Kedra v. Holder

11-4855-ag Kedra v. Holder BIA Verrillo, IJ A089 032 359 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan 3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of 4 New York, on the 10th day of October, two thousand twelve. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 JON O. NEWMAN, 8 GERARD E. LYNCH, 9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 Artur Jan Kedra, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 11-4855-ag 17 18 Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States 19 Attorney General, 20 Respondent. 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 FOR PETITIONER: Artur Jan Kedra, pro se, New 24 Britain, CT. 25 26 FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant 27 Attorney General, William C. 28 Peachey, Assistant Director, Andrew 29 B. Insenga, Trial Attorney, Office 30 of Immigration Litigation, Civil 31 Division, United States Department 32 of Justice, Washington, D.C. 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 4 is DENIED. 5 Artur Jan Kedra,1 a native and citizen of Poland, seeks 6 review of an October 25, 2011 decision of the BIA affirming 7 the December 17, 2009 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 8 Philip Verrillo, which denied his request for a continuance 9 and ordered him removed. In re Artur Jan Kedra, No. A089 10 032 359 (B.I.A. Oct. 25, 2011), aff’g No. A089 032 359 11 (Immig. Ct. Hartford Dec. 17, 2009). We assume the parties’ 12 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history 13 in this case. 14 Where, as here, the BIA affirms an IJ’s decision 15 without opinion,2 we review only the IJ’s decision as the 1 Petitioner’s surname is alternately spelled “Kedra” and “Kendra” throughout the administrative record. We use “Kedra” in this Order, as this is the spelling Petitioner used when he filed the instant Petition. 2 The BIA did not err or abuse its discretion by granting summary affirmance. See Kambolli v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 454, 463 (2d Cir. 2006) (providing that this Court lacks authority to review the BIA’s decision to streamline a particular case); Xusheng Shi v. BIA, 374 F.3d 64, 66 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the BIA’s use of summary affirmance does not constitute an abuse of discretion); Yu Sheng Zhang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 362 F.3d 155, 160 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that summary affirmance does not deprive an alien of due process). 2 1 final agency determination. See Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 2 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2008). This Court reviews the denial 3 of a continuance for abuse of discretion. See Sanusi v. 4 Gonzales, 445 F.3d 193, 199 (2d Cir. 2006). An IJ abuses 5 his discretion in denying a continuance if: “(1) [his] 6 decision rests on an error of law (such as application of 7 the wrong legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual 8 finding[;] or (2) [his] decision – though not necessarily 9 the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual 10 finding – cannot be located within the range of permissible 11 decisions.” Morgan v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 549, 551-52 (2d 12 Cir. 2006) (first and third alterations in original) 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). 14 An IJ may grant a motion for continuance “for good 15 cause shown.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29. Continuances are not 16 ordinarily granted based solely on a pending labor 17 certification in the absence of additional persuasive 18 factors. See Matter of Rajah, 25 I. & N. Dec. 127, 136-37 19 (B.I.A. 2009) (collecting cases); see also Elbahja v. 20 Keisler, 505 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that, 21 where petitioner’s eligibility for adjustment of status was 22 “speculative,” it was not an abuse of discretion for IJ to 3 1 deny petitioner’s request for a continuance “in order to 2 permit adjudication of [petitioner’s] pending labor 3 certification”). 4 Here, the IJ did not abuse his discretion by denying a 5 continuance, as Kedra was not eligible for adjustment of 6 status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)(8) (stating that “any alien 7 [present in the United States] . . . who has otherwise 8 violated the terms of a nonimmigrant visa” is ineligible for 9 adjustment of status); Elbahja, 505 F.3d at 129.3 10 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 11 DISMISSED. 12 FOR THE COURT: 13 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 14 15 3 Kedra’s reliance on Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323 (2d Cir. 2006), is unavailing. In Thapa, the petitioner would have been eligible to remain in the United States if his request for labor certification had been granted, id. at 335, whereas Kedra conceded that he would be ineligible for adjustment of status whether or not his pending employment- based petition was granted. 4