UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4068
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JEREMY LEE PRATT, a/k/a Candyman,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(4:11-cr-00416-TLW-11)
Submitted: August 14, 2012 Decided: September 7, 2012
Before MOTZ, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brown W. Johnson, CLARKE, JOHNSON, PETERSON & MCLEAN, PA,
Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Alfred William Walker
Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jeremy Lee Pratt pled guilty in accordance with a
written plea agreement to conspiracy to distribute five
kilograms or more of cocaine, 280 grams or more of crack
cocaine, fifty kilograms or more of marijuana, and a quantity of
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). He was
sentenced to 240 months in prison. Pratt now appeals. His
attorney has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), claiming that the sentence is
unreasonable but stating that there are no meritorious issues
for appeal. Pratt was advised of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, but has not filed such a brief. We affirm.
I
Pratt’s advisory Guidelines range was 235-293 months.
There were no objections to the presentence investigation
report, which the court adopted. In imposing the 240-month
sentence, the district court mentioned that: Pratt’s offense was
both significant and serious; Pratt had an extensive criminal
history, including some assaults, but had served little time for
his offenses; he committed the instant offense while on
probation; and he had shown no respect for the law. The court
also considered Pratt’s difficult childhood.
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II
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). This review requires consideration of both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id.
We first determine whether the district court correctly
calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, considered
the applicable 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West Supp. 2011) factors,
analyzed the arguments presented by the parties, and
sufficiently explained the selected sentence. United States v.
Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2010). With respect to the
explanation of the sentence, the court “must place on the record
an individualized assessment based on the particular facts of
the case before it.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330
(4th Cir. 2009). If the sentence is free of procedural error,
we then review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.
Lynn, 592 F.3d at 576. This review requires us to consider the
totality of the circumstances and to decide “whether the
sentence was reasonable — i.e., whether the [d]istrict [j]udge
abused his discretion in determining that the § 3553(a) factors
supported” the selected sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 56.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing the 240-month sentence. The court fully
complied with the required procedures, providing an
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individualized assessment and appropriately taking into account
the § 3553(a) factors. The sentence, which falls within the
correctly calculated Guidelines range, is presumptively
reasonable, see United States v. Go, 517 F.3d 216, 218 (4th Cir.
2008), and Pratt did not rebut this presumption.
III
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm Pratt’s conviction and sentence. Counsel’s
motion to withdraw is denied at this time. This court requires
that counsel inform Pratt, in writing, of the right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Pratt requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Pratt.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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