/2012 Page: 3 of 3
The appeal of the August 4 remand order to the Court of Appeals of Georgia
somehow wound up in this court, and, on October 7, 2011, this court dismissed the
appeal because the remand order was not final and appealable. See 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c) and (d). Then, on October 28, 2011, the District Court entered an order
stating that the case had been closed since the issuance of the remand order on
August 4, and that the case would not be reopened. The Harrises timely appealed
the October 28 order.
The October 28 order did nothing more than recite that the Harrises had
filed several motions following the issuance of the remand order on August 4,
including the August 15 motion to vacate that order, and state that the case had
been “closed.” Because the court was treating the case as closed, it did not rule on
the motion to vacate. The question for us is whether to vacate the October 28
order and remand the case with the instruction that the District Court rule on the
August 15 motion to vacate. The August 15 motion to vacate is patently baseless.
A remand would result in the denial of the motion, and perhaps another appeal.
Rather than putting the parties through the additional expense this would entail,
we choose to end the matter here and affirm the October 28 order.
AFFIRMED.
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