11-3202-ag BIA
Jiang v. Holder A079 301 419
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR
AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 23rd day of August, two thousand twelve.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
8 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
9 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _________________________________________
12
13 LAN XIANG JIANG,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 11-3202-ag
17 NAC
18 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _________________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Gary J. Yerman, New York, New York.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
26 General; Anthony P. Nicastro, Senior
27 Litigation Counsel; Sabatino F. Leo,
28 Trial Attorney, Office of
29 Immigration Litigation, United
1 States Department of Justice,
2 Washington, D.C.
3
4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
5 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
6 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for review
7 is DENIED.
8 Petitioner Lan Xiang Jiang, a native and citizen of the
9 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of the July 19,
10 2011, order of the BIA denying her motion to reopen. In re
11 Lan Xiang Jiang, No. A079 301 419 (B.I.A. July 19, 2011).
12 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
13 and procedural history of the case.
14 The BIA’s denial of Jiang’s motion to reopen as
15 untimely was not an abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA,
16 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam). An alien may
17 file one motion to reopen, generally no later than 90 days
18 after the date on which the final administrative decision
19 was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8
20 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).
21 There is no dispute that Jiang’s 2010 motion was untimely,
22 as her final administrative order was issued in 2007. See 8
23 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).
24 Although the time limitation does not apply to a motion to
2
1 reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in
2 the country of nationality or in the country to which
3 deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material
4 and was not available and could not have been discovered or
5 presented at the previous hearing,” 8 C.F.R.
6 § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii),
7 as the BIA concluded, Jiang failed to establish changed
8 circumstances for Christians arising in China.
9 Jiang argues that she demonstrated an increased risk of
10 persecution based on her conversion to Christianity and
11 China’s recent crackdown on underground Christian churches
12 since her 2004 merits hearing. The BIA’s determination that
13 the evidence failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in
14 China is supported by substantial evidence. See Jian Hui
15 Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008). As the
16 BIA reasonably found, Jiang’s conversion constituted changed
17 personal circumstances, not changed conditions arising in
18 China. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 273-74 (2d
19 Cir. 2006). While a 2009 ChinaAid report Jiang submitted
20 noted an increase in the number of Christians persecuted
21 between 2006 and 2009, there is no indication of the
22 conditions that existed at the time of her 2004 merits
3
1 hearing, or whether the increase in incidents corresponded
2 to a proportionate increase in church members. Furthermore,
3 the 2009 reports from the State Department provide that the
4 Chinese government “continued to strictly control religious
5 practice,” suggesting similar treatment of underground
6 churches in previous years.
7 Additionally, we have no basis to conclude that the BIA
8 erred in affording minimal weight to Jiang’s sister-in-law’s
9 statement regarding Chinese officials’ raid of her house
10 church. The letter did not demonstrate that the Chinese
11 authorities were aware or likely to become aware of Jiang’s
12 practice of Christianity. See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey,
13 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t
14 of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006). Substantial
15 evidence therefore supports the BIA’s finding that Jiang did
16 not establish changed conditions for Christians in China.
17 Because the evidence Jiang submitted was insufficient
18 to establish a change in country conditions, the BIA did not
19 abuse its discretion in concluding that she failed to meet
20 an exception to the filing deadline, and in consequently
21 denying her motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 U.S.C.
22 § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i), (ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2),(3).
23 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
4
1 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
2 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
3 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
4 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
5 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
6 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
7 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
8 FOR THE COURT:
9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
10
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