UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4058
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOHNNIE O’NEIL LEWIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:09-cr-00368-F-1)
Submitted: September 14, 2012 Decided: September 26, 2012
Before SHEDD, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, James E. Todd, Jr., Research
and Writing Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-
Parker, Yvonne V. Watford-McKinney, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Johnnie O’Neil Lewis appeals the eighty-seven-month
sentence he received after we remanded his case for resentencing
in light of United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir.
2011) (en banc). Lewis contends that the district court erred
procedurally by failing to address his arguments for a sentence
at the low end of the Guidelines range. We affirm.
When he was resentenced, Lewis’ Guidelines range was
70-87 months. In support of his request for a sentence at the
low end, Lewis reminded the court of the facts of his very
difficult childhood, which had been detailed at the first
sentencing, and informed the court that, while incarcerated, he
had reflected on the harm he had done to the victim he robbed
and his children’s need for his presence in their lives. He
also informed the court that he had acquired certain job skills,
voluntarily entered a drug program, endeavored to further his
education in an unspecified manner, and was determined not to go
back to prison after his release. Before imposing sentence at
the top of the Guidelines range, the district court made an
individualized assessment of Lewis’ situation in light of the
sentencing factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), but
did not specifically address his arguments for a sentence at the
low end of the range.
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We review a sentence for reasonableness under an abuse
of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). This review requires consideration of both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Id.;
see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010).
The sentencing court “must make an individualized assessment
based on the facts presented.” United States v. Carter, 564
F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 50).
When the defendant “presents non-frivolous reasons” for a
sentence different from the one the court imposes, the court is
expected to provide at least “a brief explanation” or, if
circumstances warrant, “a lengthier explanation” of its reasons
for rejecting the defendant’s argument. Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007). If the sentence is within the
Guidelines range, this court presumes on appeal that the
sentence is substantively reasonable. United States v. Go, 517
F.3d 216, 218 (4th Cir. 2008); see Rita, 551 U.S. at 346-56
(permitting appellate presumption of reasonableness for within-
Guidelines sentence).
Here, the district court made an individualized
assessment of Lewis and his offense as required. Lewis contends
that he offered non-frivolous reasons for a sentence at the low
end of the Guidelines range, which the district court failed to
address. He relies principally on United States v. Villegas-
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Miranda, 579 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2009), in which the Seventh
Circuit found procedural error in the district court’s failure
to address an argument for a downward departure that had been
held in other circuits to be sufficient to warrant a departure.
Id. at 803. However, “a sentencing judge may reject without
discussion ‘stock arguments’ that are made as a matter of
routine.” United States v. Young, 590 F.3d 467, 474 (7th Cir.
2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). We conclude that
Lewis’ arguments were of this nature, and that the district
court did not procedurally err in failing to address them
specifically.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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