UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1239
ANA URSU,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: August 24, 2012 Decided: August 29, 2012
Before KING and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael Alexei, LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL ALEXEI, PLLC, Washington,
D.C., for Petitioner. Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Holly M. Smith, Senior Litigation Counsel,
Joseph D. Hardy, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ana Ursu, a native and citizen of Moldova, petitions
for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“Board”) dismissing her appeal from the immigration judge’s
order denying her applications for asylum, withholding of
removal and withholding under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). We deny the petition for review.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) authorizes
the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a) (2006). The INA defines a refugee as a person
unwilling or unable to return to her native country “because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
“Persecution involves the infliction or threat of death,
torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom, on account of one
of the enumerated grounds. . . .” Qiao Hua Li v. Gonzales, 405
F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
In order to qualify for relief, an applicant must show
that her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion was, or will be, at least one
central reason for the persecution. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(i)
(2006); Quinteros-Mendoza v. Holder, 556 F.3d 159, 164 (4th Cir.
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2009). Specifically, an alien must show that a protected ground
is a central reason for the feared persecution and not an
“incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate” reason.
Id. at 164.
An alien “bear[s] the burden of proving eligibility
for asylum,” Naizgi v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir.
2006); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2012), and can establish
refugee status based on past persecution in her native country
on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)
(2012). “An applicant who demonstrates that [s]he was the
subject of past persecution is presumed to have a well-founded
fear of persecution.” Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187
(4th Cir. 2004).
Without regard to past persecution, an alien can
establish a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected
ground. Id. at 187. The well-founded fear standard contains
both a subjective and an objective component. The objective
element requires a showing of specific, concrete facts that
would lead a reasonable person in like circumstances to fear
persecution. Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 351, 353
(4th Cir. 2006). “The subjective component can be met through
the presentation of candid, credible, and sincere testimony
demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution . . . . [It] must
have some basis in the reality of the circumstances and be
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validated with specific, concrete facts . . . and it cannot be
mere irrational apprehension.” Qiao Hua Li, 405 F.3d at 176
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or
withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. Elias
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Administrative findings of
fact, including findings on credibility, are conclusive unless
any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to decide to the
contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006). Legal issues are
reviewed de novo, “affording appropriate deference to the BIA’s
interpretation of the INA and any attendant regulations.” Li
Fang Lin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th Cir. 2008). This
court will reverse the Board only if “the evidence . . .
presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could
fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.”
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84; see Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d
316, 325 n.14 (4th Cir. 2002).
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the
finding that Ursu did not establish that she was targeted on
account of a protected ground. The record falls short of
compelling this court to find that Ursu qualifies for asylum or
withholding of removal. We also conclude that substantial
evidence supports the finding that Ursu failed to show that it
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is more likely than not that she will be tortured if returned to
Moldova in order to qualify for CAT protection. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(c)(2) (2012).
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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