11-3231-ag
Liu v. Holder
BIA
A077 322 603
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
New York, on the 19th day of September, two thousand twelve.
PRESENT:
JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
ZEN-HUANG LIU, AKA ZENGHUANG LIU,
Petitioner,
v. 11-3231-ag
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Kevin Long, Monterey Park, CA.
FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
General; Lyle D. Jentzer, Senior
Litigation Counsel; Charles S.
Greene III, Trial Attorney, Office
of Immigration Litigation, Civil
Division, United States Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Zen-Huang Liu, a native and citizen of the People’s
Republic of China, seeks review of a July 19, 2011 order of
the BIA denying his motion to reopen his removal
proceedings. In re Zen-Huang Liu, No. A077 322 603 (B.I.A.
July 19, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history of the case.
We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for
abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517
(2d Cir. 2006). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion
by denying Liu’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-
barred, as it was his third motion to reopen and he filed it
more than eight years after his final order of removal. See
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).
Although the time limits on motions to reopen may be
excused when the movant demonstrates changed country
conditions, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), the BIA
reasonably concluded that Liu did not demonstrate changed
conditions in this case.
2
As an initial matter, the record does not support Liu’s
contention that the BIA did not consider all of his
evidence. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471
F.3d 315, 337 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006) (providing that we will
“presume that [the agency] has taken into account all of the
evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly
suggests otherwise”).
The record supports the BIA’s conclusion that Liu’s
general evidence of conditions in China—reports and articles
describing the persecution of Christians including the
Shouters, a group which the Chinese government considers a
cult—did not establish a material change in China because
State Department reports indicate that such persecution
occurred at the time of Liu’s 2001 merits hearing. See In
re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A. 2007) ("In
determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen
demonstrates a material change in country conditions that
would justify reopening, we compare the evidence of country
conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed
at the time of the merits hearing below.”); see also Jian
Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008)
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(reviewing the BIA’s factual findings regarding changed
country conditions under the substantial evidence standard).
Additionally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in
declining to credit the affidavits from Liu and his father
based on an immigration judge’s previous finding that Liu
was not credible.1 See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d
143, 148 (2d Cir. 2007) (the BIA did not abuse its
discretion in declining to credit unauthenticated documents
submitted with a motion to reopen where the alien had been
found not credible in the underlying proceedings); see also
Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A]
single false document or a single instance of false
testimony may (if attributable to the petitioner) infect the
balance of the alien’s uncorroborated or unauthenticated
evidence.”). Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its
discretion by denying Liu’s motion as untimely and number-
barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. Any pending request for oral argument in this
1
Liu cites the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ghadessi
v. INS, 797 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1986), to argue that the
BIA should have presumed that his affidavit was reliable.
However, that case does not govern in this Court.
4
petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
34.1(b).
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
5