UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1619
BETTY W. HART,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
HANOVER COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD; MICHAEL R. ASHBY, SR.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District
Judge. (3:10-cv-00794-JRS)
Submitted: January 27, 2012 Decided: October 12, 2012
Before KING and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
David R. Simonsen, Jr., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.
Yvonne S. Wellford, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Hanover,
Virginia, Bradford A. King, THOMPSONMCMULLAN, P.C., Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Betty W. Hart, who was previously employed by the
Hanover County School Board (“the Board”), filed a complaint
against the Board and its Director of Pupil Transportation,
Michael Ashby, asserting that her employment was terminated in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-
219 (West 1998 & Supp. 2011). Hart asserts that the district
court erred when it granted Defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss her complaint for failure to state a claim.
Hart also asserts that the district court erred when it refused
to reconsider its dismissal order, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e), and dismissed her Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) motion to amend
the complaint as moot. Although we discern no error in the
district court’s order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss,
we conclude that the district court erred when it denied her
motions to amend and for reconsideration.
This court reviews de novo a district court’s order
dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, assuming
that all well-pleaded nonconclusory factual allegations in the
complaint are true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79
(2009); Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 391 (4th Cir.
2011). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion .
. . does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief
2
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(internal quotations marks, alterations and citations omitted).
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level[.]” Id. Given the allegations in
Hart’s original complaint, we conclude that the district court
did not err in granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See
Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)
(holding that adverse action taken twenty months after protected
activity “suggests, by itself, no causality at all”); Causey v.
Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803 (4th Cir. 1998) (“A thirteen month
interval between the charge and termination is too long to
establish causation absent other evidence of retaliation.”).
We nonetheless vacate the district court’s order
denying Hart’s motions for reconsideration and to amend her
complaint. Rule 15(a) requires that “leave to amend a pleading
should be denied only when the amendment would be prejudicial to
the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the
moving party, or the amendment would be futile.” Johnson v.
Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986) (construing
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
“Delay alone, however, is an insufficient reason to
deny the plaintiff’s motion to amend.” Laber v. Harvey, 438
3
F.3d 404, 427 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc). “For this reason, a
district court may not deny such a motion simply because it has
entered judgment against the plaintiff—be it a judgment of
dismissal, a summary judgment, or a judgment after a trial on
the merits.” Id. “Instead, a post-judgment motion to amend is
evaluated under the same legal standard as a similar motion
filed before judgment was entered—for prejudice, bad faith, or
futility.” Id.
As this court recognized in Laber and recently
reiterated in Katyle v. Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462,
470-71 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 115 (2011), the only
difference between a pre- and a post-judgment motion to amend is
that the district court may not grant the post-judgment motion
unless the judgment is vacated pursuant to Rule 59(e) or Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b). See Katyle, 637 F.3d at 470; Laber, 438 F.3d at
427. “To determine whether vacatur is warranted, however, the
court need not concern itself with either of those rules’ legal
standards.” Katyle, 637 F.3d at 471. Rather, “[t]he court need
only ask whether the amendment should be granted, just as it
would on a prejudgment motion to amend pursuant to [Rule]
15(a).” Id.; see also Laber, 438 F.3d at 426-29 (analyzing
whether the district court erred in denying a post-judgment
motion to amend under the more liberal motion to amend standard,
rather than the more stringent Rule 59(e) standard, and
4
concluding that the district court erred in denying the Rule
59(e) motion because the plaintiff did not act in bad faith, the
amendment was not futile, and the defendant would not be
prejudiced). We review for abuse of discretion a district
court’s denial of a motion to amend a complaint, regardless of
whether that motion is filed pre- or post-judgment. Laber, 438
F.3d at 427-28.
The only reason the district court gave for denying
Hart’s motion to amend was that the motion was moot because Hart
could not establish she was entitled to have the district
court’s final judgment vacated under Rule 59(e); the district
court did not consider whether Hart’s amended complaint would be
prejudicial, futile, or was made in bad faith. See Johnson, 785
F.2d at 509. We conclude that the district court’s failure to
properly analyze Hart’s motion to amend was an abuse of
discretion. See Murrow Furn. Galleries, Inc. v. Thomasville
Furn. Indus., Inc., 889 F.2d 524, 526 n.3, 529-30 (4th Cir.
1989) (recognizing that district court’s denial of Rule 59(e)
motion effectively denied the Rule 15(a) motion, but ultimately
vacating district court’s denial of the Rule 15(a) motion
because the district court failed to give a reason for the
denial using the standards for granting a Rule 15(a) motion).
Accordingly, there are sufficient grounds to vacate the district
court’s order to the extent it denied Hart’s Rule 59(e) motion.
5
See Laber, 438 F.3d at 428; see also Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund,
LP v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (“A
conclusion that the district court abused its discretion in
denying a motion to amend . . . is sufficient grounds on which
to reverse the district court’s denial of a Rule 59(e) motion.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, although we affirm the district court’s order
granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss Hart’s original
complaint, we vacate the district court’s order denying Hart’s
Rule 59(e) and Rule 15(a) motions. We remand this matter to the
district court so it may determine, in the first instance,
whether Hart is entitled to amend her complaint under Rule 15(a)
(i.e., whether the amendment would prejudice Defendants, whether
the amendment was made in bad faith, and whether the amendment
would be futile). * We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED IN PART
AND REMANDED
*
By this disposition, we indicate no view as to the
ultimate resolution of Hart’s motions.
6