UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4153
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DERRICK SHURON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:11-cr-00045-RDB-1)
Submitted: October 11, 2012 Decided: October 15, 2012
Before KING, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Dwight E. Crawley, LAW OFFICE OF DWIGHT E. CRAWLEY, Washington,
DC, for Appellant. John Walter Sippel, Jr., Assistant United
States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Derrick Shuron pled guilty to one count of possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2006). In his plea agreement, Shuron waived the
right to appeal his conviction and sentence, reserving only the
right to appeal a sentence greater than 100 months. Pursuant to
his Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) agreement with the Government,
Shuron was sentenced to 100 months’ imprisonment. Shuron
appealed.
Shuron’s counsel has filed a brief in accordance
with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that
there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, but questioning
whether Shuron’s guilty plea was valid under Rule 11 and whether
the district court properly sentenced Shuron. Shuron has filed
a pro se supplemental brief challenging the validity of his
guilty plea and additionally contesting a four-point sentencing
enhancement and the sentencing court’s reliance on the
presentence report. The Government has moved to dismiss
Shuron’s appeal to the extent that the issues he raises fall
within the scope of his plea agreement’s waiver of appellate
rights. For the following reasons, we grant the Government’s
motion for partial dismissal, dismiss in part, and affirm in
part.
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Pursuant to a plea agreement, a defendant may waive
his appellate rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006). United
States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2010). A valid
waiver will preclude appeal of a given issue if the issue is
within the scope of the waiver. United States v. Blick, 408
F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005). The validity of an appellate
waiver is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. “The
validity of an appeal waiver depends on whether the defendant
knowingly and intelligently agreed to waive the right to
appeal.” Id. at 169.
Here, the district court fully complied with Rule 11
when accepting Shuron’s plea, ensuring that Shuron understood
the rights he was relinquishing by pleading guilty and the
sentence he faced, that Shuron committed the offense to which he
was pleading, and that Shuron was aware of the limits his plea
would place on his appellate rights. Given no indication to the
contrary, we find that Shuron’s appellate waiver is valid and
enforceable. Moreover, under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(c), a defendant’s
appeal of a sentence to which he stipulated in a Rule
11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is limited to circumstances where
“his sentence was imposed in violation of law [or] was imposed
as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing
guidelines.” United States v. Sanchez, 146 F.3d 796, 797 (10th
Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted;
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alteration in original). Accordingly, we grant the Government’s
motion for partial dismissal, dismissing Shuron’s appeal of his
sentence.
But even a valid waiver of appellate rights will not
foreclose a colorable constitutional challenge to the
voluntariness of a guilty plea. See, e.g., United States v.
Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 732–33 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1994). Accordingly,
Shuron’s appellate waiver does not foreclose our review of the
knowing and voluntary nature of his guilty plea. Because Shuron
did not move to withdraw his guilty plea, however, we review his
Rule 11 hearing for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277
F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). As noted above, the district
court fully complied with Rule 11 when accepting Shuron’s guilty
plea, and, therefore, we find no reason to question its
validity. See United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th
Cir. 1992) (en banc).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the
record, mindful of the scope of the appellate waiver, and have
found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the
appeal in part and dismiss in part. This court requires that
counsel inform Shuron, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Shuron requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in
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this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Shuron. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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