FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 21 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GUSTAVO GUZMAN, No. 10-15983
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:08-cv-01796-DLB
v.
MEMORANDUM *
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Dennis L. Beck, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 29, 2012 **
Before: HUG, FARRIS, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
Gustavo Guzman appeals pro se the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
We review a district court’s judgment upholding the denial of social security
benefits de novo, Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008), and
reverse only if the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the
record as a whole or if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard. Molina v. Astrue,
674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012)
Guzman challenges the ALJ’s determination that he retained the residual
functional capacity to perform the full range of medium work during the time
covered by his claim. The ALJ considered all the evidence relevant to Guzman’s
functional limitations, including objective medical evidence, the opinions of
medical sources, and Guzman’s statements. See Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466
F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006) (in determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must
consider all the relevant evidence in the case record). Guzman fails to identify
relevant evidence the ALJ neglected to consider.
The objective medical findings were generally normal, showing no more
than mild disc bulging at one vertebral space in the lumbar spine. The medical
opinions were also quite benign, the most restrictive precluding Guzman from
engaging in very heavy work. Guzman subjectively claimed greater functional
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restrictions due to back pain, but the ALJ discounted his statements, primarily
because examining physicians believed he was exaggerating his symptoms and
functionally elaborating his limitations to a significant degree. Although other
physicians did not think he was malingering, no medical source suggested Guzman
was precluded from any activity less demanding than heavy work.
Even assuming that the ALJ erred by relying, in part, on Guzman’s failure to
obtain medical treatment at the time of his injury, that error is harmless because
there was other substantial evidence, including affirmative evidence of
malingering, supporting the ALJ’s decisions regarding Guzman’s credibility and
residual functional capacity. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d
1190, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2004).
The ALJ’s determination that Guzman retains the capacity for medium work
is a rational interpretation of the record as a whole that accounts for all the
evidence. Even if the evidence could be construed differently in a manner more
favorable to Guzman, the court is not entitled to second-guess the ALJ’s findings
of fact. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir.
2001); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1995) (ALJ’s factual
findings must be upheld if supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the
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record and if evidence exists to support more than one rational interpretation, the
court must defer to the Commissioner’s decision).
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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