UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-5102
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SEAN DARNELL FOWLKES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:10-cr-00332-CCB-1)
Submitted: July 24, 2012 Decided: August 29, 2012
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Andrew R. Szekely, LAWLOR & ENGLERT, LLC, Greenbelt, Maryland,
for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney,
Michael C. Hanlon, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Sean Darnell Fowlkes was convicted of possession of a
firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
(2006), and sentenced to sixty months in prison. He now appeals
his sentence, claiming that it is substantively unreasonable.
We affirm.
Fowlkes’ advisory Guidelines range was 41-51 months.
The district court gave a lengthy explanation for imposing the
variance sentence of sixty months. Among other things, the
court mentioned the serious nature of the offense and observed
that Fowlkes possessed the gun and ammunition “within a couple
of years” of his release on parole from a state sentence.
Additionally, the court was troubled by Fowlkes’ significant
criminal record, which included drug possession, battery, and
assault. Finally, the court expressed its concern that Fowlkes
had demonstrated no remorse or acceptance of responsibility.
The court concluded that a sixty-month sentence was necessary to
deter future criminal behavior and to protect the public.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This review requires evaluation
of both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the
sentence. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir.
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2010). Fowlkes does not challenge the procedural reasonableness
of his sentence.
In evaluating a sentence for substantive
reasonableness, we consider “whether the sentence was reasonable
— i.e., whether the [d]istrict [j]udge abused [her] discretion
in determining that the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2006)] factors
supported [the sentence] and justified a substantial deviation
from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 56. The analysis
requires us to “take into account the totality of the
circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the
Guidelines range.” Id. at 51.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing a variance sentence of sixty months. The
court properly considered and fully explained its decision
pursuant to the § 3553(a) factors, relying especially on
§ 3553(a)(1) (nature and circumstances of the offense and
history and characteristics of the defendant). As the court
stated, the offense was serious, Fowlkes had a significant
criminal record, and he had demonstrated no remorse.
Additionally, the court recognized the need to both protect the
public, § 3553(a)(2)(C), and deter criminal conduct in the
future, § 3553(a)(2)(B). We reject Fowlkes’ claim that his
sentence is unreasonable because several of the factors upon
which the district court relied were already taken into account
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by his criminal history score. Sister circuits have rejected
similar arguments. See United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d
1312, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Williams, 517
F.3d 801, 809 (5th Cir. 2008).
We accordingly affirm. Fowlkes’ motions to file a pro
se supplemental brief and an amendment to that brief, to place
case in abeyance, and to relieve counsel are denied. Counsel’s
motion to withdraw is denied at this time. This court requires
that counsel inform Fowlkes, in writing, of his right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Fowlkes requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Fowlkes.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the material
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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