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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-10055
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-00008-MP-GRJ
ROSCOE DOUGLAS,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(August 7, 2012)
Before WILSON, JORDAN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Roscoe Douglas appeals from the district court’s order affirming the
Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of disability insurance benefits,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). He argues that (1) there is not substantial
evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s finding that his past work experience
included a position as an office helper, and (2) the ALJ failed to follow this
circuit’s standard for determining whether his allegations of pain merited a finding
of disability. After review, we affirm.
I.
We review the ALJ’s decision to determine if it is “supported by substantial
evidence and based on proper legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d
1155, 1158 (11th Cir.2004) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted).
For entitlement to disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., a claimant must show that he had a
medically determinable impairment of at least a year in duration that made him
unable to engage in substantial gainful activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
The claimant must also show that he was disabled prior to the expiration of his
health insurance. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(a). In determining whether a
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claimant has proven that he is disabled, the ALJ must complete a five step
sequential evaluation process. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir.
1999). During the first three steps, the claimant bears the burden of proving that
(1) he “has not engaged in substantial gainful activity,” (2) he “has a severe
impairment or combination of impairments,” and (3) his “impairment or
combination of impairments meets or equals a listed impairment.” Id. If the
claimant “cannot prevail at the third step, [he] must proceed to the fourth step
where [he] must prove that [he] is unable to perform [his] past relevant work.” Id.
Specifically, the claimant must show that he is not “able to perform his past kind
of work, not that he merely [is] unable to perform a specific job he held in the
past.” Jackson v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). If
the claimant does satisfy step four, at step five the burden shifts to the
Commissioner to determine if there is other work available in the national
economy that the claimant can perform. Jones, 190 F.3d at 1228. If the
Commissioner demonstrates that jobs are available, the claimant must show that he
is unable to perform those jobs in order to be found disabled. Id.
II.
Douglas first argues that during step four the ALJ incorrectly determined
that Douglas’s past relevant work included a position as an office helper. This
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argument ignores the fact that after the ALJ made a finding at step four that
Douglas was capable of performing past relevant work, he nevertheless proceeded
to step five and held in the alternative that other work was available in the national
economy that Douglas is capable of performing. In making that determination, the
ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert. A vocational expert is a
specialist in employment and vocational factors which influence employment.
Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004). An ALJ may rely
upon a vocational expert’s testimony as the basis for finding that a claimant has
the ability to find work in the national economy. Id. “When the ALJ uses a
vocational expert, the ALJ will pose hypothetical question(s) to the vocational
expert to establish whether someone with the limitations that the ALJ has
previously determined that the claimant has will be able to secure employment in
the national economy.” Id. Here, the ALJ engaged in such a questioning process,
and the vocational expert testified that Douglas was capable of performing a
number of types of work. Based on the vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ
determined that Douglas could perform other jobs in the national economy.
Because Douglas does not challenge that finding and the ALJ’s alternative
determination that Douglas could find work in the national economy was proper,
Douglas’s argument fails.
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III.
Douglas also argues that the ALJ applied the wrong pain standard and erred
in discrediting Douglas’s testimony regarding his level of pain. Under this
circuit’s “pain standard,” a claimant wishing to establish a disability based on
testimony of pain and other symptoms must show (1) evidence of an underlying
medical condition, and (2) either (i) objective medical evidence confirming the
severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (ii) evidence that the
medical condition can reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged pain.
Brown v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1236 (11th Cir. 1991). A claimant’s subjective
testimony is sufficient to support a finding of disability if that subjective testimony
is supported by medical evidence that satisfies the pain standard itself. Id. If the
ALJ discredits the claimant’s subjective pain testimony, he must articulate specific
reasons for doing so, or else the testimony must be accepted as true. See id.
Substantial evidence must support the ALJ’s reasons for discrediting pain
testimony. See Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1012 (11th Cir. 1987).
Here, the time period relevant to Douglas’s disability determination is the
span between the alleged onset date of his disability—April 23, 1999—and the
date of termination of his health insurance—December 31, 1999. A claimant that
becomes disabled after he loses insured status must be denied disability insurance
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benefits despite his disability. See Demandre v. Califano, 591 F.2d 1088, 1090
(5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). Douglas received no medical care between April 23,
1999 and December 31, 1999. He had scans in 1995 and 2000 that showed normal
or minimal findings. In 1995, two doctors opined that Douglas was capable of
performing low-intensity work. In 2004 and 2009, another doctor performed
consultative examinations and recommended the same. Douglas also testified that
he had been working as a house painter in 1997 through 2000, possibly indicating
that he was able to perform substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1571.
Based on this information, the ALJ properly determined that the objective medical
evidence did not indicate that Douglas was disabled during the relevant time
period.
The ALJ also considered Douglas’s subjective testimony. However, the
ALJ determined that Douglas’s testimony was not credible, and he specified a
number of reasons for making that determination. For example, in 1994 Douglas
claimed workers’ compensation benefits and asserted a total disability, but in 1995
those benefits were revoked when it was discovered that he was working for cash
while maintaining to his employer that he was still disabled. Additionally, a
number of physicians testified that Douglas exhibited drug-seeking behaviors and
that they had refused to prescribe narcotic medication to Douglas because they
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believed his requests were motivated by a desire to obtain narcotics rather than a
true medical problem. Douglas had an extensive criminal record, which included
crimes of dishonesty. He also reported to a doctor in 1998 that he had been
engaging in strenuous activities, such as cutting trees, lifting heavy objects, and
painting. Such evidence can properly be taken into consideration by a ALJ in
evaluating the credibility of subjective complaints. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529(c)(3)(I).
The ALJ considered the evidence concerning the intensity, persistence, and
functionally limiting effects of Douglas’s symptoms, as well as medical signs and
laboratory findings, when evaluating Douglas’s credibility. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529. He properly applied this circuit’s pain standard, taking into account
evidence during the relevant period. He also considered evidence from before and
after the relevant period that would have bearing on Douglas’s disability during
the relevant time. The ALJ then properly found that no objective evidence
indicated that Douglas was disabled between April and December of 1999 and that
Douglas’s subjective claims of pain were not credible. Substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s findings.
Although Douglas argues that various medical records from 2002 through
2008 indicate that he has serious medical problems that undermine the ALJ’s
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conclusion, we reiterate that the time period relevant to Douglas’s disability
determination is the span between April 23, 1999 and December 31, 1999.
Because Douglas does not argue that those dates are incorrect and because the
ALJ’s determinations were procedurally correct and supported by substantial
evidence, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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