FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION SEP 26 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WALTER BROWN, Jr., No. 10-55500
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 5:08-cv-00292-ODW-SS
v.
MEMORANDUM *
WOLFE, Police Officer, in his/her
individual capacity; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Otis D. Wright, II, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 18, 2012 **
Before: LEAVY, PAEZ, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Walter Brown, Jr., a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
excessive force. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
The district court properly concluded that Brown’s excessive force claims
are Heck-barred because success on Brown’s claims would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction for resisting arrest, as that conviction was based on
resistance in response to defendants’ allegedly excessive force. See Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (§ 1983 action that necessarily implies the
invalidity of plaintiff’s conviction must be dismissed unless the conviction has
been invalidated); People v. Simons, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351, 355 & n.5 (Ct. App.
1996) (defendant cannot be convicted of resisting arrest under California law
unless the officer was acting lawfully at the time); see also Beets v. County of Los
Angeles, 669 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Where a defendant is charged with
a single-act offense but there are multiple acts involved each of which could serve
as the basis for a conviction, a jury does not determine which specific act or acts
form the basis for the conviction.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Brown’s motion to
reconsider its summary judgment because Brown failed to establish any basis for
reconsideration. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5
2 10-55500
F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion and
setting forth grounds for reconsideration).
All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 10-55500