11-2220
United States v. Salazar
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 17th day of September, two thousand twelve.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 Chief Judge,
8 GUIDO CALABRESI,
9 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11
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13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
14 Appellee,
15
16 -v.- 11-2220
17
18 DOMINGO SALAZAR,
19 Defendant-Appellant,
20
21 NORMA MENDEZ,
22 Defendant.
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24
25 FOR APPELLANT: Lawrence Gerzog, New York, N.Y.
1
1
2 FOR APPELLEE: Michael H. Warren (Susan
3 Corkery, on the brief),
4 Assistant United States
5 Attorneys, for Loretta E. Lynch,
6 United States Attorney for the
7 Eastern District of New York,
8 Brooklyn, N.Y.
9
10 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
11 Court for the Eastern District of New York (Gleeson, J.).
12
13 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
14 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
15 AFFIRMED.
16
17 Domingo Salazar appeals from a judgment of conviction,
18 following a guilty plea to one count of sex trafficking, one
19 count of illegal reentry following deportation, and five
20 other counts also related to his conspiracy with his wife to
21 smuggle a minor into the United States for the purpose of
22 forcing her to engage in prostitution.
23
24 The government offered Salazar an agreement pursuant to
25 which he could have pleaded guilty to sex trafficking and
26 illegal reentry. Although Salazar himself would have gained
27 little by accepting, the government was also offering that
28 if Salazar pleaded guilty by July 1, 2010, his wife could
29 plead guilty to sex trafficking conspiracy and avoid the
30 fifteen-year mandatory minimum attached to the substantive
31 sex trafficking charge. Considerable discussion over the
32 factual bases of some of the allegations, and over Salazar’s
33 claim that he had not had a chance to “study” the plea
34 agreement, followed. During all of this time, however,
35 Salazar never wavered from his desire to plead guilty. In
36 due course, he did plead guilty, but without the benefit of
37 a formal agreement.
38
39 Before us, Salazar asks that his plea be declared
40 involuntary for several reasons. He cites his limited
41 English-language ability and lack of education. However,
42 Salazar had the benefit of an interpreter; he told the court
43 that he understood the proceedings; and his lawyer expressed
44 “no reason to doubt [Salazar’s] competence.” Salazar also
45 emphasizes that he was under “enormous pressure” because the
46 government’s offer to his wife was conditioned on his guilty
47 plea. We have held, however, that this kind of pressure does
2
1 not necessarily render a guilty plea invalid. “The inclusion
2 of a third-party benefit in a plea bargain is simply one
3 factor for a district court to weigh in making the overall
4 determination whether the plea is voluntarily entered.”
5 United States v. Marquez, 909 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1990);
6 see also id. (“Since a defendant’s plea is not rendered
7 involuntary because he enters it to save himself many years
8 in prison, it is difficult to see why the law should not
9 permit the defendant to negotiate a plea that confers a
10 similar benefit on others.”). And finally, Salazar argues
11 that the court participated in plea discussions in violation
12 of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1).
13
14 Because Salazar failed to raise these claims before the
15 district court, he must show plain error. United States v.
16 Torrellas, 455 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2006). To satisfy that
17 standard, Salazar must demonstrate “that (1) there was
18 error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error
19 prejudicially affected his substantial rights.” Id.
20 (internal quotation marks omitted). Salazar “has the further
21 burden to persuade the court that the error seriously
22 affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
23 judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks
24 omitted).
25
26
27 We have examined the record with care and conclude that
28 Salazar cannot meet these stringent requirements. Finding no
29 merit in Salazar’s remaining arguments, as well, we hereby
30 AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
31
32
33
34 FOR THE COURT:
35 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
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