FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 17 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 11-50059
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:09-cr-00490-SJO-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ROBERT TRINGHAM,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 9, 2012
Pasadena, California
Before: TROTT, KLEINFELD, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Robert Tringham appeals his conviction on several grounds: that the district
court abused its discretion in denying his motions for substitution of counsel and
for a continuance, that his Faretta waiver was invalid because it was coerced by
the court’s denial of his motions to substitute counsel, that cumulative error
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
violated his right to due process, that the court did not adequately inquire into a
witness’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and
that insufficient evidence supported his conviction on two counts. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Tringham
“failed to establish any conflict that would require the Court to substitute new
counsel.” The court questioned Tringham and his attorney “‘privately and in
depth’” about the issues Tringham raised. United States v. Nguyen, 262 F.3d 998,
1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). The disagreement between Tringham and
his attorney was over strategy, and “[i]t is well-settled . . . that this type of dispute
is not a sufficient conflict to warrant substitution of counsel.” United States v.
McKenna, 327 F.3d 830, 844 (9th Cir. 2003).
Because the district court did not err in denying Tringham’s motions to
substitute counsel, Tringham’s waiver of the right to counsel was voluntary. See
United States v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712, 715-16 (9th Cir. 1990).
Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Tringham’s motion
for a continuance upon granting his request to proceed pro se. Tringham did not
show prejudice resulting from the denial. See Armant v. Marquez, 772 F.2d 552,
556-57 (9th Cir. 1985). To the contrary, Tringham stated, “[T]he witnesses that we
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didn’t get and the witness evidence that we haven’t seen . . . . I do not think that
it’s maybe a deal breaker if I don’t get it.”
Because Tringham did not establish that the district court erred on any of his
individual claims, “cumulative error is simply inapplicable.” United States v.
Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1256 (9th Cir. 2004).
Contrary to Tringham’s assertions, the district court did not allow his
witness to make a blanket invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. The witness invoked the privilege “in response to specific
questions.” United States v. Drollinger, 80 F.3d 389, 392 (9th Cir. 1996) (per
curiam) (citation omitted). It was “evident from the implications of the
question[s], in the setting in which [they were] asked, that a responsive answer to
the question[s] or an explanation of why [they could not] be answered might [have
been] dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.” United States v.
Flores-Blanco, 623 F.3d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951)).
Tringham’s sufficiency of the evidence claims fail because a “rational trier
of fact could have found the evidence sufficient” to convict him on counts eight
and nine. United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 1995).
AFFIRMED.
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