United States v. Rodney Palmer

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4072

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

RODNEY PALMER,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge.
(2:10-cr-00280-DCN-1)

Submitted: October 9, 2012 Decided: October 17, 2012

Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael Chesser, Aiken, South Carolina, for Appellant. William
N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Susan Z. Hitt, Assistant
United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Rodney Palmer appeals his conviction after a guilty

plea to using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a

drug trafficking crime and a crime of violence, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006). On appeal, Palmer contends

that the district court impermissibly participated in plea

negotiations by initiating plea discussions, advising Palmer

that he would be better off pleading guilty, suggesting he would

receive a life sentence if he went to trial, and commenting

favorably on the Government’s evidence. Palmer also contends

that the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw

his guilty plea because the court’s participation in the plea

negotiations rendered his plea involuntary. We affirm.

Rule 11(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure “governs guilty pleas and clearly prohibits a court

from participating in plea negotiations.” United States v.

Bradley, 455 F.3d 452, 460 (4th Cir. 2006). Because this issue

was not raised below, review is for plain error, United

States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002), and

Palmer must show that any errors affected his substantial

rights. United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th

Cir. 2009). After reviewing the record and briefs, we conclude

that the district court did not impermissibly participate in

plea negotiations. The court’s comments at the pretrial status

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hearing cannot be construed as coercing Palmer into pleading

guilty; rather, they were all made in the context of evaluating

whether to relieve Palmer’s second court-appointed counsel and

to warn Palmer not to take his decision to replace court-

appointed counsel lightly. Furthermore, Palmer’s contention

that the court coerced him into pleading guilty is belied by his

entering into the plea agreement four months after the status

hearing and acknowledging in his plea colloquy that he was not

coerced into pleading guilty. See Fields v. Attorney Gen., 956

F.2d 1290, 1299 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that, “[a]bsent clear

and convincing evidence to the contrary, a defendant is bound by

the representations he makes under oath during a plea

colloquy”).

Turning to Palmer’s motion to withdraw his guilty

plea, we review the district court’s denial of the motion for

abuse of discretion. United States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421,

424 (4th Cir. 2000). A defendant bears the burden of “show[ing]

a fair and just reason” for the withdrawal of his guilty plea.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). Having determined that the

district court here did not impermissibly participate in the

plea negotiations, we also conclude that the court’s failure to

inform Palmer he could persist in his plea of not guilty, see

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(B), did not affect his substantial

rights, that Palmer did not credibly assert his legal innocence,

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and that Palmer had close assistance of competent counsel.

Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Palmer’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See United

States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991) (listing

factors for court to consider in evaluating motion to withdraw

guilty plea); see also United States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d 1145,

1154 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that first, second, and fourth

Moore factors are most significant).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED