11-3552-cv
G.B. v. Tuxedo Union Free Sch. Dist.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL
RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
"SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY
PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New
York, on the 18th day of October, two thousand twelve.
PRESENT: DENNY CHIN,
RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
Circuit Judges.
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G.B., L.B., on behalf of their minor
child, N.B., and on their own behalf,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
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TUXEDO UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellant.*
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FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES: MARY JO WHATELEY (Michael H.
Sussman, on the brief), Sussman &
Watkins, Goshen, New York.
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: MARK CRAIG RUSHFIELD, Shaw,
Perelson, May & Lambert LLP,
Poughkeepsie, New York.
*
The Clerk of the Court is directed to revise the
official caption to conform to the above.
Appeal from a judgment dated August 15, 2011, of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York (Karas, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Defendant-appellant Tuxedo Union Free School District
(the "District") appeals from a judgment entered on August 15,
2011, in favor of plaintiffs-appellees G.B. and L.B., on behalf
of their daughter, N.B., and on their own behalf, on their claim
for tuition reimbursement under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., following (1)
the district court's September 30, 2010 order granting
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denying the
District's cross-motion for summary judgment; and (2) the
district court's August 12, 2011 order directing entry of
judgment for plaintiffs in the amount of $71,041.25. We assume
the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the
procedural history of the case, and the issues presented for
review.
We review de novo a district court's award of summary
judgment in an IDEA case. A.C. ex rel. M.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 553
F.3d 165, 171 (2d Cir. 2009). In doing so, we recognize that
"the role of the federal courts in reviewing state educational
decisions under the IDEA is 'circumscribed.'" Gagliardo v.
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2007)
(quoting Muller ex rel. Muller v. Comm. on Special Educ., 145
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F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1998)). Although we must conduct an
independent review of the administrative record and make a
determination based on a preponderance of the evidence, we must
give due weight to the administrative proceedings, mindful that
the judiciary lacks the expertise necessary to resolve difficult
questions of educational policy. See M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of
Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 240-41 (2d Cir. 2012).
In determining whether parents who challenge a proposed
Individualized Education Program ("IEP") are entitled to
reimbursement for private school tuition, we first ask if the
proposed IEP was adequate to "afford the child an appropriate
public education." Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142
F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 1998). If the IEP was not adequate, we
then ask whether the private schooling obtained by the parents
was "appropriate to the child's needs." Id. An IEP is adequate
if (1) the state complied with the IDEA's procedural
requirements, and (2) the IEP is "reasonably calculated to enable
the child to receive educational benefits." Cerra v. Pawling
Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting
Walczak, 142 F.3d at 129) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
evaluating an IEP, we must also be mindful of the IDEA's
requirement that disabled children be placed in the "[l]east
restrictive environment," and educated "[t]o the maximum extent
appropriate" alongside their non-disabled peers. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(5); see also Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 108 (noting the
IDEA's "strong preference for 'mainstreaming'").
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We have conducted an independent and de novo review of
the record, and for substantially the reasons stated by the
district court in its thorough opinion of September 30, 2010, we
conclude that (1) the proposed IEPs for N.B. for the 2006-07 and
2007-08 school years were inadequate to afford N.B. an
appropriate public education in the least restrictive
environment, and (2) the private schooling obtained by plaintiffs
was appropriate to N.B.'s needs.
We have considered the District's remaining arguments
and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we hereby AFFIRM
the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
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