UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1424
DAVID ANTHONY WIGGINS,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
11 KEW GARDEN COURT; CHARLES DONALD RAWLINGS; ALEXANDRA N.
WILLIAMS, individually, and in her official Ministerial
capacity as District Court Judge; MARSHA L. RUSSELL,
individually, and in her official Ministerial capacity as
District Court Judge; MICHAEL P. VACH, individually, and in
his official capacity as Administrative Clerk; LARRY KING,
a/k/a Sal Catalfamo; LANDLORD UTILITIES, LLC,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, District Judge.
(1:12-cv-00200-BEL)
Submitted: August 10, 2012 Decided: August 28, 2012
Before WYNN, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed as modified by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David Anthony Wiggins, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
David Anthony Wiggins appeals from the district
court’s order dismissing his complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Although we find that the district court had jurisdiction over
certain of the causes of action in Wiggins’ complaint, we may
“affirm on any grounds apparent from the record,” including the
alternative ground that the complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Pitt County v. Hotels.com,
L.P., 553 F.3d 308, 311 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations
omitted). Because we conclude that these causes of action were
not sufficient to state a claim, we modify the district court’s
order as explained below and affirm as modified.
Wiggins’ amended complaint raised numerous claims,
including breach of contract and malicious prosecution against
Charles Donald Rawlings and unconstitutional conspiracy against
all Defendants. With regard to the unconstitutional conspiracy,
Wiggins averred that the Defendants (including two state judges
and a state court clerk) conspired to prevent him from obtaining
title to a specific piece of real estate on the basis of his
race, gender, ethnicity, and elective enfranchisement. Wiggins
asserted that, during a state court case on the same issue,
certain Defendants filed false and fraudulent suits and
documents and the judiciary Defendants aided them by deciding
the case without justification and failing to enforce a prior
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contract. In his informal brief, Wiggins avers that
jurisdiction is premised upon federal questions arising under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) and related statutes.
Section 1983 is a vehicle by which state actors may be
held accountable for deprivations of established constitutional
rights. Although § 1983 provides a remedy for violations of an
individual’s constitutional rights, it only does so when those
violations occur as a result of state action. A person acts
under color of state law when he has exercised power “possessed
by virtue of state law and made possible only because [he] is
clothed with the authority of state law.” United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). A § 1983 claim cannot be
premised on purely private conduct, no matter how unlawful that
conduct may be. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526
U.S. 40, 50 (1999).
Thus, all claims alleged solely against the individual
private defendants, including those for breach of contract and
malicious prosecution, were properly dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction as there was no state action involved. Wiggins
provides no other basis for jurisdiction. Accordingly, we
affirm the portion of the district court’s order dismissing
these claims.
However, the Supreme Court has held that “[p]rivate
parties who corruptly conspire with a judge in connection with
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[an official judicial act] are ... acting under color of state
law within the meaning of § 1983.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S.
24, 29 (1980). As such, Wiggins’ claims that Defendants engaged
in a conspiracy involving his state suit allege federal causes
of action. Accordingly, the district court’s conclusion that
the amended complaint did not contain an arguable basis for
jurisdiction was in error. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (providing
that district courts have jurisdiction over “all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States.”).
While the court erroneously concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction over Wiggins’ entire complaint, we conclude that
the allegations in Wiggins’ complaint were insufficient to meet
the requirements of pleading an unconstitutional conspiracy
claim. To properly plead an unconstitutional conspiracy, a
plaintiff must assert facts from which a conspiratorial
agreement can be inferred. Great Western Mining & Mineral
Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 U.S. 1798 (2011). Conclusory pleadings are
not entitled to an assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). Thus, allegations that Defendants
resorted to the courts and won are insufficient to show a joint
action with the judiciary. Dennis, 449 U.S. at 28. Wiggins
must plead an agreement between the state court judges and
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employees and other Defendants, as “a bare assertion of
conspiracy will not suffice.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 554, 556 (2007).
We hold that Wiggins’ allegations are inadequate to
properly plead an agreement. Wiggins claims that the Defendants
conspired together, but he fails to make any factual contentions
concerning any actual conduct by any of the judiciary Defendants
aside from entering orders and making legal decisions. Wiggins
has not pleaded any facts that plausibly suggest a meeting of
the minds between the private Defendants and the members of the
judiciary. As such, Wiggins has failed to allege, except in
general terms, sufficient factual allegations to create
“plausible grounds to infer an agreement.” Id. at 556.
Therefore, we modify the district court’s order to
show that the conspiracy claims were dismissed without prejudice
for failure to state a claim and affirm the district court’s
order as modified. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
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