United States v. Tonya Pressley

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4080

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

TONYA LYNN PRESSLEY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (7:08-cr-00796-HMH-2)

Submitted: August 16, 2012 Decided: August 20, 2012

Before KING and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David W. Plowden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. David Calhoun Stephens, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Tonya Lynn Pressley appeals from her twenty-four-month

sentence imposed upon revocation of her supervised release. On

appeal, counsel has filed an Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), brief stating that there are no meritorious issues, but

raising whether Pressley’s sentence was plainly unreasonable.

We affirm.

A district court has broad discretion to impose a

sentence upon revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United

States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). We will

affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release

if it is within the applicable statutory maximum and is not

“plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,

439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a revocation

sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first assess the sentence

for reasonableness, “follow[ing] generally the procedural and

substantive considerations that we employ in our review of

original sentences.” Id. at 438. A supervised release

revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district

court considered the Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter 7 advisory

policy statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors

that it is permitted to consider in a supervised release

revocation case. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. Although the

court need not explain the reasons for imposing a revocation

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sentence in as much detail as when it imposes an original

sentence, “it still must provide a statement of reasons for the

sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal

quotation marks omitted). A revocation sentence is

substantively reasonable if the district court stated a proper

basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence

imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.

Only if a sentence is found procedurally or substantively

unreasonable will we “then decide whether the sentence is

plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 439.

After review of the record, we conclude that the

revocation sentence is not plainly unreasonable. The

twenty-four-month prison term does not exceed the applicable

maximum allowed by statute. The district court considered the

argument of Pressley’s counsel and allocution by Pressley and

her mother and son, the Guidelines advisory range, and addressed

on the record Pressley’s significant and continuing pattern of

theft and drug use, and her inability to comply with supervised

release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(C); U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual Ch. 7, Pt. A, introductory cmt.

3(b) (2011). The district court adequately explained its

rationale for imposing sentence, and the reasons relied upon are

proper bases for the sentence imposed.

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Accordingly, we conclude that Pressley’s sentence was

reasonable. Pressley filed a pro se supplemental brief

requesting a lower sentence because the charges against her that

constituted Grade A violations were dismissed. In accordance

with Anders, we have reviewed the issues Pressley raises in her

informal brief and the record in this case and have found no

meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm Pressley’s

conviction and sentence. This court requires that counsel

inform Pressley, in writing, of the right to petition the

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If

Pressley requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes

that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move

in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.

Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on

Pressley.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED