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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-10816
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-00730-TCB
RAJESH M. PATEL,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT BHDD,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(August 8, 2012)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, BARKETT and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Appellant Rajesh M. Patel appeals pro se from the district court’s denial of
his employment discrimination action filed under Title VII, alleging retaliation
and discrimination based on race, gender, and national origin. Patel’s only
argument on appeal is whether the district court erred in denying him leave to
amend his complaint on the ground that any amendment would be futile.
A district court’s decision to deny leave to amend based on futility is a legal
conclusion, and we review such decisions de novo. Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc.,
544 F.3d 1230, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008).
Unless otherwise specified, a party may amend its pleading “only with the
opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). The
Rule goes on to state that “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so
requires.” Id. Despite the rule that leave to amend should be given freely, the
court may deny leave to amend on numerous grounds, including the futility of the
amendment. Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of Div. of Univs. of Florida Dept. of Educ.
ex rel. Univ. of S. Florida, 342 F.3d 1281, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003). Futility justifies
the denial of leave to amend where the complaint, as amended, would still be
subject to dismissal. Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th
Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts
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to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” rather than merely
conceivable. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to
discharge or discriminate against any individual on the basis of his race, gender, or
national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Where a plaintiff does not allege
direct evidence of discrimination, courts often apply the McDonnell Douglas1
framework in testing the claim. Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty., Ala.,
446 F.3d 1160, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006). Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff may
establish a prima facie case for discrimination by showing: (1) he is a member of a
protected class; (2) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) his
employer treated similarly situated employees who were not members of the
plaintiff’s class more favorably; and (4) he was qualified for the job at issue. Rice-
Lamar v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., 232 F.3d 836, 842-43 (11th Cir. 2000).
It is also unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any employee in
retaliation for filing a complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). A plaintiff may
establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing: (1) he engaged in statutorily
protected expression; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there
1
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668
(1973).
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was a causal relationship between the two events. Pennington v. City of
Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001).
Patel, in his initial complaint, failed to provide any factual allegations that
he was subject to discrimination or retaliation. He presented no allegation that a
comparable person not of his protected class was treated more favorably, nor that
he suffered any adverse employment action as a result of engaging in protected
expression. Patel’s motion for leave to amend provided no reason for the district
court to believe that he could offer sufficient allegations to make a claim for relief
plausible on its face. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974. Therefore,
we conclude that granting leave to amend would have been futile. See Weaver,
169 F.3d at 1320. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying
Patel’s motion for leave to amend and granting the Georgia Department of
Behavioral Health and Development Disabilities’s motion to dismiss without
prejudice.
AFFIRMED.
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