11-2945-ag
Lin v. Holder
BIA
Weisel, IJ
A098 895 905
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
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IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
New York, on the 10th day of August, two thousand twelve.
PRESENT:
JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
Circuit Judges.
_______________________________________
JI-QUING LIN, A.K.A. JIQING LIN,
Petitioner,
v. 11-2945-ag
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
______________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Charles Christophe, New York, New
York.
FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
General; John S. Hogan, Senior
Litigation Counsel; Todd J. Cochran,
Trial Attorney; Office of
Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Ji-Quing Lin, a native and citizen of the
People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a June 24, 2011,
decision of the BIA affirming the July 2, 2009, decision of
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Robert Weisel, denying his
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Ji-
Quing Lin a.k.a. Jiqing Lin, No. A098 895 905 (B.I.A. June
24, 2011), aff’g No. A098 895 905 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July
2, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
We have reviewed both the BIA’s and IJ’s opinions “for
the sake of completeness.” See Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d
233, 237 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The substantial evidence standard of review applies. See
Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
For asylum applications, like Lin’s, governed by the REAL ID
Act, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the
circumstances, . . . base a credibility determination” on an
asylum applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,”
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the plausibility of his or her account, and inconsistencies
in his or her statements, without regard to whether they go
“to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534
F.3d 162, 165 (2d Cir. 2008).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse
credibility determination. Lin argues that the agency erred
in finding implausible that he did not know the name of the
woman who taught him Falun Gong because he called her
“aunt,” a title of respect. However, the agency did not err
in finding it implausible that Lin would have practiced
Falun Gong with an individual in a remote location for six
months, having been introduced by his mother, and not know
the name of that individual, and reasonably rejected Lin’s
explanation that he did not learn her name because he
referred to her as “aunt” and because his mother was
illiterate. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 81 (2d
Cir. 2005) (the agency need not credit an applicant’s
explanations for inconsistent testimony unless those
explanations would compel a reasonable fact-finder to do
so).
The agency further reasonably determined that Lin
failed to corroborate his claim because he failed to provide
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a letter from his mother. We will not reverse a
determination with respect to the availability of
corroborating evidence unless “a reasonable trier of fact
[would be] compelled to conclude that such corroborating
evidence is unavailable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D); see
also Kyaw Zwar Tun v. INS, 445 F.3d 554, 563 (2d Cir. 2006).
The agency was not required to credit Lin’s convoluted and
inconsistent explanation that he did not provide a
corroborating letter from his mother because it was
confiscated by Chinese authorities and that a second letter
his mother provided arrived too late for his court
appearance, particularly since Lin later stated that he lost
this second letter and did not ask his mother to submit
another letter because she was illiterate and, alternately,
because he was working and did not think he needed the
letter. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 81; see also Biao Yang v.
Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that “an
applicant’s failure to corroborate his testimony may bear on
credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general
makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has
already been called into question”).
Accordingly, the agency’s adverse credibility
determination was supported by substantial evidence. That
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determination provided an adequate basis for denying asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT relief because Lin’s claims
were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v.
Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006); Xue Hong Yang v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 2005).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, petitioner’s
pending motion for a stay of removal is DENIED as moot.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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