BLD-258 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 12-1768
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
GREGORY WOODS,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 06-cr-00063-001)
District Judge: A. Richard Caputo
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Submitted on a Motion for Summary Affirmance
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
August 16, 2012
Before: SCIRICA, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 3, 2012)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Appellant Gregory Woods appeals an order of the District Court denying his
motion for a reduction in sentence, 18 U.S.C.§ 3582(c). For the reasons that follow, we
will summarily affirm.
Woods was convicted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania pursuant to a plea of guilty for violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (possession
with intent to distribute crack cocaine and cocaine), and (b)(1)(C) (providing for
maximum sentence of 20 years). The plea agreement was binding and provided for a
sentence of 144 months’ imprisonment, see Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 11(c)(1)(C) (“the plea
agreement may specify that an attorney for the government will: * * * agree that a
specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case”). See
Plea Agreement, at ¶¶ 1A, 8.
On December 1, 2009, the District Court sentenced Woods to the 144-month term
provided for in the plea agreement. Woods was also sentenced to a three-year term of
supervised release. The District Court adopted the presentence investigation report
without change, and explained that it was imposing a sentence below the advisory
guidelines range because it had accepted the binding plea agreement. The District Court
found that the sentence of 144 months was reasonable in view of the considerations
expressed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which, in Wood’s case, involved balancing his difficult
upbringing with the seriousness of his offense and the seriousness of his criminal history.
See N.T., 11/30/09, at 17. Woods moved to withdraw his plea; the motion was denied,
and, on appeal, we affirmed, see United States v. Woods, 415 Fed. App. 371 (3d Cir.
2010).
On February 1, 2012, Woods filed a pro se motion for reduction of sentence, 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), based on the Guidelines amendment that retroactively lowered the
base offense level for crack cocaine offenses. In this motion Woods noted that he had not
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been sentenced as a career offender, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, 1 and he argued that the
District Court had the authority to lower his sentence under United States v. Freeman,
131 S. Ct. 2685 (U.S. 2011) (defendants who enter into plea agreements recommending
particular sentence may still be eligible for reduction under section 3582(c)(2)). In
concluding, Woods argued that he should receive a sentence of 120 months. The District
Court appointed the Federal Public Defender to represent Woods, but appointed counsel
concluded that Woods was ineligible for a reduction and filed a motion to withdraw,
which the District Court granted.
In an order entered on March 5, 2012, the District Court denied Woods’ section
3582(c)(2) motion for a reduction in sentence. In a form order, the court stated its
reasons, noting that Woods’ previous total offense level (under the crack cocaine
guidelines) was 34 and his criminal history category was VI, but he could not be
sentenced above the statutory maximum of 240 months because of his guilty plea. 2
Under the crack cocaine amendment, his total offense level was 32, and with a criminal
history category of VI, his amended Guidelines range was 210 – 240 months. Woods
was sentenced pursuant to the binding plea agreement to 144 months, a sentence well
1
See generally United States v. Thompson, 682 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2012) (reaffirming
holding in United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2009), that crack cocaine
offender sentenced as career offender is not eligible for sentence reduction based on
amendment to crack cocaine guideline). Although Woods qualified for treatment as a
career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 in that he has at least two prior felony controlled
substance convictions, his Guidelines range was not calculated under the career offender
guideline.
2
In Woods’ case, the plea agreement references the statutory maximum of 20 years as the
original Guidelines range because he pleaded guilty to violating 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(C), and because the original guidelines range of 262-327 months exceeded the
statutory maximum for that provision.
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below the amended Guidelines range. Accordingly, Woods did not qualify for a sentence
reduction.
Woods appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. After Woods filed
an Informal Brief, the Government filed a motion to summarily affirm. Woods has
submitted a response in opposition to summary affirmance. In his Informal Brief, Woods
argues that, under Freeman, the District Court had the authority to give him a reduction
based on the crack cocaine amendment even in view of his Rule 11(c)(1)(C) binding plea.
In his response in opposition to summary affirmance, Woods points out that his original
sentence was not based on the career offender guideline.
We will grant the Government’s motion and summarily affirm the order of the
District Court because no substantial question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit
LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. Section 3582(c)(2) of title 18 authorizes a district court to
reduce a term of imprisonment in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced “based
on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). A sentence may be reduced under section
3582(c)(2) if “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by
the Sentencing Commission.” Id. The question of whether a defendant is eligible for a
sentence reduction under section 3582(c) is a legal question and is subject to de novo
review. United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 277 (3d Cir. 2009).
We see no basis here for concluding that the District Court erred in denying
Woods’ section 3582(c)(2) motion. Woods ultimately was sentenced pursuant to a
binding plea agreement, but the crack cocaine guideline plainly informed the process of
arriving at the bargained-for sentence of 144 months, and the District Court’s decision
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whether to accept the recommendation for the sentence. In denying Woods’ section
3582(c)(2) motion, the District Court recalculated the total offense level under the crack
cocaine guideline and determined that the amended Guidelines range would be 210 to
240 months. Although the amended Guidelines range would have permitted a sentence
lower than the original Guidelines range/statutory maximum of 240 months, the
Sentencing Commission has directed that “the court shall not reduce the defendant’s term
of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and this policy statement to a term that is
less than the minimum of the amended guideline range.” U.S.S.B. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A)
(November 1, 2011). 3 Since Woods’ actual sentence of 144 months, as negotiated for in
the binding plea agreement, was already 66 months below the minimum of the amended
Guidelines range, the District Court clearly did not commit legal error in determining that
Woods was ineligible for a lower sentence of 120 months.
Woods’ reliance on Freeman is misplaced. The question in Freeman was whether
a sentence imposed pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement can be “based on” a
sentencing range within the meaning of section 3582(c)(2) so as to permit a reduction in
sentence. Justice Kennedy, writing for the plurality, delivered the judgment of the
Supreme Court that a defendant can be eligible for such relief because a sentence
imposed pursuant to a binding Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement is still “based on” a guidelines
range. Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2692-93. 4 We do not understand the District Court in
3
If the term of imprisonment imposed was less than the term provided for by the
guideline range because of a motion to reflect the defendant’s substantial assistance, then
“a reduction comparably less than the amended guideline range … may be appropriate,”
id. at § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B). This exception is not applicable in Woods’ case because no
such motion to reflect substantial assistance was filed.
4
In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor took the narrower view that the term of
imprisonment imposed by a district court pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement is
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Woods’ case to have concluded that it lacked authority to award Woods’ a section
3582(c)(2) reduction because of the binding plea agreement. On the contrary, the District
Court clearly performed the recalculation under the crack cocaine guideline.
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the Government’s motion and summarily
affirm the order of the District Court denying the section 3582(c)(2) motion for a
reduction of sentence.
based on the agreement itself, and not on the district court’s calculation under the
Guidelines, but she concurred in the judgment because Freeman’s plea agreement stated
that his sentence would be determined pursuant to the Guidelines and recommended a
sentence that was based on the figure at the bottom end of his Guidelines range. Id. at
2695-96, 2699-2700 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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