DLD-252 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-1517
___________
JEVON D. GREEN,
Appellant
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY; MAYWOOD POLICE DEPARTMENT;
MAYWOOD MUNICIPAL COURT;
OFFICER MATTHEW PARODI; OFFICER KEVIN MADDEN
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-04733 )
District Judge: Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
August 9, 2012
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 27, 2012)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Jevon Green appeals an order of the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey dismissing his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the reasons
stated herein, we will summarily vacate and remand for further proceedings.
In July 2008, while driving in New Jersey, Green was stopped by Maywood
police officers. Apparently, an altercation arose during the traffic stop and Green was
charged with assaulting two police officers. Green was later convicted in Superior Court,
Bergen County, of charges stemming from the incident.
In August 2011, Green filed a pro se complaint in the District Court against the
State of New Jersey, the Maywood Police Department, the Maywood Municipal Court,
and Officers Matthew Parodi and Kevin Madden. He also filed a motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and requested that counsel be appointed. In Green’s
complaint, he listed the following causes of action: “assault, mistaken identity, illegal
incarceration, illegal towing of motor vehicle, violation of civil rights and housing
discrimination.” 1 As relief, Green sought, inter alia, compensation for expenses that he
incurred in connection with the incident.
The District Court dismissed the complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1
The District Court noted that it was not “convinced” that it had jurisdiction over
the complaint, but that it appeared Green’s claims of “violation of civil rights” and
“housing discrimination” arose under Federal law.
2
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) for the following reasons: (1) Green failed to state “sufficient factual
matter” to show that any potential claims are facially plausible, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and (2) under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), claims for monetary relief
against defendants who are immune from suit are subject to dismissal. 2 This appeal
followed. 3
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s order. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir.
2000). For the reasons discussed below, we will summarily vacate the District Court’s
order and remand for further proceedings. See 3d Cir. LAR. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
We agree with the District Court that, as drafted, the complaint fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted. To avoid dismissal, a complaint’s “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint “must not be ‘so
undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is
contemplated by [Fed. R. Civ. P. 8]’” Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d
59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d
Cir. 2008)).
2
The District Court did not specify which of the defendants are immune from suit.
3
While the appeal was pending, the District Court denied Green’s timely motion
for reconsideration of its order. However, as Green never filed an amended notice of
appeal, the issue of reconsideration is not before this Court. Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(4)(B)(ii); United States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 664, 668 (3d Cir. 2000).
3
Green’s complaint fails to satisfy these standards. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Nevertheless, prior to dismissing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e), a District Court
must give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his pleading to cure the defect unless
such an amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.,
293 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 2002).
The District Court neither informed Green that he could amend his complaint, nor
did it determine that any amendment would be inequitable or futile. On the current
record, we cannot exclude the possibility that Green, who is litigating his case pro se,
might plead additional facts in an amended complaint that will state a claim for relief.
Thus, while we express no view as to whether Green will ultimately plead any
meritorious claims, we conclude that the District Court erred in dismissing the complaint
without providing Green leave to amend. Accordingly, we will summarily vacate the
District Court’s order dismissing the case with prejudice and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Green’s request for appointment of counsel on
appeal is denied as moot.
4