United States v. Abraham Jimenez-Manuel

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4227

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ABRAHAM JIMENEZ-MANUEL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:11-cr-00259-HEH-1)

Submitted: October 2, 2012 Decided: October 9, 2012

Before MOTZ, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Valencia D.
Roberts, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant,
Appellate Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H.
MacBride, United States Attorney, S. David Schiller, Assistant
United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Abraham Jimenez-Manuel (“Jimenez”) pled guilty to

illegal reentry after removal as a convicted felon, in violation

of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(1) (2006). The district court

sentenced him to twenty-one months’ imprisonment and a term of

three years’ supervised release. On appeal, Jimenez challenges

the procedural reasonableness of the sentence, contending that

the district court failed to adequately explain the imposition

of a three-year term of supervised release when he was to be

deported after serving his term of imprisonment. See U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 5D1.1(c) & cmt. n.5

(2011); see USSG app. C., amend. 756 (effective Nov. 1, 2011).

We affirm.

When rendering a sentence, the district court “must

adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful

appellate review and to promote the perception of fair

sentencing.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).

However, a district court is not required to discuss the 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) sentencing factors in a checklist

fashion. United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir.

2006). Furthermore, “[w]hen imposing a sentence within the

Guidelines, . . . the explanation need not be elaborate or

lengthy.” United States v. Hernandez, 603 F.3d 267, 271 (4th

Cir. 2010).

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 On appeal, we review a sentence, “whether inside, just

outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range[] under a

deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall, 552 U.S. at

41. Because Jimenez did not object below to the adequacy of the

district court’s explanation for the sentence it imposed, our

review is for plain error. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572,

577-78 (4th Cir. 2010); see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.

725, 731-32 (1993) (detailing plain error standard).

After review of the sentencing transcript and the

parties’ briefs, we conclude that the district court adequately

explained its imposition of a three-year term of supervised

release. The court considered Jimenez’ extensive criminal

history and prior unauthorized entries into the United States as

well as the § 3553(a) factors. The court particularly condemned

Jimenez’ acts of domestic violence, one of which occurred

shortly after Jimenez was shown leniency by immigration

officials. Taking the facts and circumstances of Jimenez’ case

into consideration, the court created a special condition of

release, a prohibition against unauthorized reentry, and clearly

explained the additional penalties if Jimenez violates the

condition. Although the court did not specifically tie the

§ 3553(a) factors to the term of supervised release in a

checklist manner, it is apparent that the court considered the

specific facts and circumstances of Jimenez’ case and found that

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an added measure of deterrence was needed. Because the district

court thoroughly explained its reasons for the imposition of a

three-year term of supervised release, we conclude that the

district court committed no procedural error. *

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

*
Alternatively, Jimenez asserts that the district court
should have explained why it imposed the maximum term of
supervised release, as opposed to a lesser amount of time. We
conclude that the same explanation that supported imposing a
term of supervised release in the first instance is similarly
adequate to explain the length of the term of supervised release
deemed appropriate by the district court.

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