UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4072
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RODNEY PALMER,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge.
(2:10-cr-00280-DCN-1)
Submitted: October 9, 2012 Decided: October 17, 2012
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael Chesser, Aiken, South Carolina, for Appellant. William
N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Susan Z. Hitt, Assistant
United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rodney Palmer appeals his conviction after a guilty
plea to using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a
drug trafficking crime and a crime of violence, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006). On appeal, Palmer contends
that the district court impermissibly participated in plea
negotiations by initiating plea discussions, advising Palmer
that he would be better off pleading guilty, suggesting he would
receive a life sentence if he went to trial, and commenting
favorably on the Government’s evidence. Palmer also contends
that the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea because the court’s participation in the plea
negotiations rendered his plea involuntary. We affirm.
Rule 11(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure “governs guilty pleas and clearly prohibits a court
from participating in plea negotiations.” United States v.
Bradley, 455 F.3d 452, 460 (4th Cir. 2006). Because this issue
was not raised below, review is for plain error, United
States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002), and
Palmer must show that any errors affected his substantial
rights. United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th
Cir. 2009). After reviewing the record and briefs, we conclude
that the district court did not impermissibly participate in
plea negotiations. The court’s comments at the pretrial status
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hearing cannot be construed as coercing Palmer into pleading
guilty; rather, they were all made in the context of evaluating
whether to relieve Palmer’s second court-appointed counsel and
to warn Palmer not to take his decision to replace court-
appointed counsel lightly. Furthermore, Palmer’s contention
that the court coerced him into pleading guilty is belied by his
entering into the plea agreement four months after the status
hearing and acknowledging in his plea colloquy that he was not
coerced into pleading guilty. See Fields v. Attorney Gen., 956
F.2d 1290, 1299 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that, “[a]bsent clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary, a defendant is bound by
the representations he makes under oath during a plea
colloquy”).
Turning to Palmer’s motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, we review the district court’s denial of the motion for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421,
424 (4th Cir. 2000). A defendant bears the burden of “show[ing]
a fair and just reason” for the withdrawal of his guilty plea.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). Having determined that the
district court here did not impermissibly participate in the
plea negotiations, we also conclude that the court’s failure to
inform Palmer he could persist in his plea of not guilty, see
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(B), did not affect his substantial
rights, that Palmer did not credibly assert his legal innocence,
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and that Palmer had close assistance of competent counsel.
Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Palmer’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See United
States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991) (listing
factors for court to consider in evaluating motion to withdraw
guilty plea); see also United States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d 1145,
1154 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that first, second, and fourth
Moore factors are most significant).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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