FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION SEP 25 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LINDA D. OUTLAW, No. 11-15984
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:09-cv-00620-JMS-
BMK
v.
UNITED AIRLINES, INC.; ROBERT MEMORANDUM *
FREEMAN,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
J. Michael Seabright, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 10, 2012 **
Before: WARDLAW, CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Linda D. Outlaw appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in her employment action alleging discrimination and harassment based on her race
and color in violation of Title VII. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We review de novo, Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir.
2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Outlaw’s
discrimination claim because Outlaw failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether similarly situated individuals outside of her protected class were
treated more favorably, and whether United Airlines’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for its adverse employment actions, including terminating Outlaw, were
pretextual. See id. at 640-42 & n.5 (listing elements of a prima facie case of
discrimination, discussing “similarly situated” individuals requirement, and
explaining that circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Outlaw’s
harassment claim because Outlaw failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether the alleged conduct was because of her race or color, or was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment. See id.
at 642 (discussing racial harassment).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, nor arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
2 11-15984