United States v. Derrick Shuron

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4153

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

DERRICK SHURON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:11-cr-00045-RDB-1)

Submitted: October 11, 2012 Decided: October 15, 2012

Before KING, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.

Dwight E. Crawley, LAW OFFICE OF DWIGHT E. CRAWLEY, Washington,
DC, for Appellant. John Walter Sippel, Jr., Assistant United
States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Derrick Shuron pled guilty to one count of possession

of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) (2006). In his plea agreement, Shuron waived the

right to appeal his conviction and sentence, reserving only the

right to appeal a sentence greater than 100 months. Pursuant to

his Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) agreement with the Government,

Shuron was sentenced to 100 months’ imprisonment. Shuron

appealed.

Shuron’s counsel has filed a brief in accordance

with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that

there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, but questioning

whether Shuron’s guilty plea was valid under Rule 11 and whether

the district court properly sentenced Shuron. Shuron has filed

a pro se supplemental brief challenging the validity of his

guilty plea and additionally contesting a four-point sentencing

enhancement and the sentencing court’s reliance on the

presentence report. The Government has moved to dismiss

Shuron’s appeal to the extent that the issues he raises fall

within the scope of his plea agreement’s waiver of appellate

rights. For the following reasons, we grant the Government’s

motion for partial dismissal, dismiss in part, and affirm in

part.

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Pursuant to a plea agreement, a defendant may waive

his appellate rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006). United

States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2010). A valid

waiver will preclude appeal of a given issue if the issue is

within the scope of the waiver. United States v. Blick, 408

F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005). The validity of an appellate

waiver is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. “The

validity of an appeal waiver depends on whether the defendant

knowingly and intelligently agreed to waive the right to

appeal.” Id. at 169.

Here, the district court fully complied with Rule 11

when accepting Shuron’s plea, ensuring that Shuron understood

the rights he was relinquishing by pleading guilty and the

sentence he faced, that Shuron committed the offense to which he

was pleading, and that Shuron was aware of the limits his plea

would place on his appellate rights. Given no indication to the

contrary, we find that Shuron’s appellate waiver is valid and

enforceable. Moreover, under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(c), a defendant’s

appeal of a sentence to which he stipulated in a Rule

11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is limited to circumstances where

“his sentence was imposed in violation of law [or] was imposed

as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing

guidelines.” United States v. Sanchez, 146 F.3d 796, 797 (10th

Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted;

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alteration in original). Accordingly, we grant the Government’s

motion for partial dismissal, dismissing Shuron’s appeal of his

sentence.

But even a valid waiver of appellate rights will not

foreclose a colorable constitutional challenge to the

voluntariness of a guilty plea. See, e.g., United States v.

Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 732–33 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1994). Accordingly,

Shuron’s appellate waiver does not foreclose our review of the

knowing and voluntary nature of his guilty plea. Because Shuron

did not move to withdraw his guilty plea, however, we review his

Rule 11 hearing for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277

F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). As noted above, the district

court fully complied with Rule 11 when accepting Shuron’s guilty

plea, and, therefore, we find no reason to question its

validity. See United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th

Cir. 1992) (en banc).

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the

record, mindful of the scope of the appellate waiver, and have

found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the

appeal in part and dismiss in part. This court requires that

counsel inform Shuron, in writing, of his right to petition the

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If

Shuron requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes

that such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in

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this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s

motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Shuron. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART