UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4227
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ABRAHAM JIMENEZ-MANUEL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:11-cr-00259-HEH-1)
Submitted: October 2, 2012 Decided: October 9, 2012
Before MOTZ, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Valencia D.
Roberts, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant,
Appellate Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H.
MacBride, United States Attorney, S. David Schiller, Assistant
United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Abraham Jimenez-Manuel (“Jimenez”) pled guilty to
illegal reentry after removal as a convicted felon, in violation
of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(1) (2006). The district court
sentenced him to twenty-one months’ imprisonment and a term of
three years’ supervised release. On appeal, Jimenez challenges
the procedural reasonableness of the sentence, contending that
the district court failed to adequately explain the imposition
of a three-year term of supervised release when he was to be
deported after serving his term of imprisonment. See U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 5D1.1(c) & cmt. n.5
(2011); see USSG app. C., amend. 756 (effective Nov. 1, 2011).
We affirm.
When rendering a sentence, the district court “must
adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful
appellate review and to promote the perception of fair
sentencing.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).
However, a district court is not required to discuss the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) sentencing factors in a checklist
fashion. United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir.
2006). Furthermore, “[w]hen imposing a sentence within the
Guidelines, . . . the explanation need not be elaborate or
lengthy.” United States v. Hernandez, 603 F.3d 267, 271 (4th
Cir. 2010).
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On appeal, we review a sentence, “whether inside, just
outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range[] under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall, 552 U.S. at
41. Because Jimenez did not object below to the adequacy of the
district court’s explanation for the sentence it imposed, our
review is for plain error. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572,
577-78 (4th Cir. 2010); see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725, 731-32 (1993) (detailing plain error standard).
After review of the sentencing transcript and the
parties’ briefs, we conclude that the district court adequately
explained its imposition of a three-year term of supervised
release. The court considered Jimenez’ extensive criminal
history and prior unauthorized entries into the United States as
well as the § 3553(a) factors. The court particularly condemned
Jimenez’ acts of domestic violence, one of which occurred
shortly after Jimenez was shown leniency by immigration
officials. Taking the facts and circumstances of Jimenez’ case
into consideration, the court created a special condition of
release, a prohibition against unauthorized reentry, and clearly
explained the additional penalties if Jimenez violates the
condition. Although the court did not specifically tie the
§ 3553(a) factors to the term of supervised release in a
checklist manner, it is apparent that the court considered the
specific facts and circumstances of Jimenez’ case and found that
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an added measure of deterrence was needed. Because the district
court thoroughly explained its reasons for the imposition of a
three-year term of supervised release, we conclude that the
district court committed no procedural error. *
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
*
Alternatively, Jimenez asserts that the district court
should have explained why it imposed the maximum term of
supervised release, as opposed to a lesser amount of time. We
conclude that the same explanation that supported imposing a
term of supervised release in the first instance is similarly
adequate to explain the length of the term of supervised release
deemed appropriate by the district court.
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