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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-10703
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:10-cv-01478-GAP-KRS
JASON S. SMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(August 15, 2012)
Before MARCUS, WILSON, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jason Smith appeals the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of his
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claims for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under
Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. The ALJ found that Smith suffered
from the severe impairments of obesity, asthma, and bipolar disorder, and that he
was moderately limited in his ability to maintain his concentration, persistence,
and pace. Nonetheless, the ALJ determined that Smith could perform simple,
routine, and repetitive tasks. Considering Smith’s residual functional capacity, the
ALJ concluded that Smith was not disabled because he could perform his past
relevant work. On appeal, Smith argues that the ALJ failed to specifically account
for his moderate limitations when assessing his residual functional capacity and
ability to work. After a careful review of the administrative record and the parties’
briefs, we affirm the ALJ’s denial of disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income.
We review the ALJ’s decision to ensure it is supported by substantial
evidence and that it is based upon the proper legal standards. Winschel v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). “Substantial evidence is more
than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If
the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, we must defer to it even if
the evidence preponderates against the finding. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
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363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). “We may not decide the
facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the
Commissioner.” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (alterations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
Eligibility for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income requires that the claimant be disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E) (disability
insurance benefits); Id. § 1382(a)(1)–(2) (supplemental security income).* A
claimant shall be considered disabled if he is unable to engage in substantial
gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable impairment that can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of at least 12 months. Id. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A).
The claimant bears the burden of proving his disability. Ellison v. Barnhart, 355
F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
In order to determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Social Security
Administration applies a 5-step sequential evaluation. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a),
416.920(a). This process includes an analysis of whether the claimant: (1) is
unable to engage in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe medically
*
The definition of disability and the test used to determine whether a person has a
disability is the same for claims seeking disability insurance benefits or supplemental security
income.
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determinable physical or mental impairment that meets the duration requirements;
(3) has an impairment that meets or equals an impairment listed in the regulation
and that meets the duration requirements; (4) can perform his past relevant work,
in light of his residual functional capacity; and (5) can make an adjustment to
other work, in light of his residual functional capacity, age, education, and work
experience. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
A claimant who can perform his past relevant work is not disabled. Id.
§§ 404.1560(b)(3), 416.960(b)(3). When determining whether a claimant can
perform his past relevant work, the ALJ first determines the claimant’s residual
functional capacity. Id. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). “The residual functional
capacity is an assessment, based upon all of the relevant evidence, of a claimant’s
remaining ability to do work despite his impairments.” Lewis v. Callahan, 125
F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)); see also 20
C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1).
Smith has pulled language from our opinion in Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1176,
to form his argument. Winschel presented a question concerning the analysis at
step five of the sequential evaluation. One way an ALJ can make his
determination of whether a significant number of jobs exist in the national
economy is by consulting a vocational expert. Id. at 1180. But “‘[i]n order for a
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vocational expert’s testimony to constitute substantial evidence, the ALJ must
pose a hypothetical question which comprises all of the claimant’s impairments.’”
Id. (quoting Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002) (per
curiam)). We concluded that the ALJ’s decision in Winschel did not constitute
substantial evidence because the hypothetical posed did not account for the
conclusions made at earlier steps with respect to limitations in concentration,
persistence, and pace. Id. at 1181. Smith reasons that if the Commissioner in
Winschel argued that an ALJ’s hypothetical did not need to account for limitations
found at steps two and three, then the Commissioner here must have also
instructed the ALJ to ignore the same limitations when determining the ability to
perform past relevant work.
Our characterization of the Commissioner’s argument in Winshel is not
instructive on the question of whether the ALJ here considered Smith’s moderate
limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace. A review of the record indicates
that the ALJ did consider these limitations. When explaining his decision at step
four, the ALJ stated that he did consider the Psychiatric Review Technique, which
recorded Smith’s moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace. But
when Smith’s limitations were considered alongside the rest of the evidence in the
record, the ALJ determined that Smith’s statements concerning the intensity,
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persistence, and limiting effects of his claimed symptoms were not entirely
credible.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. In particular, Dr. Graham
examined Smith and noted that during the examination Smith did not have
problems with attention, concentration, or recent memory issues. There were no
behavioral indications of anxiety, depression, or of a thought disorder. State
psychological consultants believed Smith was capable of simple, routine, and
repetitive work. The examination conducted by Dr. Barber was essentially
unremarkable and indicated a capacity for work-related activities. Indeed, Smith
frequently volunteered at Habitat for Humanity. The ALJ relied upon a complete
residual functional capacity assessment, and substantial evidence supports the
conclusion that in light of Smith’s residual functional capacity, Smith can perform
his past relevant work. Smith is not entitled to disability insurance benefits or
supplemental security income.
AFFIRMED.
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